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Introduction and Motivation 
 
This  thesis  explores  the  relationship  between  macroeconomics  and  finance  from  an  empirical 
perspective. 
Macroeconomics  analyses  the  economy  as  a  whole  focusing  on  the  dynamics  of  aggregate 
quantities. It involves the analysis of different aspects of the economy; in this study we mainly 
consider the evolution of some key variables such as output, unemployment and inflation. A key 
issue in macroeconomic theory concerns the distinction between the short and the long run. Price 
stickiness characterizes the Keynesian world in the short run; while, all prices are assumed to be 
fully flexible in the long run, as stressed by the neo-classical doctrine. The temporal distinction is 
also important from a policy point of view. For instance, monetary policy actions display deferred 
effects on the economy; such a delay might procrastinate even several quarters depending on the 
phase of the business cycle. 
Modern finance develops methods and techniques with the aim of determining the fair price of any 
tradable  asset.  Although  challenging,  asset  pricing  theory  is  fascinating  since  it  implies  the 
existence of a metric to evaluate uncertainty. Fair pricing hinges on the possibility of identifying 
an objective,  rather than subjective, measure of risk. Risk is also a time factor. According to 
common wisdom, the longer the investment horizon, the greater the uncertainty, the higher the 
premium  required  by  investors.  The  term  structure  of  interest  rates,  which  is  a  core  subject 
throughout  the  thesis,  is  capable  of  capturing  the  aforementioned  chain;  bond  pricing  can  be 
viewed as a specific case of asset pricing. For instance, in Chapter 2 we claim that medium term 
maturities may reflect uncertainty more effectively than long maturities. In particular, long term 
bonds are risky when held over short horizons thus justifying a compensation for bearing risk 
required by investors.  
In this work the link between finance and macroeconomics is represented by the term structure of 
interest  rates,  since  its  shape  is  acknowledged  to reflect  agents’  expectations  about  the  future 
stance of monetary policy. While the short end of the term structure is directly influenced by the 
monetary authority decision of setting a target value for the policy rate, the dynamics of long term 
yields depends upon a great variety of factors. In particular, the propagation of the impulse to the 
short end of the term structure along the entire spectrum of maturities reflects agents expectations 
about future monetary policy interventions. The term structure of interest rates thus represents a 
crucial step of the monetary policy transmission, that is the mechanism through which monetary 
policy  affects  aggregate spending, i.e. the  real  economy. To summarize, the term structure of   7 
interest rates offers an effective opportunity of synthesizing the above mentioned macroeconomic 
distinction between the short and the long run. 
The importance of analyzing the link between macroeconomics and finance has been emphasized 
in recent contributions. Cochrane (2006) points out that there exists a close connection between 
finance, uncertainty, and the real economy. Recent research, in fact, has achieved a common view 
about the role played by the stochastic discount factor, which is used to price any asset in the 
economy.  Individuals  tackle  the  trade-off  between  saving  and  consuming  by  comparing  the 
marginal  utilities  of  present          future  consumption.  Therefore,  according  to  this  story  the 
decision of postponing consumption is equivalent to the choice of buying an asset today. The 
dynamics of the stochastic discount factor evolves consistently with the idea that people prefer 
holding an asset that performs greatly when they feel poor and consume little rather than when 
they feel rich and can afford luxurious good. Risk aversion thus reflects uncertainty and represents 
the link between financial theory and aggregate spending decisions.  
Applied  econometrics  has  become  more  and  more  sophisticated  in  recent  years  giving  the 
opportunity  of  deepening  the  analysis  of  the  macro-finance  environment.  The  importance  of 
instrumental  variables  estimation  and  the  diffusion  of  non  linear  methods  have  contributed  to 
enhance  the  quality  of  empirical  research.  In  this  work  we  make  extensive  use  of  non  linear 
models which we believe effective in emphasizing expectations. For instance, Kalman filtering is 
an appealing device to describe how rational agents adjust expectations in a Bayesian fashion as 
soon as new information becomes available.  
Hence, the thesis reserves a key role to expectations. In several parts of the thesis, in fact, we 
stigmatize the traditional dogma of rational expectations. The assumption of perfect and symmetric 
information, which is a side of rationality, seems extreme in social sciences; the idea of bounded 
rationality  (Simon,  1957)  suits  definitely  better.  Linear  models  fail  describing  agents’ 
expectations-based  approach;  while  empirical  methods  employed  in  this  work  handle  with 
expectations  in  various  ways.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  expectations  are  often  conditioned  to  the 
evolution of leading economic indicators. Alternatively, we emphasize the dynamic process of 
revisiting expectations when new information becomes available. We presume that an extensive 
use of non linear frameworks improves the analysis of information flows. 
The scrupulous attention dedicated to expectations in this work, and, more generally, in recent 
research,  derives  from  the  devastating  effect  of  the  Lucas  (1976)  critique.  Lucas  argued  that 
parameter estimates of macroeconometric models are unstable because of rational expectations; in 
particular, parameters are unlikely to remain invariant since they depend on agents’ expectations 
about policy actions. Two sources of instability can be identified. On the one hand, the socio-  8 
economic environment is variable over time; on the other hand, policymakers can change their 
preferences. Expectations have become such a relevant issue in macroeconomic theory that it is 
now common practice for the  monetary authority to monitor private sector expectations.   
This  thesis  contributes  to  the  advancements  of  applied  macro-finance  research  in  different 
directions. First, we provide an extensive analysis of the term structure of interest rates. From a 
financial point of view we are interested to check the strength of the expectations hypothesis, 
which has always been doubted in empirical studies. From a macroeconomic perspective, instead, 
we aim at highlighting the relationships between the yield curve, monetary policy and real activity.  
Second, we provide a deep analysis of the term structure of interest rates. We analyze not only the 
overall dynamics of the yield curve, but we also focus on its underlying factors. In particular, we 
assess  whether  the  latent  factors  of  the  term  structure  have  a  reasonable  macroeconomic 
counterpart. Third, we test the predictive ability of the yield spread in different contexts. The slope 
of the yield curve is believed to carry information regarding the future evolution of both interest 
rates  and  macroeconomic  variables,  since  it  reflects  agents’  expectations  about  the  incoming 
monetary policy stance. Fourth, we exploit the informative content of the slope of the yield curve 
to determine under which circumstances the  Lucas (1973) hypothesis dominates the Friedman 
(1977) hypothesis. Finally, we assess the predictive content of risk premia and their volatility. 
Examining the term structure of interest rates, or the yield curve, is equivalent to dealing with 
bond pricing since bond prices are just the expected value of the discount factor (Cochrane, 2006). 
In absence of uncertainty the discount factor merely matches the yield to maturity. Bond pricing is 
a recurrent theme in the macro-finance literature for several reasons (Piazzesi, 2003). Monetary 
policy is the first reason since monetary policy actions can only affect the short end of the yield 
curve,  while  aggregate  spending  decisions  are  more  closely  related  to  long  term  yields.  The 
monetary transmission mechanism thus is accomplished through yield curve’s movements. Fiscal 
policy is the second reason as long as the Treasury has to manage the maturity structure of public 
debt. Forecasting is a third issue since long term yields are risk-adjusted expectations of short 
yields;  hence,  the  yield  spread,  and,  more  generally,  the  term  structure,  contains  valuable 
information about the future evolution of the economy. Finally, understanding the dynamics of the 
term  structure  of  interest  rates  is  crucial  for  pricing  derivative  securities;  moreover,  financial 
engineering exploits the dynamics of interest rates for hedging risk. 
Recent research has analyzed bond pricing in macroeconomic settings; in particular, a strand of the 
macro-finance  literature  has  focused  on  the  interpretation  of  three  unobservable  component 
underlying the term structure of interest rates, namely level, slope, and curvature (Litterman and 
Scheinkman, 1991). Three factors, in fact, are enough to explain almost all movements of the yield   9 
curve over time. The level is usually associated to the medium term inflation rate targeted by the 
monetary  authority.  The  slope  reflects  the  dynamics  of  the  policy  rate  set  by  the  monetary 
authority in response to changing conditions of the economy. So far more controversial has been 
the interpretation of curvature.  In Chapter 2 we show evidence that curvature may  reflect the 
cyclical fluctuations of the economy. In particular, data evidence suggests that a negative shock to 
curvature seems either to anticipate or to accompany a slowdown in economic activity. To show 
results are robust we also develop and estimate a structural macroeconometric model for curvature 
and industrial production.    
The informative content of the term structure of interest rates has been traditionally examined to 
test the expectations hypothesis. In Chapter 3 we exploit the potentiality of non linear models to 
tackle typical weaknesses affecting the empirical test of the expectations hypothesis such as time 
variation in term premia, risk aversion, monetary policy uncertainty. In line with Campbell (1995) 
and Thornton (2005), data evidence suggests that the variance of term premia        rationally 
expected yields’ changes and the variance of long to short term yields respectively matter in the 
corroboration of the expectations hypothesis. Moreover, we find evidence that the informative 
content of the yield spread about future economic activity is contingent to the magnitude of term 
premia; in particular, the slope of the term structure tends to anticipate fast economic growth when 
actual term premia are low. Finally, results highlight that the ability of the yield spread to predict 
future inflation depends on uncertainty regarding the incoming monetary policy stance.    
Time  variation  in  term  premia  is  a  crucial  issue  in  chapter  4.  Several  contributions  have 
emphasized the role of both the yield spread and the term premium to predict future economic 
activity. Hamilton and Kim (2002) have also investigated whether interest rate volatility is useful 
to predict future GDP growth. We continue along the path traced by previous research since we 
explore  the  possibility  that  the  conditional  volatility  of  term  premia  forecast  errors  contains 
valuable information to infer the future dynamics of industrial production. We find evidence that 
term  premia  conditional  variance  helps  to  predict  future  real  activity.  We  speculate  that  the 
variability of term premia might capture a pessimistic sentiment akin to financial distress. 
Finally, we wish to examine whether empirical evidence contrarian to the Lucas’ view, that there 
is an inverse relationship between the variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of output 
response to nominal shocks, might be revisited in light of the information content of the term 
structure of interest rates. In particular we find evidence supporting the Lucas (1973) conjecture 
when the yield curve is either flat or downward sloping. On the other hand, data evidence tends to 
corroborate the alternative Friedman (1977) hypothesis, that the variability of inflation reduces the 
level of output, when the term structure has a positive slope.   10 
The structure of the thesis is the following. Chapter 1 contains an extensive review of the literature 
about the analysis of the term structure of interest rates. Chapter 2 focuses on the macroeconomic 
interpretation of the unobservable components of the term structure. We revisit recent evidence 
and  propose  an  appealing  and  original  interpretation  of  curvature.  Chapter  3  focuses  on  the 
expectations hypothesis and the predictive ability of the yield spread. Data evidence suggest that 
the ability of the term structure of being informative about future yields’ movements depends on 
the  level  of  term  premia.  In  Chapter  4  we  provide  evidence  suggesting  that  the  conditional 
volatility of term premia contains valuable information to infer the future evolution of economic 
activity. Chapter 5 is an empirical assessment of the Lucas hypothesis that there is an inverse 
correlation  between  the  variance  of  nominal  shocks  and  the  magnitude  of  output  response  to 
nominal shocks.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
The Term Structure of Interest Rates and the Economy: 
a Survey of the Literature 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this chapter is to offer a mere, but extensive, review of the analysis of the term structure 
of  interest  rates,  its  relation  with  monetary  policy  and,  more  generally,  with  macroeconomics. 
Several empirical studies are presented in order to highlight how the examination of the yield curve 
has evolved over time. A lot of technical works and many scientific contributions about the term 
structure have appeared in journals and on the web, therefore the selection has been challenging. 
Academic contributions on the yield curve have mostly focused on the empirical analysis of the 
expectations hypothesis. After a brief description of financial theories underlying the term structure 
of interest rates, we discuss the empirical work by Campbell and Shiller (                       
       , 1991). This is the first study that provides with a complete inspection of the entire spectrum 
of maturities; the main conclusion seems paradoxical “                                              
                                                                                                     
                                                                                 ”. The survey of the 
literature continues investigating how important the role of term premia is in the empirical analysis 
of the expectations hypothesis. Finally, we examine the relation between the yield curve, monetary 
regimes, and macroeconomic variables. 
 
   12 
1.1   Introduction 
 
The term structure of interest rates is believed to carry useful information regarding the future state of the 
economy. The shape of the yield curve, in fact, reflects agents’ expectations about the incoming 
stance of monetary policy. Policy interventions mostly affect the short end of the yield curve, while 
movements  in  long  term  yields  are  determined  by  a  complex  combination  of  factors.  Hence, 
examining the term structure (henceforth TS) primarily means to find a link between short and long 
rates. The expectations hypothesis (hereafter EH) is an appealing attempt to address this issue. The 
theory suggests that the yield spread should anticipate future yields movements. Unfortunately, EH 
has almost always been rejected in empirical studies; in particular, data do not seem to support the 
idea that forward rates can be implicitly derived by projecting spot yields into the future. Data 
evidence in support of EH is so weak that is not unreasonable to wonder whether “                
                       ” (Macaulay, 1938).  
In early studies authors focused on the empirical examination of EH at short horizons; then they 
moved on exploring more distant maturities. Former contributions have been methodological as well 
as empirical; economists and econometricians have figured out appropriate techniques for testing EH. 
For  instance,  Mishkin  (1988)  has  emphasized  the  importance  of  using  appropriate  covariance 
matrices to perform consistent inference in presence of overlapping residuals.  
The lack of empirical support for EH has inspired plenty of studies. Time-varying term premia, as 
well as model misspecification have been proposed as possible explanations of the aforementioned 
“anomaly”. EH contrarian evidence might also depend on change in risk perception, issues related 
to  relative  assets  supply,  measurement  errors,  irrational  rather  than  rational  agents’  behaviour, 
overreaction of long rates to expected changes in short rates. Non linearity in the EH equation has 
also been advocated to justify the empirical rejection of the expectations theory. 
Abandoned  the  mere  financial  perspective,  researchers  have  turned  to  the  interesting  field  of 
forecasting  macroeconomic  variables  by  exploiting  the  information  content  of  the  yield  curve 
(Estrella and Mishkin, 1997; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). On the same wavelength empirical 
research has evolved by considering the possibility that term premia, rather than the yield spread, 
are informative about macro variables.  
Modelling the interaction between macroeconomic and financial variables has become more and 
more sophisticated in recent  years. Bonds are priced by  means of affine models,  and the term 
structure dynamics is typically investigated either in small macro-finance models or in non linear 
frameworks. Financial economists have finally developed a parallel strand of literature regarding 
the investigation of term premia’s macroeconomic determinants.   13 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Theories of the term structure are presented in 
Section  1.2.  Section  1.3  discusses  some  empirical  works.  In  Section  1.4  we  present  evidence 
regarding the relation between TS and monetary regimes. Section 1.5 is dedicated to time-varying 
term premia. Section 1.6 offers a brief summary about the ability of both the spread and the term 
premium to predict macroeconomic variables. Finally, in Section 1.7 the most recent macro-finance 
literature is discussed.  
 
 
 
1.2   The Term Structure of Interest Rates and the Expectations Hypothesis 
 
Four basic theories have been proposed to explain yields dynamics over time: the expectations 
hypothesis, preference for liquidity, market segmentation, and, finally, preferred habitat.  
The pure expectations hypothesis
1 (PEH) moves from a number of simplifying assumptions: risk 
neutral agents with rational expectations, liquid markets, absence of transaction costs, perfect and 
symmetric  information.  PEH  states  that  forward  (implicit)  rates  are  the  best  forecast  of  future 
interest rates; or, equivalently, that forward rates equal the market expectations of future spot rates.  
Few equivalent statements define EH (Cochrane, 2006). a) the  -period yield can be expressed as 
the average of expected future    -period yields; b) forward rates equal expected future spot rates; 
c) expected holding period returns are equal on bond of all maturities. The long term  -period rate 
 
     is a weighted average of short term  -period rates 
 
       +  (  is a constant term premium): 
 
( )      
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
      
 
  + 




 = ∑
−
=
+
0
                                                                                                              (1.1) 
  
Forward rates are, up to a constant, unbiased predictor of future realized spot rates implying that if 
investors observe an upward sloping yield curve they would expect short rates to rise in the future. 
In this vein, EH represents essentially a no-arbitrage condition. No profitable opportunities exist in 
the bond market since the long/short spread precisely anticipates the evolution over time of short 
rates.  A  simple  example  can  clarify  this  concept.  Any  investor  can  implement  two  alternative 
trading strategies that cover the same horizon length. The first is a          strategy: the investor 
buys a zero-coupon (pure discount) bond and holds it till its expiration date; the rate of return of this 
riskless action equals the bond’s yield to maturity. The second strategy is a          : the investor 
buys  a  bond  and  sells  it  before  maturity;  the  money  obtained,  uncertain  in  the  amount,  are 
immediately invested in a new bond with the same maturity date of the bond just sold. In perfect 
                                                 
1 Following Lutz (1940) we distinguish PEH from EH. The pure version of EH states that the expected excess return is simply zero; 
EH, instead, assumes that it is constant over time.   14 
financial markets both strategies must guarantee the same rate of return ruling out any arbitrage. In 
the latter case, when a bond is sold before maturity, the holding period return may differ from its 
yield to maturity, i.e. the investor take a risk. In the former case, instead, the investor knows with 
certainty that the bond price at maturity will equal its face value; the holding period return exactly 
matches the  yield to maturity. If during the life of a zero-coupon security an unexpected price 
change takes place, the investors would expect some form of compensation, for instance a price 
change in the opposite  direction in the  future  (before the bond  expires). Variations in nominal 
returns on a given bond are thus negatively correlated, and hence forecastable. The basic reasoning 
behind EH is that two equivalent investment options should offer the same expected return; if not, 
investors may well arbitrage away any difference. The relation tying the yield to maturity and the 
instantaneous forward rate at that specific maturity is analogous to that linking the average and 
marginal costs. Whenever the marginal cost curve (spot forward rates) is below the average cost 
curve (yield to maturity), average cost decreases. Conversely, if forward rates are high relative to 
the yield to maturity, the yield to maturity is expected to raise. This is because the yield to maturity 
represents the cost of borrowing, while forward rates measure the cost of extending the loan a 
period further. It can be shown that the  -period ahead instantaneous forward rate equals the yield 
on a  -period ZCB plus   times the slope of the yield curve to maturity.  
Different theories explain how interest rates evolve over time. The preference for liquidity (Hicks
2) 
posits  that  risk  averse  investors  prefer  short  to  long  term  investments;  agents  thus  require  an 
incentive, a positive liquidity premium, to invest on long horizons. Market segmentation (Culbertson
2) 
implies that the bond market is split into different sections each characterized by trading activity put 
forward by investors with different preferences about the horizon’s length. Assets are not perfect 
substitutes and TS is determined by equilibria achieved independently at each maturity. Preferred 
habitat (Modigliani and Sutch
2) is a particular case of market segmentation. Both borrowers and 
lenders  compare  long  and  short  rates  before  deciding  which  strategy  they  should  implement. 
Moving  into  a  particular  maturity  set  depends  only  on  expected  profitability.  The  more 
homogeneous the  expectations, the closer the  model to PEH. With heterogeneous  expectations, 
instead, there is a significant mismatch between demand and supply of financial assets; hence, a 
liquidity premium is necessary since investors claim a compensation for adapting preferences. 
Research regarding the term structure has evolved in continuous time, where TS models represent 
an advanced area of application of financial theory. We briefly present affine models since later we 
estimate a discrete-time affine model to derive the latent components of the yield curve (Chapter 2). 
                                                 
2 J. R. Hicks,                  , (1946). Culbertson J.,                                     , (1957), in Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Modigliani F., Sutch R.,                                     (1966), in American Economic Review; also Modigliani, R. 
J. Shiller, I                                                                          (1973), in Economica.   15 
Cox,  Ingersoll,  and  Ross  (1985)  derive  a  continuous  time  TS  model  in  a  general  equilibrium 
framework, in which consumers are assumed to maximise the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of 
consumption. Bond yields are expressed in terms of the stochastic discount factor, or pricing kernel: 
 
( )       
    • − − =
Λ
Λ
Λ σ                                                                                                                     (1.2) 
 
The  subjective  discount  factor,  an  individual  time  preference  rate,  becomes  stochastic  when 
modelled through the diffusion process (1.2);   represents the short term interest rate,    is the 
differenced time process;    is the Brownian motion term which drives the stochastic volatility of 
the overall process. The stochastic discount factor represents consumers’ intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution and it is used for asset pricing, i.e. to discount security forward expected prices. 
The subjective discount factor δ is an individual time preference rate that becomes stochastic when 
modelled through the diffusion process (1.2). The stochastic discount factor      thus can be seen as 
a function of the ratio between the marginal utility  ( ) •
    of future and current consumption  : 
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Essentially the pricing kernel is a density function that associates a stochastic weight to alternative 
states of the world; hence, it is a useful tool to describe agents preferences through time and across 
states.  In particular, in many financial applications the stochastic discount factor has become  a 
convenient expedient to determine, or predict, future asset prices under uncertainty. In the above 
expression. The short rate process is driven by a drift term  ( ) •   µ  and a diffusion process  ( )  
 
  • σ :  
 
( ) ( )        
 
    • + • = σ µ                                                                                                                  (1.4) 
 
The rate starts out as a state variable for the drift of the discount factor in (1.2); the expected value 
of the pricing kernel becomes the continuous series of the short rate process  ( )          − = Λ Λ  since 
the Wiener process is a     -mean normally distributed process (the Levy theorem guarantees that 
any Wiener process, adapted to  a  certain             a dynamic information set , is a  Brownian 
motion). In absence of the diffusion term, the above equations would simply be ordinary differential 
equations.  The  stochastic  differential  equation  (1.4)  that  drives  the  short  rate process        needs 
appropriate specification for being of practical use. The basic model is by Merton (1971, 1974) and 
Ho  and  Lee  (1986).  Vasicek  (1977)  has  suggested  the  following  mean-reverting  Markov 
specification for the short rate (  ):  
 
       
 
Λ − − =
Λ
Λ
σ           with           ( )                σ ρ + − =                                                        (1.5) 
   16 
Where     is the long-run equilibrium level for the short rate (  is a coefficient that captures the 
effect of mean reversion). The main drawback is that (1.5) allows for negative interest rates, which 
are economically a nonsense; in addition, the price of risk is not permitted to change sign thus 
contradicting  factual  evidence.  Moreover,  homoscedastic  single-factor  models  cannot  generate 
inverted hump-shape forward curves. 
Semi-affine  models  have become  increasingly  popular  in  macro-finance  applications  since  they 
allow for time-varying sign-changing term premia (Duarte, 2002). A model is said to be affine 
when the variable can be expressed in terms of a constant and a linear term. In the term structure 
literature the price of a bond is expressed as a linear function of (a constant and) a state vector 
through coefficients that are, in turn, functions of the bond’s maturity. The affine class is typically 
associated to term structure models that feature the absence of arbitrage condition (Piazzesi, 2003). 
A popular specification is by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985): 
 
         
 
Λ − − =
Λ
Λ
σ          with          ( )                  σ ρ + − =                                              (1.6) 
 
The square root constrains the short rate to non-negative values. The restriction      ρ σ 2 ≤ , also 
known as the                 , is necessary to prevent the spot rate from degenerating to     . As 
for  the  homoscedastic  case,  also  the  square  root  process  cannot  generate  inverted  hump-shape 
curves. Multiple-factor TS models have been introduced since two or three independent factors 
guarantees the yield curve to assume any possible shape. 
Both (1.5) and (1.6) hinge on the existence of a risk-neutral probability measure   which is the 
Radon-Nikodym  transformation  of  the  actual  probability   .  Bond  pricing  is  determined  after 
specifying a structure for the discount factor process (1.2). It holds: 
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The stochastic discount factor is usually assumed to be    -Normal. Solutions of these models are 
obtained either by applying expectations or solving analytically the differential equations (Duffie 
and Kan, 1996). A typical solution represents the (   ) bond price as: 
 
( ) ( )  
 
              ~ + = −                                                                                                                     (1.8) 
 
which  is  recursively  solved  forward  in  the  coefficients   ( )  and   ( ).  The  price  of  a  bond  is 
inversely related to the yield (here we abuse of notation since      ~  denotes any state variable). A 
more general version of equation (1.8), i.e. the empirical version of (1.7), shows that the price of an 
asset at time   is simply the stochastically discounted value of the price a period ahead:   17 
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Vasicek has proposed a completely affine model
3. A drawback of affine and semi-affine models is 
that  the  price  of  risk  is  a  strictly  increasing  function  of  instantaneous  volatility    σ ,         the 
compensation for bearing risk (expected excess returns) is proportional to interest rates’ volatility, 
i.e. to the risk itself. Although semi-affine models are a parsimonious generalization of completely 
affine models they perform poorly; in particular, the magnitude of term premia turns out to be 
systematically smaller than that observed in the data.  
Duffee (2002) introduces the class of essentially affine models to break the vicious connection 
between  the  price  of  risk  and  state  variables’  volatility.  The  diffusion  is  affine  under  both  the 
historical probability measure   and the risk-neutral probability  . The main feature of essentially 
affine models is that the price of risk becomes independent of the volatility matrix. Duffee provides 
evidence that essentially affine models forecast future yields better than affine do.  
 
 
 
1.3   The Expectations Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence 
 
The empirical review starts with the contribution by Campbell and Shiller (1991) since they offer an 
extensive analysis of the entire TS maturity spectrum. They employ a linearized version of EH 
testing whether the  yield spread anticipates future changes in interest rates. For each couple of 
maturities ( ,  ), with   >  , they estimate ordinary least square regressions of the            , or 
                 , spread onto the        spread. To correct for overlapping residuals they adopt  
Newey-West consistent covariance matrix. 
The first important result is that the yield spread fails to predict movements of long term rates; more 
precisely, the spread returns forecasts in the wrong direction ( 0 < β ) for the short term change of 
long rates. The contrarian test (Thornton, 2005)  for predicting future changes of long yields is:  
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Campbell and Shiller use 
 
      +  as an approximation of 
   
     
−
+  when estimating the above regression 
for many couples of maturities ( ,  ).  
                                                 
3 In completely affine models all processes are affine: the diffusion under the actual probability measure  ; the diffusion under the 
risk-neutral probability measure  ; the log prices of bonds; the square of the discount factor, and the quadratic form linking the state 
variables’ covariance matrix and the discount factor through the square root of the state variables. In the semi-affine class of TS 
models the Girsanov transformation does not allow both   and   to be affine; thus the model is affine only under the synthetic risk-
neutral probability measure  . In essentially affine models the square of the price of risk vector is not necessarily affine in the state 
variables. Essentially affine models nest completely the affine class of TS models.   18 
The second result concerns the prediction of short rate over the life of long term bonds. Results are 
partially supportive of EH, the estimated slope coefficient  β  turns out to be positive and close to 
    for many pairs of maturities. The conventional test (Thornton, 2005) regression is: 
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                                                                                   (1.11) 
 
Equation (1.11) can be consistently estimated under the assumption of rational expectations, since 
disturbances are not correlated with the effective yield spread. The analysis is performed with U.S. 
end-of-month data from 1952 to 1987; they conclude “                                              
                                                                                                          
                                                                                                        
     ”. They suggest that long rates tend to overreact to rationally expected changes in short rates. 
Excessively high spreads cause long rates to fall when short rates rise; short term changes in long 
rates are thus negatively correlated with long term changes in short rates. The negative correlation is 
amplified  by  the  magnitude  of  the  weighting  coefficient  that  depends  on  maturities’  temporal 
distance.  Shiller,  Campbell,  and  Schoenholtz  (1983)  point  out  that  linear  specifications  of  EH 
inappropriately assume constant bonds’         . In particular, in line with Ando and Kennickell 
(1983), high interest rates reduce long term bonds’          affecting EH tests. A better fit for EH 
is achieved once weighting coefficients are corrected for         . 
Thornton (2005) gives a simple, but effective, mathematical rationalization of EH empirical failure 
arguing that EH estimates are inherently biased when EH does not hold. If expectations are not 
rational the true data generating process is not necessarily coherent with EH. In fact, if both long 
and short rates follow a first-order autoregressive process, as they usually do, EH coefficients’ 
estimates are biased. In particular, the expected value of coefficient estimates is positive for the 
short term rate prediction (1.11), and negative in equation (1.10) that forecasts long rates. This is 
because the actual short rate appears symmetrically on both sides of (1.11); whereas the long rate 
appears with opposite sign on different sides of (1.10). These results can be generalized under the 
alternative hypothesis using asymptotic theory. The probability limit for β  in (1.10) is affected by a 
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4 The                          depends both upon the ratio of the variances δ  and the correlation coefficient between long and short 
term interest rates ρ .   19 
The                          (in square brackets) can assume both positive and negative values, so 
that the slope coefficient  β  is not necessarily    . The                          is strictly negative 
when 
2 1 − < δ ρ . For the conventional test (1.11) the limit in probability is: 
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Mishkin (1988) provides a refinement of Fama’s (1984) work on the predicting power of the yield 
spread achieving similar conclusions. Forwards rates seem reliable predictors of future changes in 
spot rates with forecasting power increasing after 1982. In September 1982 the Fed abandoned the 
                                              (stabilizing  monetary  aggregates)  in  favour  of  the 
                        regime
5. Mishkin’s main contribution is methodological, since he discusses 
econometric issues for testing EH. Ordinary least square applied to equations (1.10) and (1.11) 
generates serially correlated errors, because of the overlapping nature of variables. Autocorrelated 
disturbances affect standard errors invalidating inference procedures. Various corrections have been 
proposed: Hansen and Hodrick (1980), White (1980), and Newey and West (1985). Newey and 
West, for instance, suggest multiplying off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix by some 
weights in order to scale down residuals’ autocovariances. 
Mankiw and Miron (1986, henceforth MM) analyse EH throughout an extensive sample starting in 
1890
6. MM focus on the short end of the maturity spectrum and identify specific monetary regimes
7. 
They  find  evidence  in  favour  of  EH  only  before  the  creation  of  the  Fed.  After  ruling  out  the 
possibility of both seasonal effect and financial turmoil (occurred in 1980, 1893, and 1907), they 
conclude that EH holds before 1915 because of easy predictability of short rates due to their mean 
reverting pattern. In particular, when the short rate is above its mean by 100 basis points, it follows 
an adjustment of 57 bps within the following period
8. After the foundation of the Fed the mean 
reverting behaviour has progressively faded away due to the policy of stabilizing, or even pegging, 
interest  rates.  Data  evidence  after  1915  suggests  that  the  short  rate  is  a  martingale.  In  case  of 
monetary policy inertia (interest rates smoothing), the Fed keeps the expected change of the short 
                                                 
5 Before October 1979 the monetary regime was an                         as well.  
6 Data before 1910 were collected by the National Monetary Commission, which was the precursor of the Federal Reserve System 
founded in 1915. In this sample data are the interest rates banks charged for loans of fixed maturities.  
7 The first sub-sample ends just before the foundation of the Fed in 1915. The second regime terminates at the introduction of the 
New Deal banking reforms, sample which also approximates both the end of the classic Gold Standard and the beginning of the 
                      (early 1930s). The third regimes goes from 1934 to 1951, which ends with the       , i.e. the agreement 
between the Treasury and the Fed of abandoning the                      . The fourth regime lasts till 1958, when the market for 3- 
and 6-month Treasury Bills actively begins. The entire sample finishes in October 1979 when the Fed changed the conduct of 
monetary policy. As mentioned earlier, Volcker became president of the Fed in 1979 and the                         policy was 
abandoned in favour of the                                         .  
8 The regression for the 1980-1915 sub-sample returns a particularly high goodness of fit, much higher than in other sub-samples. In 
addition, the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly null is rejected at 1% significance level.   20 
rate  equal  to      ;  hence  the  spread  would  always  match  a  random  term  premium  without 
containing any predictive power. MM believe that the existence of a time-varying risk premium can 
explain deviations from EH after 1915
9. They also mention few other potential causes that may 
account for the empirical failure of EH, such as change in risk perception, change in relative asset 
supplies, measurement errors, and near rational, rather than rational, expectations. 
A reconsideration of MM’s work is provided by Kool and Thornton (2004) who show that, once 
financial panics in 1907-1908 are properly taken into account, the evidence in favour of EH is not 
different before and after the creation of the Federal Reserve; so that EH is rejected also before 
1915. Kool and Thornton argue that the eventual support for EH before 1915 is merely due to the 
presence of extreme observations in the data sample. 
Rudebusch (1995) think that MM’s thesis is plausible but it has not been formalized. Focusing on 
cases in which the long maturity is exactly twice the short term maturity (  = 2  ) concluding “    
                                                                                                            
                                                                                                    β        
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                       ”. 
Rudebusch splits the entire sample into two sub-samples reflecting different Fed’s regimes (Sept. 
1974 - Sept. 1979; Mar. 1984 - Sept. 1992). To test the random walk hypothesis proposed by MM, 
he  builds  a  probability  model  of  the  deviation  of  the  interest  rate  from  its  targeted  level 
1 − − =               δ . The daily effective fed funds rate is expressed as the sum of the targeted level plus 
the delta deviation
10. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) η η                            
− +
− − − + = 1 1                                                                                               (1.14) 
 
If MM theory holds, the probability of positive and negative adjustments should be the same at each 
date 
− + =             ∀ . Interest rate smoothing occurs when the fed funds target randomly oscillates 
around its past value, being       and thus unpredictable, the mean of deviations. Conversely, if 
changes  in  the  target  for  federal  funds  are  followed  by  changes  in  the  same  direction  there  is 
evidence of gradualism in the conduct of monetary policy. The estimated hazard functions do not 
display duration dependent behaviour when the horizon is longer than five weeks. Deviations from 
the target rate are large but not persistent; they tend to disappear within the following trading day. 
In line with MM, Rudebusch concludes “                                                             
                                                 
9 Hardouvelis (1994) argues that time-varying term premia do not matter in explaining persistent negative estimates of the slope 
coefficientβ . He, instead, supports the idea of the overreaction hypothesis originally proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1991). 
10 The mean absolute value of these deviations is 17 basis points.   21 
                          ”. Moreover, consistently with Fama and Bliss (1987), Rudebusch comments 
“                                                                                                        
                                                                                                          
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                      
                                                              ”.  
Fama and Bliss (1987) concentrate on the information content of forward rates concluding that 
forward rates have substantial predictive power which is increasing with the forecast horizon. They 
argue this is due to the mean reverting property of the  -year interest rate. The  -year forward rate 
is also informative about the  -year bonds’ expected returns. The inverse relation between yields   
and (   ) prices   of an  -period zero coupon bond with face value   is: 
 
( )
 
 
 
        ln 1 − =                                                                                                                             (1.15) 
 
The    -period spot rate is 
1
    . It is common to look at bond prices in logarithm for the suitable 
interpretation. If the price of a ZCB is 0.95, i.e. 95 cents per dollar face value, the    -price is 
051 . 0 − , indicating that the bonds sells at 5 percent discount. The holding period return on an  -year 
bond which is hold for 1 year is: 
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The forward  rate obtained  comparing two different points in time of the maturity spectrum is  
 
1 1 , + + − =
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Equivalently, the forward rate can be expressed either as difference of bond prices or as difference 
between yields. Expression (1.18) gives a measure of the current evaluation (time   prediction) of 
the interest rate on a  -year ZCB with maturity     future. The price of a discount bond can be 
seen as a sequence of expected discounted payoffs; it is immediate to use forward rates: 
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Prices thus contain rational forecasts of equilibrium expected returns. The forward-spot spread is: 
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Fama and Bliss estimate
11 the following regression: 
                                                 
11 Cook and Hahn (1989) use similar explanatory variables to analyse the term structure and term premia.    22 
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A positive and significant  β  indicates that the spread carries valuable information for predicting 
future changes in the  -year spot rate (   ) years ahead. Equation (1.20) is complementary to: 
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The following equation, instead, shows that the forward-spot spread (LHS) is composed by the time   
expected premium of the  -year return on an  -year bond over the  -year spot rate (the first RHS term)  
and the expected change from (   ) to   in the yield on (   )-year bond (second RHS term): 
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In  regression (1.23) the dynamics of  the term premium is a function of the forward-spot spread:  
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A  positive  and  statistically  significant    β   is  interpreted  as  evidence  of  a  time-varying  term 
premium. Fama and Bliss interpret their results in line with Shiller (1979): when bond prices are 
rationally determined, the volatility of long rates affects the variability of both term premia and 
expected returns. Fama and Bliss’ major finding is “                                            
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                     
                                               ”. This conclusion is also coherent with MM’s idea.  
Campbell (1995) finds that exceptionally high spreads do not help infer future movements in long 
rates. EH implies unpredictable excess returns on long over short bonds. As Thornton (2005) would 
argue later, Campbell suggests: “                                                                        
                                                                                                       
                                                                                      . 
An instrument correlated with the spread could help (Campbell and Shiller 1991); however, negative 
estimates of EH coefficients seem robust to different instruments. Campbell’s explanation of the 
paradox hinges on the presence of a measurement error, which may derive from changing rational 
expectations.  Measurement  errors  affect  positively  explanatory  variables,  while  negatively  the 
dependent variable. Campbell focuses on the unusual response of long yields in 1994 after a tight 
policy implemented by the Fed. Long term rates have increased more than short rates, widening the 
spread substantially above the post war average. The exceptionally steep yield curve has induced 
the Treasury to shortening the average maturity of Federal debt in order to save on interest costs.   23 
The Fed increased the fed funds rate
12 by 1.25 percent in four months starting in January 1994. Two 
possible  explanations  for  the  overreaction  of  long  rates.  Investors  could  have  found  the  Fed 
behaviour  surprisingly  severe  since  Greenspan  had  previously  established  a  reputation  for 
gradualism. The atypical conduct might have been misinterpreted by investors as they judged the Fed 
having private information about future inflation, so they anticipated future contractionary actions. 
Unfortunately, this explanation is not entirely supported by factual evidence since the Fed conduct 
was transparent. The Fed clearly aimed at chocking any inflationary pressures off. Alternatively, 
investors merely required elevated excess returns on long term maturities to compensate for high 
risk reflected in soaring volatility of long rates. At the end of May forward rates dropped achieving 
the January level. Campbell: “                                                                   
                                                                                                   ”.  
Another attempt to rationalize the systematic rejection of EH is offered by Froot (1989)
13. He shows 
that the perverse effect affecting short term changes in long rates is actually  due to a violation of the 
rationality principle rather than to time variation of risk premia. Froot emphasizes that deviations 
from EH consist of two components, an expectations error and a term premium. He finds that the 
perception  of  risk  becomes  increasingly  important  for  pricing  bonds  with  long  duration.  Term 
premia extracted from survey data are positively correlated with both inflation and the level of 
nominal rates. The market survey   is determined by market expectations on the forward rate plus a     -
mean expectational error  ( ) ( ) 0
,
, =
   
          ε  uncorrelated with expectations: 
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,   represents  the  market  expectations  about  the  yield  on  a  (   )-period  bond 
issued at time     minus the yield to maturity at time   on a  -period bond. Forward premia are also 
proportional to the yield spread, as pointed out by Campbell, Shiller and Schoenholtz (1983). The 
term  premium  ( )    
 
, θ   on  a   -period  bond  held  from  period     to  period  (   ),  is  defined  as  the 
difference between the forward premium and the expected future change in the interest rate:  
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Consequently, EH can be tested by estimating the following equation: 
 
                                                 
12 The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other depository 
institutions overnight. The effective federal funds rate is a weighted average interest rate reflecting federal funds transactions by a 
group of brokers who report daily to the Fed of New York.  
13 The empirical analysis is based on market survey data from                                             ; this dataset reveals 
investors’ beliefs about interest rates on securities with different maturities. Survey data gives the crucial opportunity of decomposing 
the spread’s biased predictions into an expectational error measure and a term premium. Estimations are carried out for both the 
conventional and the contrarian tests using quarterly data from 1969 to 1986. The conventional test returns positive β  estimation but 
significantly lower than unity; the contrarian test returns negative β  coefficients.   24 
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EH implies a null premium as forward rates should equal future spot rates; so that EH is respected 
when both  1 = β  and  0 = α .  The slope coefficient comes out to be:  
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β  can be expressed also as the summation of a premium and an expectations error        β β β + + =1                                       
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   β  is null when also the variance of the premium is     ; this is the case of EH.     β  is      in 
absence of systematic expectational error. Froot extracts from data the following components:  
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Kuttner (2001) investigates how monetary policy surprises affect interest rates
14. Using data from 
the fed funds future market, he discriminates between anticipated and unanticipated policy actions. 
Results confirm a strong reaction to unanticipated ones. The rate response of a security is 
  
 
 
   
 
            υ β β α + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ ~ ~                                                                                                      (1.30) 
 
 
    ~ ∆  is the expected component of monetary policy actions while 
 
    ~ ∆  represents the unanticipated 
one.  The  total  change  of  the  target  rate  gives  the  nominal  size  of  monetary  policy  intervention 
(
 
 
 
          ~ ~ ~ ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ).    is the interest rate associated to 3-, 6-, and 12-month bills, the 2-, 5-, 10-year notes 
and  the  30-year  bond.  Results  indicate  important  responses  of  securities  yields’  to  the  surprise 
component:    β  is much larger than    β . The Wald test rejects the null      β β =  for all securities. In 
addition, the intensity of the response gets smaller as the maturity increases. Consistently with EH 
“                                                                                                           
                                                                               ”. As in Cook and Hahn 
(1989), the fed funds’ mean reversion implies softer reaction for long bonds. Moreover, they point 
out  that surprises have more to do with timing of actions rather than size.  
                                                 
14 An important strand of literature analyses the reaction of interest rates to monetary policy announcements. Roley and Sellon find 
that the relationship between policy announcements and the behaviour of long term rates is variable over the business cycle. They 
conclude that there is a strong but variable connection between monetary policy actions and long rates; moreover, “                  
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                  . Roley and Sellon (1998) have also 
documented the eventual reaction to policy non-announcements “                                                                      
                                                                                  ”.   25 
Kozicki and Sellon (2005) analyse a particular phenomenon, later labelled “             ” by chairman 
Greenspan, occurred after policy tightening in 2004. It happened that long rates declined substantially 
after severe monetary policy thus contradicting common wisdom and pre-existing evidence “      
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                            
                                                                                                           
                            ”. At the beginning of a policy tightening short rates raise to remove 
previous  accommodation;  this  jump  is  intended  to  curb  excess  demand  and  contain  inflationary 
pressures. On the other hand, long rates reflect agents’ expectations about structural or institutional 
changes  in  the  economy.  They  attribute  the  unusual  long  rates  dynamics,  and  the  subsequent 
flattening of the yield curve, to a decrease in the inflation term premium required by investors 
(interpretable as a sign of  both reputation and credibility). 
Favero  claims  that  EH  rejection  might  be  due  to  a  misleading  way  of  processing  information.  He 
undertakes a reversal engineering approach to obtain the forward path of short rates, which is used to 
generate  EH-consistent  long  rates.  He  employs  a  reduced-form  VAR  defined  on  the  following 
variables: inflation, a measure of the output gap, and the IMF world commodity price index. The most 
endogenous variable, the policy rate, is placed at the end of the VAR sequence. Such a specification 
implies a Taylor rule reaction function for the short rate. Rolling estimates and stochastic dynamic 
simulations generate forecasts for the policy rate 
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Results are interpreted as evidence in favour of EH since there is a clear tendency of the generated series 
to  co-move  with  actual  data.  Actual  data,  in  fact,  lie  within  the  95%  confidence  interval  bands. 
Similarly,  Carriero,  Kaminska,  and  Favero  (2004)  argue  that  inappropriate  approach  to  model 
expectations underlie EH empirical failure. Using a macro model augmented with financial factors 
they simulate EH-consistent long rates and construct a series of the yield spread which is used to 
test EH. The comparison between simulated and actual data allow them not to reject the null EH.  
 
 
 
1.4   The Expectations Hypothesis and Monetary Regimes  
 
In  this  Section  we  explore  whether  the  corroboration  of  EH  is  related  to  monetary  regimes. 
Hardouvelis (1988) provides evidence that the predictive power of the spread is not necessarily 
reduced by the intention of the monetary authority to stabilize the short rate, as instead Mankiw and   26 
Miron (1986) suggested. Three samples
15
 are considered: the                         between January 
1972 and October 1979; the                                           between 1979 and October 
1982
16;  and,  again,  the                                      till  November  1985.  Despite  forward  rates 
inherently  incorporate  a  time-varying  premium,  data  evidence  suggests  forward  rates  generating 
respectable predictions of future change in interest rates. Hardouvelis finds evidence regarding the 
predictive power of the spread also after October 1982, during the                                 
regime. Moreover, between October 1979 and October 1982 the predictive power of forward rates lasts 
only six weeks into the future, while after 1982 it endures till nine weeks ahead. He concludes 
“                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                         
                                                                            ”. 
Recently a variety of critical contributions on the predictive power of the yield spread have been 
proposed by Thornton. In 2004 he offers empirical evidence in contrast with Simon (1990) and 
Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman (1996).  
Simon (1990) offers empirical evidence supporting the predictive power of the spread during the 
                                         (October 1979 - October 1982). He focuses on the short 
end of TS considering the spread between the 3-month Treasury bill and the federal funds rate 
finding  that  the  spread  is  informative  about  future  interest  rates  when  the  short  rate  is  highly 
volatile, which occurs  when the Fed targets monetary aggregates (M1). 
Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman (1996) analyse the predictive power of the spread using interest 
rates data for settlement Wednesdays
17. With daily observations from 1974 and 1991
18, they find 
evidence in favour EH focusing on maturities shorter than 6 months. They document that during the 
                                          regime, when interest rates were highly volatile, the 
spread  carried  substantial  predictive  power;  whereas,  after  October  1982,  when  interest  rates’ 
volatility dropped, the slope coefficient  β  was approximately     . The corroboration of EH thus 
seems connected to the volatility of the short rate. They conclude “                                
                                                                                                  
                                                 
15 In this note we report the measures of interest rates’ volatility in the sub-samples to give a flavour of how different the periods 
were from a financial point of view. From October 1979 to October 1982 volatility, on a weekly basis, has reached its peak around 
140 basis points; before 1979 it was just 31 basis points, and after 1982 it decreased from 140 to 65 basis points. 
16 Initially the target of the Federal Reserve was the monetary aggregate M1, then it became                      . 
17 These are the days when banks are required to meet Federal Reserve-imposed reserves requirements. 
18 Before October 1979 the regime  was  an explicit                        . Between 1980 and October 1982 the Fed aimed at 
stabilizing monetary aggregates. After October 1982 the operating procedure passed from              to                  , but 
several economists agree on describing that passage as a return, at least partially, to an                          A change in the reserve 
accounting occurred in 1984. Before 1984 the system was a                          , that is required reserves were calculated over 
a week-long computation period and had to be maintained over the two following weeks. After 1984 the accounting procedure was 
known  as  the                                      ,  required  reserves  were  computed  over  a  two-week  period,  and  had  to  be 
maintained for a two-day lag.   27 
           ”; moreover “                                                                           
                                                                                           ”. Finally they 
emphasize “                                                                                          
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                       
                                                                 ”. 
Thornton  (2004)  claims  that  results  by  both  Hardouvelis  and  Roberds,  Runkle  and  Whiteman  are 
somehow awkward. His basic idea is that it seems difficult to accept that the spread predicts changes 
in  short  rates  when  the  target  of  the  monetary  authority  is  expressed  in  terms  of  monetary 
aggregates. The first criticism hits the considerable predictive power ascribed to the spread during 
the                                  sample. Conventional wisdom suggests easier prediction of 
short rates when the Fed is actually targeting the funds rate. Two different reasons support this 
view. On the one hand, the monetary authority acts to offset the effects of shocks to supply and 
demand in the funds market, which makes the fed funds deviate from its targeted level; hence the 
funds  rate  may  well  display  a  mean  reverting  forecastable  pattern;  on  the  other  hand,  rational 
market participants may well anticipate the Fed’s target for the fed funds rate. In addition, if the 
monetary authority makes transparency an important institutional objective, investors can also infer 
future movements of the policy rate by analysing the macroeconomic scenario. The second criticism 
concerns the settlement Wednesday issue. Even though Roberds        (1996) clearly motivate their 
appealing theory, Thornton sustains the argument tautological as long as he argues that spikes in the 
funds rate, which typically occur on settlements Wednesdays, are merely idiosyncratic, in the sense 
that they are not generally reflected by other short term T-bills rates. Thornton thus attributes the 
anomalous findings to the presence of extreme observations since OLS estimates are particularly 
sensitive to outliers. 
 
 
 
1.5   The Yield Curve and Time-Varying Risk Premia 
 
Fama (1984, 1986), Fama and Bliss (1987), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Cook and Hahn (1989) 
reckon time-varying premia a potential source of EH rejection. More recently, evidence in this 
sense is presented by Lee (1995), Tzavalis and Wickens (1997) among others. 
In this Section we report the model by McCallum (1994, 2005). He allows for the possibility of 
time variation in risk premia and monetary policy inertia assuming that the short rate responds to 
the  yield  spread.  McCallum  develops  the  analysis  in  a  simple     -period  case,  and,  then,   28 
generalizes the model considering   periods. EH states that the  -period long rate is an average of 
expected future spot (   -period) rates plus a constant term premium    ξ  
 
( ) [ ]                   ξ + + = +1
2 5 . 0                                                                                                             (1.32) 
 
The expectations error is defined as follows 
 
( ) 1 1 1 + + + − =               ε                                                                                                                        (1.33) 
 
Substituting the latter in the former yields: 
 
[ ] ( ) 1
2
1 5 . 0 5 . 0 + + + − − = −                     ε ξ                                                                                          (1.34) 
 
Assuming a constant premium ( ξ ξ =   ), and imposing orthogonality of  1 +   ε  with both 
2
     and      , it 
is  possible  to  derive  the  traditional  Campbell-Shiller  equation  (1.11).  The  stochastic  process 
generating    ξ   is  assumed  to  be  covariance  stationary  but  not  necessarily  a  white  noise;  more 
specifically, for better tractability, McCallum imposes    ξ  to be a first-order autoregressive AR(1) 
process, thus time-varying, with white noise disturbances (stationarity implies  1 < ρ )  
 
        + = −1 ξ ρ ξ                                                                                                                               (1.35) 
 
The policy rule for the short term rate allows for interest rate smoothing 
 
( )                   ζ λ σ + − + = −
2
1                                                                                                          (1.36) 
 
σ  is close to unity and  2 0 < ≤ λ . σ  captures the smoothing behaviour of monetary policy, whilst λ  
denotes a tendency to tighten whenever the spread is too high, i.e. when monetary policy is loose. 
The fundamental, or bubble-free, solution is obtained by combining (1.32) and (1.36)  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]                         ζ ξ λ σ λ + + − + = − + − 1 1 5 . 0 1                                                                        (1.37) 
 
Substituting and taking expectations yields 
 
( ) [ ]                   ξ ρ φ ζ φ ξ φ φ φ φ φ 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 + + + + + = − +                                                                 (1.38) 
 
A solution for the short rate is assumed to be of the form 
 
            ζ φ ξ φ φ φ 3 2 1 1 0 + + + = −                                                                                                      (1.39) 
 
The short rate depends on both a time-varying risk premium and innovations in the monetary policy 
rule. For (1.39) to be a solution we need to impose some parameter restrictions. When  1 = σ , which 
is  the  interest  smoothing  case,  the  first  difference  of  the  short  rate  equals  the  yield  spread. 
Parametrically the solutions are:  0 0 = φ ,  1 3 1 = =φ φ , and  ( ) ρ λ λ φ 5 . 0 1 2 − = . In a mere AR(1) model 
for the short rate,  1 = σ  implies a random walk process. It follows that   29 
 
( )               ξ ρ φ2 1 = − +                                                                                                                    (1.40) 
 
The term premium thus drives the expected theoretical spread. The yield spread is expressed as: 
 
( ) [ ]                         ξ
ρ λ
ξ
5 . 0 1
1
5 . 0 1
2
−
= + − = − +                                                                         (1.41) 
 
In this equation    ξ  is not orthogonal to  ( )             − +1 . The spread in (1.41) depends on the evolution 
of the term premium over time. Substituting and reordering, yields 
 
( ) ( )                       ζ
ρ λ
λ
ρ λ 5 . 0
5 . 0 1
5 . 0
5 . 0 5 . 0 1
2
1 1 +
−
+ − = − − − −                                                        (1.42) 
 
This represents a more general version of the Campbell-Shiller equation (1.11);  β  is nothing more 
than a consistent estimator of  ρ λ 5 . 0  which is clearly lower than     (since  1 = σ ). Therefore, 
adding a simple monetary policy rule to the framework for testing EH leads to the conclusion that 
the estimation of  β  is trivially lower than    ; as well as Thornton (2005) pointed out. When 
0 = λ ,  i.e.  monetary  policy  does  not  respond  to  the  spread,  it  holds  the  MM  random  walk 
hypothesis for the short rate. Finally, with  1 < σ  we need to include a non-zero intercept in the policy rule 
to permit a stationary equilibrium, being  ( ) 0 =     ζ . Hence, McCallum has shown that a stochastic 
time-varying risk premium can affect the empirical corroboration of EH. 
 
 
 
1.6   The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Term Premia, and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
In the first part of this Section we discuss some evidence regarding the ability of the yield spread to 
anticipate future movements in macroeconomic variables; while, in the second part we focus on the 
predictive ability of the term premium.  
In 1977 Shiller and Siegel provide an empirical assessment of the so-called               . Using 
British data, Gibson (1923) found a strong positive correlation between the (log) series of a price 
index and long term interest rates. Shiller and Siegel using spectral techniques confirm this relation, 
but highlight that there is a short cycle correlation as far as short rates are concerned.  
Mishkin (1990a, 1990b) investigates whether TS helps forecast future inflation. Data suggest that 
interest rates on bonds with maturities less than or equal to six months do not provide any relevant 
information about the future path of inflation; however, the short end of TS contains information 
about the  real TS of interest  rates. On the other hand, for maturities between nine  and twelve 
months TS is informative about future inflation. Mishkin starts the analysis with a very simple 
equation where the   -period inflation is simply regressed onto the  -period interest rate:    30 
 
 
 
 
     
 
      + + = β α π                                                                                                                   (1.43) 
 
The model unfortunately fails to forecast inflation. The rejection of the null hypothesis of constancy 
of the real interest rate ( 1 =   β ) is interpreted as a sign that nominal rates are informative about real 
interest rates. Before October 1979    β ˆ
 is greater than    ; so that negative values for the quantity 
  β − 1  indicate negative correlation between nominal and real rates. Mishkin derives an equation to 
analyse how  changes in inflation over time are explained by changes in interest rates: 
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, , + − + = − β α π π                                                                                             (1.44) 
 
Estimates  performed  with  U.S.  T-bills  data  document  that  during  the                          
                      the  ability  of    nominal  rates  to  anticipate  future  inflation  has  decreased. 
Mishkin concludes: “                                                                                   
                                                                                   ”. The null hypothesis 
0 1 , = −     β  is rejected only for short maturities, thus the short end of the nominal TS carries valuable 
information for inferring the dynamics of its real counterpart. The null hypothesis, however, is not 
rejected for longer maturities supporting the view that the nominal spread helps forecast inflation.  
Frankel and Lown (1994) propose a refinement of Mishkin’s works. They argue that an appropriate 
indicator of expected inflation should exploit information along the entire spectrum of the yield 
curve rather than using merely a spread between two points. They suggest looking at the real stance 
of monetary policy and claim that TS can be thought an inverse indicator of the real interest rate. 
Basically the difference between long and short rates approximate the real rate since long rates 
reflect inflation expectation better than short rates. Accommodative policy increases the steepness 
of the yield curve and lowers the real rate. Expansionary policy actions drive short rates down, 
while inflation, due to the stimulus to aggregate demand, is expected to rise and long rates along 
with it. Frankel and Lown estimate the steepness of a non linear transformation of TS. The real 
interest rates is time-variant following a first-order continuous-time stochastic differential equation: 
 
( )  
 
               σ π δ + − − − = 0                                                                                                      (1.45) 
 
     is the instantaneous short rate; 
 
0 π  is the exogenous long run expected inflation;    is the constant steady 
state value of the real rate (not directly observable). Parameter δ  indicates the speed of adjustment of 
the real rate towards the equilibrium.    is a standard                 with normally distributed 
independent  increments       ~ ( )     , 0 .  The  Fisher  equation 
     0 π +   represents  the  value  of  the 
nominal interest rate. The economic rationale follows. Consider the monetary authority is going to 
expand money supply raising consequently expected inflation “                                         31 
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                          
                            ” short rates then rise to reflect worries about expected inflation.  
According to EH an equation for the interest rate on a bond with maturity τ  issued in t = 0 the short 
term interest rate is the average of instantaneous interest rates between time 0 and τ  
 
∫ + =
τ
τ
τ
τ 0
0 0
1
                                                                                                                                  (1.46) 
 
τ     is a possible liquidity premium; integrating (1.46) and using appropriate weights, yields: 
 
( )( ) τ τ
τ ω π − − − + + = 1 0 0 0 0           
                                                                                              (1.47) 
 
The unknown ( ) 0 0     
  − − π  represents the correct measure of the steepness of  TS. At any point in 
time, the τ -term interest rate is expressed as a weighted average of theoretical long nominal rates 
( )   
  + 0 π . The longer the maturity the higher the weight given to long term rates and the lower the 
weight given to short rates. Frankel and Lown obtain positive and significant estimates of the slope 
both  before  and  after  September  1979.  Coefficients  are  greater  than     ;  they  thus  claim  their 
results are superior in forecasting inflation compared Mishkin’s results. 
Caporale and Pittis (1998) exploit the uncovered interest rates parity to assess whether yield spreads 
are useful to forecast inflation differentials among countries. Working with European data they find 
evidence suggesting that the predictive power has increased when the exchange rate became an 
objective of European countries and realignments occurred less frequently. 
Estrella  and  Hardouvelis  (1991)  investigate  whether  the  TS  slope  is  informative  about  future 
activity. Using U.S. average quarterly data they find evidence that the interest rate spread between 
the 10-year T-bond and the 3-month T-bill predicts real GNP change  ( ) ( ) [ ]                     + + = ln 400 , .  
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The  regression  is  estimated  for  different  horizons,  from  3  to  20  quarters  ahead.  The  slope 
coefficient is significantly positive; the intercept is positive as well, which means that a negative 
slope not necessarily implies a negative future GNP growth.    is a vector of other information 
variables. They find that “                                                                            
                                                                                                     
                            ”. The spread can explain more than one-third of the variation in future 
output changes.    32 
Estrella and Mishkin (1997) perform a similar analysis for both U.S. and some European countries. 
They examine whether the spread is sensitive to rates at different maturities and the effect of the 
spread on output and inflation. They adopt a VAR model to capture the double-sided relation 
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             ε δ γ β α                                                              (1.49) 
 
   is the central bank rate; 
   
1  is the 3-month T-bill rate, and 
   
40  is the 10-year T-bond rate. 
VAR models are usually specified with exogenous variables at the beginning and endogenous (policy) 
variables at the end; the ordering reflects how variables influence one another. They defend the 
choice of placing the policy rate in the first position  “                                              
                                                                                                         
                                                                                                         
                                                                            ”. Results differ across 
countries; a percentage point rise in the central bank rate generates a decline in the spread, ranging 
from 20 basis points in the case of Italy to almost 90 in France. The effect of the spread on real 
output is significant for horizons of 4 to 8 quarters ahead. In France, Germany, and U.S. the effect 
holds also at shorter horizons. Moreover, a probit regression reveals the ability of the spread to 
anticipate recessions; however the sensitivity of the probabilities to change in the spread are highly 
non linear. Finally, Estrella and Mishkin argue that TS could be an intermediate target for monetary 
policy pointing out that the spread is undoubtedly an indicator of the monetary policy stance.  
Despite  empirical  evidence  largely  supports  the  predictive  power  of  the  spread,  no  theoretical 
frameworks have been proposed to analyse the relationship between the spread and the economy. 
Estrella (2004) develops a rational expectations model to explore the relation between the yield 
curve and macroeconomic variables. The model matches an important feature of existing empirical 
evidence which regards the greater accuracy of the spread to anticipate business cycle fluctuations 
rather than future inflation. The simple macro model is composed by three basic equations, an IS 
(AD)  curve,  a  Phillips  (AS)  curve,  and  a  monetary  policy  rule  that  allows  for  interest  rate 
smoothing. Results are summarized by the following equations; (1.50) highlights the dependence of 
future  output  gap  upon  the  spread,  the  difference  between  the  interest  rate  and  inflation,  the 
inflation deviation from the targeted steady state level, and the current level of the output gap.   
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Equation (1.51) shows how agents form inflation expectations. In both cases the predictive power of 
the spread is inversely related to the policy parameter      , which reflects the reaction of the central 
bank to the deviations of output around its potential level. The more incline the monetary authority 
to stabilize output, the weaker the predictive ability of the TS slope. Parameter   captures the effect 
that current output exerts on actual inflation. The variability of the ratio between   and       over 
time accounts for the instability of the spread to predict future inflation; it explains also the relative 
inaccuracy of the spread for forecasting future inflation rather than output.  
Now we turn our attention to the recent strand of literature examining whether term premia contains 
predictive power to infer future level of output.  
Fama and French (1989) find evidence suggesting that term premia are inversely related to the 
business cycle. Cochrane (2005) reinforces this view. A good security, in fact, is expected to offer 
high returns, i.e. premia, in bad states, when investors feel poor. This basic idea underlies modern 
asset pricing through the stochastic discount factor, which reflects the intertemporal marginal utility 
of consumption. Earlier Hicks (1946) has emphasized the financial role of the term premium, since 
it  is  linked  to  the  capital  risk  resulting  from  interest  rates’  volatility.  Investors  require  a 
compensation to bear risk associated to highly volatile rates. A negative correlation between term 
premia and the economic cycle is also documented by Cook and Hahn (1989).  
Hamilton and Kim (2002) provide a decomposition of the spread using         observed short term 
rates data instead of         expected rates. The spread is split into two components: the expected 
future changes in short rates and a premium. They show that both components help predict real 
GDP  growth;  the  estimated  effect  of  both  components  on  future  output  growth  is  significantly 
positive. Cyclical movements of interest rates’ volatility are not explicitly related to GDP; however, 
volatility seems an important empirical determinant of both the spread and the term premium. Ang, 
Piazzesi and Wei (2006) confirm that the distinction of the aforementioned components is important 
to obtain a clear understanding of the forecasting model. The spread reflects the expected stance of 
monetary policy; while premia are related to agents’ risk aversion. Although the risk factor is not 
statistically significant, evidence highlights that the ability of the model to forecast future output 
improves substantially when the spread is split into the aforementioned components.  
Kim and Wright (2005) employ a standard arbitrage-free dynamic latent factor TS model to derive 
risk premia. They ascribe the above mentioned conundrum to a fall in term premia. Wright (2006) 
finds that risk premia help predict recessions over a six-quarter horizon, but not from two to four 
quarters  ahead.  Consistently  with  previous  research,  he  remarks  that  lower  premia  raise  the 
probability of a recession in the future.   34 
Favero, Kaminska, and Soderstrom (2005) analyse the role of the yield spread to predict variations 
in output (∆ ) since it has been argued that the spread forecasting ability has decreased in recent 
times  (Dotsey,  1998).  The  reduced  predictive  power  can  be  attributed  either  to  the  changing 
behaviour of the Fed, more concerned about price stability, or to the effect of term premia. As 
Hamilton and Kim (2002), Favero      . (2005) thus isolate the term premium. The 20-quarter rate 
can be expressed as the average of expected future 3-month rates 
1
      +  plus a time-varying premium 
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   can be seen as the sum of a risk term and a liquidity premium. After simulating a macro-finance 
VAR model forward to obtain forecasts of the short rate 
1 ˆ       + , they generate the rationally expected 
(  ) component of the yield spread: 
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The spread is thus the summation of    and   . Discrepancies between effective and expected 
spread exist since then information set       used by agents is not as rich as the continuously updated 
information set    Ω  available to the econometricians. The correlation between    and    is negative. 
The predictive power of both components of the spread results from the following regression: 
  
                        + + + + + = ∆ + π γ γ γ γ γ 4
1
3 2 1 0 4 4                                                                             (1.54) 
 
Recursive estimations show that the term premium is highly significant in explaining future output 
( ) fluctuations, as well as inflation (π ) and the short rate. Inflation and the expectations-based rate 
series share important co-movements. The positive correlation between    and inflation implies 
that the expectational term is negatively correlated with the real interest rate “                    
                                                                                                 
                                                       . Favero      . (2005) relate term premia 
behaviour to time-varying investors’ risk aversion “                                               
                                                                                                   
                                       ”.  
Feroli (2004) explores the interaction between monetary policy and TS. He suggests that, assuming 
both interest rate smoothing and counter cyclical monetary policy, the spread is informative about 
future output. Smoothing rates implies that the first difference of the short term policy rate becomes 
an instrument of monetary policy. Feroli considers four measures of monetary policy: the federal 
funds  rate,  the  first  difference  of  the  fed  funds,  residuals  from  an  identified  VAR  (policy   35 
innovations), and a narrative measure of monetary policy stance (Boschen and Mills, 1995). It turns 
out that the significance of the spread is robust to different specification of equation (1.54). The 
spread Granger determines output. Monte Carlo simulations highlights that after 1979 the predictive 
ability of the spread has diminished due to a change in the policy preferences. Feroli says that the 
ability of the spread to predict economic growth crucially depends on expectations about future 
policy concluding that the ability to predict is somewhat different from the ability to cause
19. 
Empirical research has largely explored the possibility that premia could anticipate future economic 
activity; however, Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007) observe that no theoretical formalization 
has been proposed
20. Despite data evidence, they show that there is not a structural relationship 
between  term  premia  and  future  GDP  growth.  We  thus  conclude  this  Section  by  presenting  a 
theoretical model of TS and the economy
21. Only optimizing agents live in the economy. Firms 
maximize expected discounted profits given the technology    (assumed to be an AR(1) process): 
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       is the stochastic discount factor between   and    ;   and   denote respectively the price and the 
quantity of final output (  is the firm index);   represents the wage rate, while   the amount of 
labour. The optimal price is set as a mark-up on marginal costs. The production function is a typical 
Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale: 
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Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic competitive firms and are purchased by a perfectly 
competitive final good sector that produces final goods with constant elasticity of substitution (θ ). 
The  typical  downward  sloping  demand  curve  and  the  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  price 
aggregator on the continuum firms space   ∈ [0, 1] are respectively   
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Consumers maximize their lifetime utility:  
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19 Granger definition of causality: a time series  t is said to Granger cause  t if predictions of  t based on past values of both  t and 
 t are more accurate than predictions obtained using past values of  t only. 
20 Estrella (2004), briefly discussed above, develops a rational expectations model to examine the relationship between the slope of 
the yield curve and macro variables. He concludes that the relationship is not structural; however, in line with Feroli (2004), he finds 
that TS dynamics influences output and inflation through monetary policy actions.  
21 Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) derive a model combining a typical DSGE macro model with no-arbitrage TS framework.   36 
 
δ   is  the  subjective  time-preference  discount  factor,     denotes  household’s  consumption,  and  
          represents a shock to consumption habits (b andχ  are parameter). The pricing kernel is 
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Optimizing households’ behaviour leads to both an intratemporal condition 
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and to the classical intertemporal Euler condition with consumption habit: 
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   is the continuously compounded interest rate. Private consumption    and government spending (   
which is first-order autoregressive with idiosyncratic shock) form the aggregate demand of a closed 
economy. The central bank responds to both output and inflation deviations from the respective 
natural and targeted level; the monetary policy rule allows for interest rate smoothing. Finally, the 
financial sector is described by the usual asset pricing condition: 
 
{ } 1 1 + + =                                                                                                                                           (1.62) 
 
The price of any asset equals its the stochastic discounted future values. In the case of a perpetuity, 
the (   ) nominal consol price satisfies: 
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The risk neutral (  probability measure)     price of the consol can be expressed as follows: 
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Thus, the implied term premium is: 
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Considering two finite maturities   and   (  >  ), the term premium satisfies the following: 
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Rudebusch      . (2007) find that the first-order approximation (   -linearization) of the model 
around  the  steady  state  makes  the  term  premium  disappear;  the  second-order  approximation   37 
produces a constant premium. Only the third-order approximation allows a time-varying premium. 
Results  do  not  highlight  any  structural  relationship  between  term  premia  and  macro  variables. 
However, impulse response analysis generates interesting results. A positive monetary policy shock, 
a rise in the fed funds rate, increases the premium and lowers output; the response of the premium 
vanishes away after few quarters. Following a positive technology shock, the premium drops and 
output  jumps  upward.  Therefore  an  increase  in  the  premium  seems  associated  to  future  weak 
economic growth. A positive innovation to government spending increases the term premium as 
well as output; in addition, the upward shift of the premium is quite persistent since the government 
budget worsen. Consistently with the model outcome, but contrarian to previous results
22, they find 
evidence suggesting that faster economic growth is related to a decline in the term premium.   
 
 
 
1.7   Macroeconomic Models, Latent Factors, and the Term Structure 
 
In this Section I briefly present the strand of literature regarding the macroeconometric analysis of 
dynamic  TS  models.  The  contributions  discussed  in  this  part  challenge  to  merge  two  different 
fields: macroeconomics and finance.  
Financial economists have found a suitable way to model bonds pricing by means of arbitrage-free 
affine TS models. The relative simple tractability of affine        non-affine (Black, 1976) models 
has contributed to the success of modelling TS within affine frameworks. Affine models imply that 
the price of a zero-coupon bond    with maturity   is exponentially affine (constant plus linear 
term) in the real function   ( ) and in the vector function   ( ):  
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   is the vector of state variables.The inverse relationship between bonds’ prices and yields implies:  
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where  small-case  letters  denote       transformation.  Affine  models  are  appealing  since  they 
summarize the dynamics of bond pricing by means of few state variables since available evidence 
suggests that almost all movements of the yield curve can be captured by the joint effect of only 
three factors. The name of the yield curve factors comes from Litterman and Scheinkman (1991). A 
shock to the level affects uniformly yields of all maturities generating a parallel shift of the entire 
yield curve. A positive shock to the slope increases the steepness of the yield curve, since short 
                                                 
22 Hamilton and Kim (2002), as well as Favero, Kaminska, and Soderstrom (2005), find that lower term premia predicts slower 
output growth. Also Wright (2006) argues that “                                               ”.   38 
rates raise less than long rates. Finally, a curvature shock affects intensely the middle part of the 
maturity spectrum accentuating the hump-shape form of the yield curve. 
Ang and Piazzesi (2003) pioneered the approach including macroeconomic variables in dynamic 
arbitrage-free TS models. They examine the influence of macro variables on the yield curve. Bond 
yields are determined by the three unobservable variables (level, slope, and curvature), a measure of 
inflation, and an indicator of real economic activity. Results show that incorporating inflation and 
real activity into asset-pricing models improves forecasting movements of yield curve both in- and 
out-of-sample. However, such effects are sometimes limited. They find evidence that approximately 
85% of bond yields variation is attributed to the impact of macro factors. Macro factors, obtained by 
principal components explain movements of short and medium term yields (up to maturity of     
year);  whereas,  movements  of  long  yields  are  related  to  unobservable  factors.  Therefore,  they 
conclude that macroeconomic variables cannot shift the level of the yield curve.  
Wu (2001) investigates the relationship between the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy surprises 
and the slope factor finding a strong correlation. Policy surprises are identified in different ways to 
make the analysis more robust; although they account for 80% to 90% of the movements of slope 
factor,  such  influences  usually  dissipate  in  one  to  two  months.  The  level  factor  is  apparently 
independent from monetary policy, Wu thus concludes that, after 1982, the Fed has affected the 
yield curve primarily through changing its slope. 
Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008) decompose nominal interest rates into movements in real rates and 
expected inflation. Since real rates and expected inflation are not directly observable, they build a 
model to infer these factors from their impact on other variables in the economy. They find that 
short term real rates tend to be highly volatile, while long rates are smooth and persistent. The flat 
shape of the real TS allows them to conclude that the positive slope typically present in the nominal 
TS is due to an inflation risk premium which is increasing in maturity. Moreover, real rates mainly 
follow pro-cyclical dynamics whereas nominal rates show a counter-cyclical pattern. They also find 
that changes in expected inflation and in inflation risk premia explain about 80% of the variations of 
nominal rates. 
Rudebusch  and  Wu  (2004)  develop  a  no-arbitrage  macro-finance  model  to  examine  the  joint 
movement of TS and macro variables. They consider only two latent factors as they argue two 
factors are enough to capture about 99% of yields’ dynamics. Results indicate that the TS level is 
associated  with  the  central  bank  inflation  target; while,  the  slope  factor  closely  reproduces  the 
dynamics of the policy rate implied by a Taylor-type reaction function. Rudebusch and Wu (2005) 
propose a refinement of their previous work to analyse the shift of TS occurred during the 1980s. 
They argue that the volatility of term premia has declined in the last decades together with the price   39 
of risk reflected in the level factor. Risk premia are thus closely linked to the expected inflation rate 
targeted by the monetary authority; hence, the severe conduct of monetary policy started by Volcker 
and, to some extent, continued by  Greenspan,  has influenced the TS level. They  conclude that 
modified risk premia reflected in the level factor can definitely account for TS shifts over time. 
Hordahl,  Tristani,  and  Vestin  (2006)  estimate  a  joint  macroeconomic  and  finance  model  for  the 
German yield curve. The model is developed on the crucial assumption of no-arbitrage, and includes 
three basic equations: an equation for the output gap, an equation for inflation (the new Keynesian 
Phillips curve), and a monetary policy Taylor rule for the short rate. The macroeconometric model 
appears to fit German data quite well and reproduces salient features related to the German TS. 
Data evidence, in fact, indicates a regular decline in the targeted inflation rate from 4 to 1 % in the 
last three decades; in addition, an increase in the inflation target would lead to a substantial increase 
in the risk premium. They document by means of the impulse response analysis that inflationary 
shocks affect yields at medium maturities, accentuating TS curvature. Risk premia significantly 
respond to output gap shocks particularly after the German reunification. Investors seem to prefer 
long  term  bonds  during  recessions  since  risk  premia  are  related  to  the  expected  state  of  the 
economy. Finally, they adopt a                     technique to generate a measure of risk premia 
compatible with the solution of the EH puzzle (given a specific set of parameter values which 
maximizes  the  log-likelihood  function  derived  in  their  model).  The  model-implied  population 
coefficients replicate quite closely the pattern of the sample coefficients; in line with Hardouvelis 
(1994) and Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), they thus conclude that the expectations puzzle is less 
severe using German data than for U.S. 
Dewachter, Lyrio and Maes (2004) employ a continuous-time affine TS model to analyse yields and 
the economy allowing for time-varying risk premia. Inflation and the output gap are observable, 
while latent factors represent respectively the real interest rate, the central tendencies of inflation, 
and the central tendencies of the real rate. Evidence suggests that the output gap and inflation do not 
adequately fit the dynamic properties of TS at long maturities; whereas, the variability of the long 
end of the yield curve is mainly driven by the central tendency of inflation. Medium term yields, 
from six months to two years, appear to be responsive to the central tendency of the real rate. They 
also find that both macro and latent factors affect bond excess holding returns. 
Diebold and Li (2003), and Diebold, Piazzesi and Rudebusch (2005) employ the Nelson-Siegel 
method to examine bonds pricing within a dynamics latent factor approach. Nelson and Siegel 
(1987) have proposed a parsimonious model for the yield curve capable of reproducing a great 
variety of shapes, and, more importantly, of fitting U.S. data quite well. In continuous-time the 
yield to maturity  ) (     on a  -period bill can be expressed as the average of future forward rates: 
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The  following  interpolant  is  essentially  a  Laguerre  function,  i.e.  a  polynomial  function 
characterized by an exponential decay term (λ): 
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Parameters  0 β ,  1 β ,  and  2 β   embody  the  long,  short,  and  medium  properties  of  the  yield  curve 
respectively; hence, they can be interpreted as level, slope, and curvature. The loading of  0 β  does 
not decay to      as the maturity increases, i.e. the multiplying coefficient     is constant. The  1 β  
loading starts at     and decays monotonically towards     . Finally, the loading of  2 β  starts at 
    , increases and then goes back to     , as a curvature factor is expected to behave. Nelson and 
Siegel find that the proposed model can account for almost 96% of the variations in bill yields 
between 1981 and 1983. Nelson and Siegel (1988) focusing on the long run properties of the model 
show that, under some regularity conditions, the flattening of the yield curve at long maturities is 
approximately proportional to the reciprocal of time to maturity. 
Before concluding it is interesting to mention some works reflecting the most recent evolution of 
macro-TS research. Recently there has been an attempt to include latent factor dynamics into New 
Keynesian  macro  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium  (DSGE)  models.  Bekaert,  Cho,  and 
Moreno  (2005)  combine  the  structural  New  Keynesian  macroeconomics  with  no-arbitrage  TS 
theory. They find that changes in the inflation target dominate the dynamics of the level factor. In 
addition, they relate both slope and curvature to monetary policy shocks. Impulse responses of TS 
factors to macroeconomic shocks confirm the above interpretation.  
In a similar vein Wachter (2006) develops a macro-finance no-arbitrage TS model. The innovative 
feature introduced by Wachter is external habit on consumption. In such a framework bond prices 
depend on expected inflation and past consumption through habit. She finds evidence that bond 
term premia are increasing with maturity (Ang, Bekaert, and Wei 2008; Boudoukh, Richardson, 
Smith, and Whitelaw, 1999). Finally, model simulations generate a pattern for time-varying term 
premia that accounts for the expectations puzzle; since the model implies that investors’ marginal 
utility  becomes  highly  volatile  during  periods  of  slowdown  in  economic  activity.  This  line  of 
research has been followed by Garcia and Luger (2005) who have developed an equilibrium macro-
finance model with a reference level of consumption, i.e. a benchmark denoting the predictable 
component of consumption.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
A Macroeconometric Analysis of the Unobservable Components 
of the Yield Curve: Evidence from U.S. and Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This work extends the strand of literature that examines the relation between the term structure of 
interest rates and macroeconomic variables. We focus on three unobservable components to describe 
the evolution of the term structure over time. The level reflects the medium term inflation rate 
targeted by the monetary authority. The slope factor is related to the nominal stance of monetary 
policy; in particular, the slope tracks the annual change of the effective federal funds rate. The 
second unobservable component thus captures the adjusting preferences of the monetary authority 
over the business cycle. Finally, we address the challenging issue of attributing a macroeconomic 
interpretation  to  the  curvature  factor.  We  find  evidence  suggesting  that  curvature  reflects  the 
fluctuations of the business cycle. In particular, curvature is positively correlated with industrial 
production growth and inversely related to unemployment. Interestingly, this result holds in spite of 
whether curvature is extracted from the nominal or the real term structure. A negative shock to 
curvature seems either to anticipate or to accompany a slowdown in economic activity. The curvature 
effect thus complements the transition from an upward sloping yield curve to a flat one.  
a 
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2.1   Introduction 
 
Examining the relation between yields of different maturities is crucial for both macroeconomists and 
financial economists. From a macro perspective, the short rate is a policy instrument controlled by 
the monetary authority; from a financial perspective, short rate movements help predict long rates, 
since long term yields are the expected average of risk-adjusted future short yields. 
Traders and financial analysts often attribute term structure movements to monetary policy actions; 
expectations on policy announcements exert a significant impact on the dynamics of the term structure. 
In addition, macroeconomists believe that the shape of the yield curve gives information about the future 
path of macroeconomic variables; moreover, the yield curve itself tends to respond to macro news. 
Only recently macro variables have been included in TS models leaving space to explore the way 
further. In this chapter, in fact, we aim to establish a clear connection between factors underlying 
term  structure’s  movements  and  macroeconomic  variables.  In  particular,  we  focus  on  the 
interpretation of curvature, or the butterfly factor, which has been mostly ignored before; secondly, 
we propose an innovative interpretation of the slope factor, which seems related to the evolution of the 
nominal stance of monetary policy rather than to the level of the policy rate. 
We consider the bond market of the U.S. economy between January 1984 and June 2007. Our 
analysis thus covers both the final part of the Volcker’s mandate at the Federal Reserve System and the 
Greenspan era; in particular, we focus on a sample characterized by both price stability and relative 
homogeneity  of  the  monetary  regime  (                                   ).  We  also  analyse  the 
Canadian  term  structure  of  interest  rates  between  January  1986  and  June  2006.  Data  evidence 
suggests that almost all TS movements can be summarized by few underlying factors. We thus 
estimate two alternative TS factor models in order to extract three latent components, namely level, 
slope and curvature. The terminology refers to the effect that a shock to these unobservable factors 
exerts on the shape of the yield curve (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). 
An important strand of literature has recently focused on the macroeconomic interpretation of these 
factors.  The  existing  empirical  literature  associates  the  TS  level  to  some  measures  of  inflation. 
Rudebusch and Wu (2004), as well as Bekaert, Cho and Moreno (2005), suggest the level factor 
reflects the inflation rate targeted by the monetary authority,       the medium-long run equilibrium 
inflation rate. Dewacther, Lyrio, and Maes (2006) emphasize the level is an indicator of the central 
tendency of inflation. There is also general consensus about the interpretation of the slope, which is 
believed to be a monetary policy factor. Rudebusch and Wu (2004) provide evidence that the slope 
tracks a fitted Taylor-type monetary policy rule; Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) relate the slope 
to monetary policy shocks. A negative slope shock increases short rates by more than long rates 
reducing the yield spread, which is what generally occurs after a policy tightening. The economic   43 
interpretation of curvature is more controversial. It has been argued it is either related to monetary 
policy  shocks  (Cho,  Bekaert,  and  Moreno,  2005),  or  to  the  real  stance  of  monetary  policy 
(Dewacther, Lyrio, and Maes, 2006), or, eventually, to the expected future path of interest rates 
(Giese, 2008). Dewachter and Lyrio (2002) suggest that curvature represents a clear independent 
monetary policy factor; in particular, curvature reflects movements of the real interest rates that are 
orthogonal to any other macroeconomic variables. Finally, Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006) 
emphasize the effect of both inflation and output shocks on medium term maturities of the yield 
curve.  
The empirical work contained in this chapter finds its inspiration in the following diagrams (Figure 
2.1). Grey shaded areas highlight NBER recessions; while yellow shadings call attention to the 
economic slowdown following Volcker’s disinflation.  
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U.S. data.  lev ,S (kf): level factor extracted 
by  Kalman  filtering  the  NS  model  (Section 
2.3).  CPI  inflation:  Consumer  Price  Index 
(urban  consumers,  all  items)  annual  growth 
rate.  core  CPI  inflation:  Consumer  Price 
Index (all items less food and energy) annual 
rate of growth. 
 
U.S. data.  slo ,S (kf): slope factor extracted 
by  Kalman  filtering  the  NS  model  (Section 
2.3). effective federal funds rate grw: annual 
rate of growth of the federal funds rate (Fed of 
St. Louis, FRED database). 
 
U.S. data.  cur ,S (kf): curvature factor 
extracted by Kalman filtering the NS model 
(Section  2.3).  Ind.  Product.  grw:  annual 
growth  rate  of  the  seasonally  adjusted 
Industrial  Production  Index    (FRED). 
Unemp.  grw:  annual  growth  of 
unemployment  (civilian,  seasonally 
adjusted, FRED).   
Figure 2.1 
 
In the left panel of Figure 2.1, we plot the level factor together with both the CPI and the core-CPI 
inflation measures. As expected, the series display important co-movements. The negative trend of 
the level factor is not regularly reproduced by the price series though. The constant decline of the 
level  might  be  due  both  to  the  augmented  credibility  of  the  U.S.  monetary  regime  and  to  the 
consolidation of the U.S. monetary authority’s reputation. The central panel of Figure 2.1 reveals 
that the slope factor is closely associated to the annual change of the federal funds rate, which we 
consider an important indicator of how the nominal stance of monetary policy evolves over time. 
Finally, curvature is plotted in the right panel of Figure 2.1. We suggest curvature being related to 
the real economy. A visual inspection of the right diagram of Figure 2.1 is striking in this sense. 
There is a clear drop of curvature during periods of slowdown in real economic activity. In particular, 
curvature  seems  to  be  contemporaneously  linked  to  the  industrial  production  growth,  while  it 
follows with some delay the change in the labour market conditions.   44 
The empirical analysis of curvature is developed along few parallel lines. Firstly, we compare two different 
models  in  order  to  discern  the  economic  nature  of  the  third  unobservable  component.  In  one  model 
curvature is a function of some monetary variables; while, the second model links curvature to variables 
that reflect the conjunctural evolution of the real economy. Empirical evidence supports the view that 
curvature is more closely related to the cyclical fluctuations of real activity. In addition, we estimate 
a typical forward-looking aggregate demand (IS) curve for both curvature and the industrial production 
gap; results suggest that curvature approximates quite well the aforementioned gap.  
Harvey  (1988)  and  Chapman  (1997)  highlight  a  significant  relationship  between  the  real  term 
structure of interest rates and consumption growth. We thus extract a measure of curvature from the 
real TS finding that it is significantly related to the business cycle. In particular, although curvature 
from the nominal TS seems unrelated to consumption, evidence suggests that the real counterpart of 
the third unobservable component is inversely correlated with consumption.  
Finally, we present and estimate a joint macroeconometric model for curvature and real activity 
which confirms the aforementioned economic interpretation of curvature. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief review of the literature. 
In Section 2.3 we present the Nelson-Siegel latent factor model. The core of the empirical analysis is 
contained in Sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, where we provide evidence to support the macroeconomic 
interpretation of curvature. In particular, in Section 2.5 we estimate a cyclical model for curvature; 
while in Section 2.6 we develop and estimate a joint macroeconometric model for curvature and real 
activity. Empirical evidence in Section 2.7 concerns the macroeconomic interpretation of both the level 
and  the  slope  of  the  yield  curve.  Sections  2.8  presents  evidence  for  Canada.  Finally,  Section  2.9 
concludes. Data are presented in            . . Estimations of TS models are in            .  . 
 
 
 
2.2   Literature Review 
 
Two main classes of TS models have been considered in the literature. The classical affine TS class is 
based on the no-arbitrage assumption; and the Nelson-Siegel class where yields are assumed to be a 
function of the latent factors through Laguerre functions of their maturities. 
The success of the affine class might be due to the relatively simple tractability compared to the 
computational  difficulties  implied  by  the  non-affine  class  (Black,  1976).  In  addition,  arbitrage 
opportunities are quickly traded away in bond markets, since bonds are exchanged in well organized 
efficient markets. Affine models are appealing since they explain bonds’ price dynamics by means of 
few state variables, i.e. the latent factors. In particular, almost all movements of TS are due to the effect of 
a small number of components. Dai and Singleton (2000) show that 99% of the variations in the yield   45 
curve can be attributed only to three factors. Rudebusch and Wu (2004) argue that level and  slope account 
for over than 99% of the variation in the yield curve dynamics.  
Ang and Piazzesi (2003) estimate a macro-finance model of TS and the economy investigating the 
influence  of  both  inflation  and  a  real  factor  on  the  yield  curve  in  an  arbitrage-free  asset  pricing 
framework.  Bond  yields  are  determined  both  by  the  three  unobservable  factors  (level,  slope,  and 
curvature) and by two common factors that reflect respectively a measure of inflation and an indicator of 
real economic activity. Incorporating macro factors into TS models improves the ability to forecast 
yields’ movements both in- and out-of-sample. However, such effects are sometimes limited. Ang and 
Piazzesi argue that approximately 85% of bond yields variation is attributable to the impact of macro 
factors; macroeconomic variables explain movements at short and medium term maturities (up to     
year); movements of long term bond yields, on the other hand, are due to the effect of financial factors. 
A joint macro-finance TS model for the Euro area is worked out by Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006). 
The model includes three equations: an equation for the output gap, i.e. the AD-IS relation; an equation for 
inflation, which is an empirical specification of the new Keynesian Phillips curve; and, finally, a monetary 
policy rule for the short term rate. The macroeconometric model appears to fit German data quite well. 
Impulse response analysis shows that inflationary shocks affect  yields mostly at medium maturities, 
increasing the curvature of the yield curve; while, monetary policy shocks affect the short end of the 
yield curve. Risk premia tend to respond to output gap real shocks.  
Rudebusch and Wu (2004) develop an affine macro-finance model of TS and the economy to examine 
the joint evolution of the yield curve and macro variables. They find that the level is closely associated with 
the central bank’s long run inflation target; while the slope reflects the central bank’s reaction function, 
i.e. the short term interest rate set in response to the cyclical evolution of inflation and real activity.  
Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008) offer a decomposition of the nominal TS into the combined effect of real 
interest rates and expected inflation. Since neither real interest rates nor expected inflation are observable, 
they infer these factors from their impact on other variables in the economy. Short term real interest rates 
are volatile, whereas long term rates are smooth and persistent. Moreover, data evidence suggests that 
the positive slope typically present in the nominal TS is caused by an inflation risk premium which is 
increasing in maturity; the real term structure is thus flat since it is not affected by inflation. Real rates 
tend  to  follow  pro-cyclical  dynamics  whereas  nominal  rates  show  counter-cyclical  movements. 
Variations in expected inflation and in inflation risk premia explain about 80% of the variation in nominal 
interest rates and that these variables are also the main determinants of nominal interest rate spreads at 
long horizons. 
Dewachter, et   . (2004) employ a continuous-time affine TS model to investigate the dynamic relation 
between yields and macroeconomic variables. The adopted framework also allow for time-varying risk   46 
premia. The model includes two observable macroeconomic variables, i.e. inflation and the output gap, 
and three unobservable components. They propose these latent factors to represent the real interest rate, 
the central tendency  of inflation, and the  central tendency of the real interest rate respectively.  They 
achieve conclusions in line with Ang and Piazzesi (2003). Macroeconomics variables are not capable of 
explaining movements at the long end of the yield curve. The variability of the long end of the yield curve 
is instead related to the central tendency of inflation. Medium term interest rates, from six months to two 
years,  appear  to  be  responsive  to  the  real  interest  rate  central  tendency.  They  recognize  that  both 
observable and unobservable components influence risk premia and bond excess returns. 
Diebold  and  Li  (2003),  Diebold,  Piazzesi  and  Rudebusch  (2005),  Diebold,  Rudebusch,  and  Aruoba 
(2006) have employed the Nelson-Siegel interpolant to examine bond pricing. Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
have proposed a parsimonious model for the yield curve, which is capable of reproducing a great 
variety of shapes that the yield curve can assume over time. The model fits U.S. data quite well. The 
interpolant, which is essentially a polynomial function, is flexible enough to fit a wide range of shapes 
displayed by the yield curve. The loadings of these exponential functions embody the long, short, and 
medium properties of the yield curve respectively; so that these parameters can be interpreted as level, 
slope, and curvature respectively (see Section 2.3). NS find that the model can account for almost 
96% of the variations in yields during the period between 1981 and 1983. They also show that this 
model  implies  that,  under  some  regularity  conditions,  the  flattening  of  the  yield  curve  at  long 
maturities is approximately proportional to the reciprocal of the time to maturity.  
The most recent strand of literature has mixed TS model with macroeconomic theory, including latent 
factor dynamics into New Keynesian macroeconomic general equilibrium framework. Bekaert, Cho, and 
Moreno  (2005)  have  developed  a  model  in  which  they  combine  the  structural  New  Keynesian 
macroeconomics and the no-arbitrage term structure theory. This line of research has been followed by 
Wachter  (2006)  and  Garcia  and  Luger  (2005)  who  have  considered  a  consumption-based 
equilibrium macro-finance model.  
 
 
 
2.3   The ,elson-Siegel Factor Model 
 
Nelson and Siegel (1987, 1988) propose a factor model for TS which has become increasingly 
popular to the extent that also central banks have adopted it. Diebold and Li (2006) employ the NS 
approach  without  imposing  the arbitrage-free  condition (Hull and White, 1990;  Ang and Piazzesi, 
2003) and excluding the equilibrium approach (Dai and Singleton, 2000; Piazzesi and Schneider, 
2006). The yield on a bond with maturity   (
) (    ) is set to be a polynomial function of the maturity:  
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Parameter  λ  governs the exponential decay
23; as Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006), we set  λ  
equal to 0.077. It follows a plot of the loadings:  
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L: loading of the level factor.  
S: loading of the slope factor.  
C: loading of the curvature factor. 
Figure 2.2 
 
The first loading, i.e. the unity coefficient multiplying      , is a constant and it is interpreted as the level 
factor; the loading of       is interpreted as the slope; it is an exponential function that starts at     and 
decays monotonically toward     . The loading of       starts at     , increases with maturity   and 
then declines, it finally approaches to     . The shape of the loadings resembles the effect exerted 
on TS by a shock that hits the specific latent factors (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). 
The  latent  factors  follow  a  first-order  VAR  process.  Differently  from  standard  assumptions  in 
canonical affine TS model (Dai and Singleton, 2000), we do not restrict the transition matrix (    Φ ) 
to be lower triangular. So that the actual value of each factor depends on the first lag of all the other 
factors. The transition matrix is (3 x 3) and contains nine parameters, while the mean state vector is 
(3 x 1). The latent components are stacked in the state vector: [ ]                 , , = ; the transition, or state, 
equation of the state-space representation is: 
 
                 , 1 ω µ + ⋅ Φ + = −                                                                                                              (2.2) 
 
The disturbance 
0 ,     ω is      . Normal with      mean and diagonal covariance matrix (Ω). The initial 
state  vector  0     is  orthogonal  to  the  disturbances 
0 ,    ω   of  the  transition  equation.  The  observation 
equation of the state-space system is: 
 
          ν + ℵ =                                                                                                                                   (2.3) 
                                                 
23 Nelson and Siegel suggest fixing it equal to 0.06, since this is the value that maximizes the third loading, i.e. the exponential 
function which multiplies the curvature factor. We have estimated the model also with this value of the parameter; results are similar.    48 
The disturbance term is        Normally distributed with      mean and variance (   ⋅
2 σ ). We assume 
a white noise transition disturbances    ν  orthogonal to the initial state vector  0   . The measurement 
equation links yields to the unobservable components: 
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We consider nine yields with maturities 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-, 36-, 48-, 60-, and 120-month; it seems 
enough  to  achieve  a  dense  representation  of  the  maturity  spectrum  domain.  Nominal  TS 
estimations
24
 suggest high persistency of all latent factors and weak cross-factor dynamics. The first 
autoregressive  coefficients  of  the  latent  factors  are  0.98,  0.92,  and  0.90  for    ,    ,  and     
respectively. Estimations for the real TS are different, since the most persistent factor becomes 
curvature. The first autoregressive coefficients of the latent factors extracted from the real TS are 
0.94, 0.91, and 0.95 for   ,   , and    respectively. 
 
 
 
2.4   Curvature and Business Cycle Fluctuations 
 
A better understanding of TS dynamics can be achieved only by exploring the macroeconomic 
underpinning of the yield curve. We start by giving a macroeconomic interpretation to the curvature 
factor which is so far an unresolved issue. The first part of this Section gives an insight about the 
inspiration of the work that follows. Initially we focus both on correlations between curvature and 
real variables and on the visual inspection of the dynamics of the variables of interest. The intuition 
is more formally developed in the second part of this Section, as well as in the following Sections of 
this Chapter, where we perform a rigorous empirical analysis to support the intuition. 
A curvature shock influences medium term yields giving a hump-shaped form to the yield curve
25. 
Hence,  a  negative  shock  generates  an  inverted  hump-shaped  yield  curve,  which  is  sometimes 
observed in the data. As shown in diagram 2.3, curvature seems related to the business cycle. NBER 
                                                 
24 Estimations reported in               . 
25 One-factor TS models cannot generate the inverted hump-shape. Two-factor TS models allow for greater flexibility and can 
account for an inverted hump of the yield curve; however, the effect on curvature depends on the combined effect of the first two 
factors. Three-factor TS models provide a suitable framework to analyse the economic function of curvature.   49 
recessions (grey shaded areas) are accompanied by a sharp curvature drop. Curvature dynamics is 
sensitive to the rise of the unemployment and to the reduction of industrial production. The yield 
curve  seems  hit  by  a  significant  curvature  shock  each  quarter  preceding  NBER  recessions. 
However, we wish to point out that this is not in contrast with previous evidence indicating the slope as 
a good predictor of future economic activity (Stock and Watson, 1989; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). 
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U.S.  data.  cur  ,S  (kf):  curvature  factor 
extracted  by  Kalman  filtering  the  NS  model 
(Section 2.3). IP grw: annual growth rate of the 
seasonally adjusted Industrial Production Index 
(Fed  of  St.  Louis,  FRED).  un  grw:  annual 
growth  of  the  unemployment  rate  (civilian, 
seasonally adjusted, FRED).   
Figure 2.3 
 
Our focus on curvature provides a more general analysis of TS since also intermediate, rather than only 
extreme, maturities, are examined. Any shock affecting the short end of the yield curve, typically a 
monetary policy shock, generates only a moderate and delayed reaction of long yields, which are 
smooth and persistent; so that, any shock affecting the short end of TS can be considered a shock to 
the slope. Our interest in medium maturities arises from the idea that yields at the medium end 
represent an important link between the extremely dynamic short end and the smooth TS long end. 
In particular, in this chapter we argue that the propagation of shocks from the short to the long end 
reflects the evolution of economic conditions over the business cycle. 
The empirical macro-finance literature has proposed different measures of curvature (see legend of 
Table 2.1). Correlations are positive, but not so high as expected; although not reported, the plot of 
different curvature series share important co-movements. In the following part of this Section we focus 
on curvature obtained by Kalman filtering the NS factor model of TS, since it fits quite well all the 
theoretical measures proposed in the literature. 
 
 
. 
Correlations 
Curvature  PC  A-LT (kf)  NS (kf)  AP  BCM  NS – DL 
PC  1           
A-LT (kf)   0.624  1         
NS (kf)   0.596   0.460  1       
AP   0.459   0.256   0.893  1     
BCM   0.440  -0.011   0.837   0.834  1   
NS – DL   0.681   0.466   0.878   0.634   0.789  1 
. 
 
Different  measures  of  curvature.  PC:  third  principal 
components. A-LT (kf): curvature extracted by Kalman filtering 
a  standard  Affine  TS  model  with  lower  triangular  transition 
matrix. ,S (kf): curuvature from Kalman filtering the NS model 
(Section 2.3). AP: theoretical measure of curvature (Ang and 
Piazzesi,2003) computed as y(1 )+y(60 )-2*y(12 ), where   
indicates  the  maturity  in  months.  BCM:  Bekaert,  Cho,  and 
Moreno  (2005)  propose  y(3 )+y(60 )-2*y(12 ).  ,S-DL: 
Nelson and Siegel (1987), Diebold and Li (2006), and Diebold, 
Rudebusch,  and  Aruoba  (2006),  compute  curvature  as 
2*(y24 )-y(120 )-y(3 ). 
Table 2.1 
 
A  preliminary  examination  of  the  correlations  between  curvature  and  some  economic  indicators 
suggests a considerable connection between the financial factor and the real economy, as shown in   50 
Table  2.2.  Curvature  seems  related  both  to  the  unemployment  rate  and  its  variation  over  time. 
Moreover,  curvature  is  correlated  to  the  rate  of  growth  of  industrial  production  computed  over 
different horizons, from a quarter (  = 3) to three years (  = 36). Finally, curvature is also linked to 
the real personal consumption expenditure and tracks different measures of the output gap.  
 
. 
. 
Correlations: Curvature and Real Variables 
. 
   NS (kf)       NS (kf) 
un grw  -0.511     IP grw (3)  0.321 
un grw (-12)  -0.639    IP grw (6)  0.373 
un  -0.507    IP grw (12)  0.470 
un (-3)  -0.432    IP grw (24)  0.607 
un (-6)  -0.345    IP grw (36)  0.679 
r-cons grw  0.335    IP gap BK  0.666 
r-cons grw (-12)  0.458    IP gap HP  0.440 
.. 
 
U.S.  data.  ,S  (kf):  curvature  factor  extracted  by  Kalman 
filtering the NS model (Section 2.3). un grw: annual growth of 
the  unemployment  rate.  un:  unemployment  rate  (civilian, 
seasonally adjusted, FRED). r-cons grw: annual rate of growth 
of  the  seasonally  adjusted  real  personal  consumption 
expenditures  (FRED).  IP  grw:  annual  rate  of  growth  of  the 
seasonally adjusted industrial production index (FRED). IP gap 
BK: industrial production gap obtained with the Baxter King 
band pass filter. IP gap HP: industrial production gap obtained 
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
Negative numbers in parenthesis indicate      (months); while 
positive numbers in parenthesis indicate       (months).   
Table 2.2 
 
Figure 2.4 plots curvature together with some cyclical economic indicators: the unemployment rate of  
growth (left panel); the industrial production gaps (right panel).  
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U.S.  data.  cur  ,S  (kf):  curvature 
extracted by Kalman filtering the NS 
model  (Section  2.3).  un  grw  (-12): 
twelfth lag of therate of growth of the 
unemployment  rate  (civilian  rate, 
FRED).  IP  gap  HP:  industrial 
production gap obtained by Hodrick-
Prescott  filtering  the  seasonally 
adjusted  Industrial  Production  Index. 
IP gap BK: industrial production gap 
obtained  with  the  Baxter  King  band 
pass filter. 
Figure 2.4 
 
Figure 2.5 plots curvature and with real consumption (left panel) and the 12-month lag series of real 
personal  consumption  expenditures  (right  panel).  Curvature  co-moves  quite  closely  with  real 
variables.  In  particular,  as  mentioned  above,  a  sharp  reduction  of  the  curvature  factor  occurs 
immediately before economic slowdown.  
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U.S.  data.  cur  ,S  (kf):  curvature 
extracted by Kalman filtering the NS 
model  (Section  2.3).  real  cons  grw: 
annual rate of growth of the seasonally 
adjusted  real  personal  consumption 
expenditures.  real  cons  grw  (-12): 
twelfth  lag  of  the  annual  rate  of 
growth of the seasonally adjusted real 
personal consumption expenditures. 
Figure 2.5 
 
Evidence  seems  to  support  the  conjecture  that  curvature  is  informative  beyond  the  slope  about 
business cycle fluctuations. We speculate that negative shocks to curvature seem either to anticipate or   51 
to accompany a decline in economic activity. Moreover, available empirical evidence is consistent 
with the idea that the curvature effect complements the transition from an upward sloping yield curve 
to a flat one. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  curvature  factor  is  either  related  to  monetary  policy  shocks  (Cho, 
Bekaert, and Moreno, 2005), or to the real stance of monetary policy (Dewacther, Lyrio, and Maes, 
2006), or again to the expected future path of interest rates (Giese, 2008). In the following analysis 
we show that curvature is more closely related to the condition of the real economy rather than to 
monetary variables. The right panel of Figure 2.6 plots curvature and the annual rate of change of 
the federal funds rate; the series show a close fit
26. The right panel plots curvature and CPI inflation; 
in this case the relation seems to be weaker. 
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U.S.  data.  cur  ,S  (kf):  curvature 
extracted by Kalman filtering the NS 
model (Section 2.3). ffr grw: annual 
growth of the effective federal  funds 
rate. inflation: annual rate of growth  
of  the  seasonally  adjusted  Consumer 
Price  Index  (all  items,  urban 
consumers). 
Figure 2.6  
 
To assess whether curvature is closely related to real variables rather than to monetary variables we 
estimate two different equations. The monetary model (M) is: 
 
                          , 3 12 , 2 12 , 1 0 1 ε π δ δ δ δ + + ∆ + ∆ + = − −                                                                           (2.5) 
 
Where  12 , − ∆          is the annual change in the federal funds rate;  12 , 1 − ∆        is the annual rate of growth of the 
money stock M1;    π  represents CPI inflation, i.e. the annual change of the seasonally adjusted consumer 
price index. The real-variable model (R) relates curvature to some business cycle indicators:  
 
                                     , 4 12 , 3 12 , 2 12 , 1 0 ε ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = − − −                                                    (2.6) 
 
12 , − ∆          is  the  annual  rate  of  growth  of  the  seasonally  adjusted  industrial  production;  12 , − ∆         
represents the annual change in the real personal consumption expenditures;  12 , − ∆         is the annual 
variation in unemployment; and,         is either the Hodrick-Prescott or the Baxter-King de-trended series 
                                                 
26 After estimating a model for curvature using the annual change in the fed funds rate and several lags (including the intercept and 6 
lags of the fed funds change) we found a poor goodness of fit, anyway lower than that obtained through the real-variable model (R). 
Forecasting  curvature  with  such  a  model  returns  worse  “predictive  accuracy”  indicators  than  those  obtained  after  forecasting 
curvature with model (R). Predictive accuracy tests employed in this check are as follows: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), Mean 
Absolute Error (MAE), and Theil Inequality Coefficient (Theil IC). RMSE is the square root of the sum of squared differences 
between predicted and actual series. MAE is the sum of the absolute value of the differences between the predicted and the actual 
series. High values of both the RMSE and the MAE indicate poor fit. The Theil IC is the ratio between the RMSE and the sum 
between the square root of (sum of) the squared predicted values and the square root of (sum of) the actual values. The Theil 
coefficient is thus normalized between 0 and 1, the lower the coefficient the more accurate the prediction.    52 
of (   ) IP
27. In order to show that our results are robust, the above equations have been estimated 
both by ordinary least square and by instrumental variables methods
28. In addition, OLS estimations have 
been performed allowing different structures of the variance-covariance matrix
29.  
 
Curvature – Nominal TS 
    Model (R) – Equation (2.6)    Model (M) – Equation (2.5) 
                                 
    0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ   3 ρ   4 ρ  
2 χ     0 δ   1 δ   2 δ   3 δ  
2 χ  
OLS    -1.6088  0.7693  -0.2423  -0.1015  0.4909      -2.5250  0.8618  -0.1910  0.3713   
WH    (0.236)        
[-6.7] 
(0.040)  
[2.1] 
(0.091)        
[-2.7] 
(0.010)       
[-11] 
(0.106)  
[4.5]  55.54   
(0.309)        
[-8.2] 
(0.279)  
[3.1] 
(0.021)        
[-8.7] 
(0.088)  
[4.2]  108.1 
HH (12)    (0.345)       
[-4.6] 
(0.846)  
[0.9] 
(0.190)        
[-1.3] 
(0.018)       
[-5.4] 
(0.265)  
[1.8]  41.32   
(0.947)       
[-2.6] 
(0.672)  
[1.3] 
(0.041)       
[-4.6] 
(0.230)  
[1.6]  43.05 
NW (18)    (0.352)       
[-4.6] 
(0.815)  
[0.9] 
(0.179)        
[-1.3] 
(0.018)        
[-5.6] 
(0.239)  
[2.0]  35.05   
(0.842)       
[-2.9] 
(0.630)  
[1.3] 
(0.038)        
[-5.0] 
(0.209)  
[1.7]  48.07 
s-HH    (0.827)       
[-1.9] 
(0.132)  
[0.6] 
(0.266)       
[-0.9] 
(0.026)         
[-3.8] 
(0.268)  
[1.8]  24.88   
(1.066)       
[-2.5] 
(0.737)  
[1.2] 
(0.054)       
[-3.5] 
(0.309)  
[1.2]  20.31 
   
2
        0.48               
2
        0.38          
  
  
  
    0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ   3 ρ   4 ρ  
2 χ   0 δ   1 δ   2 δ   3 δ  
2 χ  
IV    -1.2650  0.7926  -0.3595  -0.1148  0.5345    -2.4316  0.7526  -0.2570  0.4067   
   
(0.458)      
[-2.7] 
(0.816)     
[-1.0] 
(0.194)      
[-1.8] 
(0.017)       
[-6.5] 
(0.221)  
[2.4]  38.45   
(0.568)      
[-4.2] 
(0.498)  
[1.5] 
(0.036)      
[-6.9] 
(0.155)  
[2.6]  42.17 
   
2
        0.47               
2
        0.35          
  
Standard error in parenthesis;  -statistics in square brackets.  
. 
Table 2.3 
 
Among  real  variables  only  real  consumption  turns  out  to  be  unrelated  to  curvature;  however, 
consumption  growth  is  significantly  related  to  curvature  of  real  TS,  as  shown  later.  Estimated 
coefficients suggest that increasing unemployment tends to lower medium term yields, generating the 
inverted hump-shape form of the yield curve. On the contrary, a positive growth of the IP index 
tends to increase yields at medium maturities. Results are consistent with evidence that a reduction 
in the IP growth, occurring when economic conditions worsen, is reflected by an inverted hump-
shaped yield curve. Hence, this is in line with the idea that the shape of the yield curve changes over 
                                                 
27 Estimating (2.6) without the IP gap leaves the goodness of fit far above 0.5. After forecasting curvature the Root Mean Squared 
Error is 1.381; the Mean Abslute Error is 1.114; and the Theil Inequality Coefficient is 0.269. Even ruling out the IP gap the 
predictive accuracy from model (R) is better than that obtained from model (M). 
28 The first lag of explanatory variables have been used as instruments. Correlations between regressors and their first lag are above 
0.95; real personal consumption growth is the only exception with a slightly lower first-order correlation coefficient.  
29 Since it is not possible to assume         that residuals are both serially uncorrelated and     normal, the asymptotic            
test,  rather  than  the  small  sample   -test,  is used  to  assess  coefficients’  joint  significance.  The  White  (1980)  correction  allows 
obtaining consistent estimates of the covariance matrix in presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form. The Hansen-Hodrick 
(HH)  correction  is  a  standard  way  to  deal  with  overlapping  data  and  serially  correlated  residuals.  Unfortunately  HH  does  not 
guarantee a positive definite covariance matrix as, instead, the Newey-West (NW) correction does. The            statistics to test 
for joint significant seems suspiciously large, we thus employ the simplified HH, useful in dealing with overlapping residuals, due, 
for instance, to the presence of growth rates among regressors. Standard errors are built ignoring conditional heteroscedasticity and 
assuming that serial correlation is simply due to overlapping observations of homoscedastic forecast errors.   53 
the business cycle. Again we remark that the curvature effect is not incompatible with the fact that 
also the TS slope varies across the business cycle.  
A flat yield curve is usually interpreted as a sign of imminent recession as long as high short rates, 
relative to long rates, should reflect severe monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). While an 
upward sloping TS reflects accommodative policies, and thus incorporates expectations of a thriving 
economy.  Hence,  suppose  that  the  economy  is  growing  fast;  strong  aggregate  demand  is  likely  to 
generate  inflationary  pressures.  Suppose  further  that  the  monetary  authority  raises  interest  rates  to 
preserve inflation stability; two effects follow. On the one hand, the yield spread shrinks, since short yields 
are  likely  to  increase  more  than  long  yields;  on  the  other  hand,  aggregate  demand  weakens 
following the reduction of private investments. This process needs time to take place, it seems thus 
reasonable to expect that the policy tightening affects medium term rates more intensely than long 
rates. The propagation along the entire spectrum of maturities generates a temporary spike in the 
medium end of the yield curve. Therefore, both the dynamics of the yield curve and the evolution of 
macroeconomic conditions occur at the same time. Expectations may either accelerate or anticipate the 
process.  The  contrary  happens before a recession. Expectations of accommodative policy  exert  a 
negative pressure on TS medium maturities reducing curvature. In this chapter we do not intend to 
establish  any  causality  relation  between  curvature  and  real  economy,  we  simply  suggest  that 
curvature reflects the cyclical behaviour of the economy. In short, the curvature effect seems to 
accompany the transition of the yield curve from a positively sloped one, prevailing during booms, 
to a flat one, which is believed to anticipate recessions. 
Estimations of the monetary equation (2.5) suggest curvature being significantly related to the annual 
change of both the fed funds and M1. Hence, evidence does not entirely reject the hypothesis that 
curvature is related to monetary policy shocks, as put forward by Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005); 
however, we provide evidence that the link between curvature and the real economy is stronger than 
the link between curvature and monetary variables
30. In line with Rudebusch and Wu (2004, 2005), 
we find that the slope is more closely related to a Taylor-type policy equation
31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 The monetary equation (2.5) for the slope returns significant coefficients robust to different standard errors (White, HH, NW, s-
HH). The goodness of fit is 55%. Monetary variables predict the slope more accurately than curvature. 
31 We jointly estimated two Taylor-type reaction functions by maximum likelihood. One based on the fed funds rate; the other based 
on the slope factor which, following Rudebusch and Wu (2004), is considered as a proxy for  the policy rate. Both dependent 
variables are assumed to respond to inflation and the HP IP gap. We have also included the first lag of the dependent variable among 
regressors allowing for monetary policy inertia. The Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal respective coefficients in the 
two equations. This evidence suggests that the response of the slope to macro variables is similar to that of the effective fed funds 
rate. Similar results are obtained after GMM estimating the forward-looking Taylor policy functions where the dependent variables 
are assumed to react to expected rather than to actual inflation.    54 
. 
Curvature – Nominal TS 
    Model (R) – Equation (2.6) 
                     
    0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ   3 ρ   4 ρ  
2 χ  
OLS 
 
-2.2535  0.2018  -0.1732  -0.6823  0.4018   
WH 
 
(0.254)   
 [-9.2] 
(0.032)  
 [6.2] 
(0.079)    
[-2.2] 
(0.070)   
 [-9.7] 
(0.061)   
[6.5]  98.44 
NW (5) 
 
(0.396)   
 [-5.7] 
(0.059)   
[3.4] 
(0.132)    
 [-1.3] 
(0.682)   
 [-5.2] 
(0.121)  
 [3.3]  96.45 
   
2
        0.62         
.  
    0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ   3 ρ   4 ρ  
2 χ  
IV    -2.311  0.1859  -0.1476  -0.7774  0.3547   
   
(0.525)   
 [-4.4] 
(0.065)  
 [2.8] 
(0.188)    
[-0.8] 
(0.139)   
  [-5.6] 
(0.120)  
 [2.9]  74.43 
   
2
        0.61             
                       
. 
Table 2.4 
 
Our results are robust to different computation of the IP gap. Table 2.4 shows, in fact, estimations of 
equation (2.6) where the IP gap is obtained by applying the Baxter-King frequency filter. 
We forecast curvature using both models (R) and (M). In Figure 2.7 forecasts are plotted together 
with (twice) the standard errors bands. Both models return accurate forecasts since the actual value 
of curvature never breaks the forecast standard errors. However, forecast errors from the real model 
(left panel) tend to oscillate closer to the      line indicating better fit. 
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U.S.  data.  actual:  curvature  factor  (Nelson 
Siegel).  forecast:  curvature  forecasted  with  the 
real-variable  (R)  model  (2.6).  2  s.e.:  twice  the 
standard  error  bands.  forecast  error:  difference 
between actual curvature and the forecasted series.  
 
U.S.  data.  actual:  curvature  factor  (Nelson 
Siegel).  forecast:  curvature  forecasted  with  the 
monetary  (M)  model  (2.5).  2  s.e.:  twice  the 
standard  error  bands.  forecast  error:  difference 
between actual curvature and the forecasted series. 
Figure 2.7 
 
A battery of tests are performed to assess the predictive accuracy of both the monetary and the real-
variable  equations.  Statistical  results,  reported  in  Table  2.5,  suggest  that  real  rather  than  monetary 
variables generate more accurate predictions of curvature. RMSE and MAE measure how closely the 
forecasted series track  actual data; low values of these statistics indicate a  good fit. The Theil   55 
inequality coefficient can assume a range of values between      and    ; the lower the coefficient 
grater the predictive accuracy. 
   
. 
Predictive Accuracy 
model  RMSE  MAE  Theil IC  .....  DM  MGN  S  W 
M  1.491  1.180  0.294   
2.46  4.84  31.9  25.6 
R  1.377  1.114  0.266   
.. 
 
RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error. MAE: Mean Absolute Error. Theil IC: Theil Inequality 
Coefficient. DM: Diebold Mariano statistics. MG,: Morgan Granger Newbold statistics. S: 
sign test. W: Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Table 2.5 
 
Results are in line with evidence presented so far. The Diebold-Mariano test rejects the null that both 
models have equal predictive accuracy. The Morgan-Granger-Newbold test confirms the significant 
difference  in  the  forecasting  accuracy  of  model  (R)  over  model  (M).  Both  the  Sign  and  the 
Wilcoxon’s Signed-Rank tests reject the null hypothesis of     -median loss differential.  
As  a  further  robustness  check  we  examine  whether  curvature  from  the  real  TS
32
  is  related  to  the 
economy.  Removing  the  effect  of  inflation  from  TS  should  not  affect  the  curvature  factor,  since 
inflation is mainly reflected in long term yields. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008) point out that the real 
TS does not show any clear upward trend, so that inflation risk premia are incorporated in long 
yields. If we believe this, we also think the medium part of the yield curve should be unaffected 
after ruling out the effect of inflation. Therefore, curvature extracted from the real TS should track 
curvature obtained from the nominal TS. The correlation between real TS and nominal TS curvature is 
above 0.95. However, the series of real TS curvature is smoothed compared to its nominal counterpart. 
After ruling out inflation, we re-estimate both the monetary and the real equations for the real TS 
curvature. Curvature is still significantly explained by real variables (Table 2.6). Curvature from the real 
TS is significantly related to consumption growth, whereas curvature from the nominal TS is not. This 
result is consistent with previous findings that the real TS of interest rate is informative about the 
future path of consumption (Harvey, 1988; Chapman, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Real rates can be computed as the difference between nominal yields and expected inflation (the Fisher effect) since, for small 
values, the ratio can be approximated by the    -difference. Assuming rationality and perfect information expected inflation matches 
its realization one period ahead. As expected, and consistently with common sense, the level factor obtained from the nominal TS 
dominates in magnitude the level extracted from the real TS which is almost flat.   56 
.. 
Curvature (real TS) 
    Model (R) – Equation (2.6) 
    0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ   3 ρ   4 ρ  
2 χ  
OLS    -0.4731  0.0636  -0.0937  -0.3403  0.1075   
WH    (0.074)        
 [-6.3] 
(0.011)   
[5.6] 
(0.024)       
 [-3.8] 
(0.022)          
[-15] 
(0.025)   
[4.2]  94.47 
HH (12)    (0.166)         
[-2.8] 
(0.018)   
[3.4] 
(0.056)   
 [-1.7] 
(0.048)         
[-7.0] 
(0.048)   
[2.2]  83.95 
NW (18)    (0.158)         
[-2.9] 
(0.018)   
[3.4] 
(0.056)        
[-1.7] 
(0.045)         
[-7.4] 
(0.048)   
[2.2]  68.30 
s-HH    (0.204)         
[-2.3] 
(0.033)  
 [1.9] 
(0.060)        
[-1.6] 
(0.063)         
[-5.3] 
(0.067)   
[1.6]  48.91 
   
2
        0.63             
.  
    0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ   3 ρ   4 ρ  
2 χ  
IV    -0.4303  0.0649  -0.1097  -0.3779  0.0935   
    (0.172)           [-
2.5] 
(0.019)      
[3.3] 
(0.068)         
[-1.6] 
(0.040)          
[-9.2] 
(0.049)    
[1.9]  70.41 
   
2
        0.63             
.  
   Standard error in parenthesis;  -statistics in square brackets. 
.. 
Table 2.6 
 
We thus use both (M) and (R) models to predict real TS curvature. Left panel of Figure 2.8 shows the 
forecast  of  curvature  obtained  with the real-variable model (R), while the right diagram plots the 
forecast with the monetary model (M)
33. The forecast series are plotted with twice the standard errors 
bands. For model (R), the actual value of real TS curvature stays within the standard errors bands of 
the forecasted series; whereas, the actual series of the curvature breaks the standard errors lines of 
the  forecast  generated  by  the  monetary  (M)  model.  Forecast  errors  associated  to  the  monetary 
model appear to be serially correlated. In particular, during the weakening of U.S. economy in early 
1980s it seems that the monetary model (M) systematically under-predicts the curvature of the real 
term structure. Early 1980s were characterized by a strong disinflation process pursued by Paul 
Volcker, the chairman of the Federal Reserve System. The severe monetary policy conduct carried 
out in that era is summarized by an effective epithet: “                        ”. Data thus suggest 
that removing the effect of inflation in an era of prominent disinflation makes monetary variables 
less  informative  about  the  term  structure  evolution,  and,  in  particular,  about  financial  factors 
underlying the term structure.  
 
                                                 
33 The scale for the forecast error series is different in the two diagrams. 
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U.S.  data.  actual:  real  curvature  factor  (Nelson 
Siegel).  forecast:  real  curvature  forecasted  with  the 
real-variable (R) model (2.6). 2 s.e.: twice the standard 
error bands. forecast error: difference between actual 
real curvature and the forecasted series.  
 
U.S.  data.  actual:  real  curvature  factor  (Nelson 
Siegel). forecast: real curvature forecasted with the 
monetary (M) model (2.5). 2 s.e.: twice the standard 
error  bands.  forecast  error:  difference  between 
actual real curvature and the forecasted series. 
Figure 2.8 
 
As a further robustness check, we perform some predictive accuracy tests. Statistics in Table 2.7 
confirm that real variables have a significantly larger predictive power. 
 
. 
Predictive Accuracy 
model  RMSE  MAE  Theil IC    DM  MGN  S  W 
M  0.4261  0.3080  0.3138   
3.21  6.47  5.55  12.66 
R  0.3724  0.2974  0.2479   
..... 
 
RMSE:  Root  Mean  Squared  Error.  MAE:  Mean  Absolute  Error.  Theil  IC:  Theil 
Inequality  Coefficient.  DM:  Diebold  Mariano  statistics.  MG,:  Morgan  Granger 
Newbold statistics. S: sign test. W: Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Table 2.7 
 
As a final inspection, we wish to verify whether the curvature factor is related to the aggregate 
demand (AD) curve, which is usually assumed to describe the state of the economy.  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 




+ − + ⋅ − + + =
+ − + ⋅ − + + =
+ − +
+ − +
                           
                           
                   
                   
, 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 0
, 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 0
1
1
ε π ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ
ε π ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ
                        (2.7) 
 
A  traditional  AD  (IS)  curve  implies  that  the  output  gap
34
  is  a  function  of  its  forward-looking 
component, its lagged realizations, and the expected real interest rate. We jointly estimate equations 
(2.7);  we  thus  compare  the  actual  AD  curve  with  its  latent  component  counterpart.          is  the 
effective fed funds rate;    π  is CPI inflation;       denotes the expectations operator. The forward-
looking real component in the AD equation captures both consumption smoothing behaviour, which 
is an empirical regularity, and the expectations reflecting the sentiment about the future state of the 
economy. The system is GMM estimated thus matching a twofold objective. We need instruments 
                                                 
34 As shown in the              , both the Hodrick-Prescott and the Baxter-King filtered series of (   ) seasonally adjusted IP 
return accurate measures of the cycle. The correlations of these cyclical indicators with the rate of growth of IP are very high; in 
addition, both the HP and the BK detrended series perfectly match the NBER recessions. Here we use the HP filtered series of     IP.    58 
because  expected  future  (unobserved)  variables  appear  in  both  equations;  instruments  are  also 
required  to  back  generated  regressors  in  the  second  equation.  In  both  cases  variables  may  be 
eventually measured with errors, so that the GMM allows obtaining robust estimates
35. In addition, 
GMM estimation handles with heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of unknown forms. 
 
. 
AD Equation - System (2.7) 
    IP gap     Curvature 
                         
      , 0 ψ     , 1 ψ     , 2 ψ     , 3 ψ       , 0 ψ     , 1 ψ     , 2 ψ     , 3 ψ  
GMM    -0.0494  0.8931  0.8292  0.0246    -0.0608  0.7366  0.9711  0.0197 
    (0.035)       
 [-1.4] 
(0.089)  
 [10] 
(0.339)   
 [2.4] 
(0.013)       
[1.9]   
(0.183)        
[-0.3] 
(0.292)   
[2.5] 
(0.209)        
[4.6] 
(0.042)   
[0.5] 
   
2
        0.88         
2
        0.95       
        
Standard errors in parenthesis;   -statistics in square brackets. 
.. 
Table 2.8 
 
If estimated coefficients of the first equation are similar to the respective coefficients of the second 
equation,  we  may  presume  that  curvature  can  proxy  the  IP  gap,  i.e.  curvature  reflects  the  cyclical 
fluctuations of real activity. Estimations are reported in the Table 2.8. The magnitude of coefficients is 
comparable.  The  higher  goodness  of  fit  of  the  curvature  equation  might  be  due  to  the  higher 
persistence of the financial factor.  
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Residuals (gap): residuals from the first 
equation  of  system  (2.7).  Residuals 
(cur): residuals from the second equation 
of system (2.7). 
 
Figure 2.9 
 
Residuals obtained from both equations are serially uncorrelated and sufficiently homoscedastic. 
Figure 2.10 plots the autocorrelation functions of residuals (36 lags included). Both correlograms 
suggest absence of serial correlation. 
 
                                                 
35 GMM estimation does not require distributional assumptions, and, therefore, provides a useful alternative to other estimation 
methods, which, nevertheless, are nested by the generalized method of moments. GMM is a large sample estimator; each equation is 
estimated on a sample of 270 observations. Instruments: the annual rate of growth of industrial production and its first lag, both of 
which are highly correlated with both the industrial production gap and the curvature factor; the realized real interest rate, computed 
as the difference between the fist lag of the federal funds rate and actual inflation.    59 
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AC:  plot  of  the  autocorrelation 
function  of  residuals.  gap:  residuals 
from the first equation of system (2.7). 
cur:  residuals  from  the  second 
equation of system (2.7).   
Figure 2.10 
 
The Wald test permits to check whether the estimated parameters in the IP gap equation are equal to 
the  respective  counterparts  in  the  curvature  equation.  We  perform  the  test  to  check  for  both 
individual  and  joint  coefficient  equality.  In  both  cases  restrictions  cannot  be  rejected  thus 
reinforcing our finding that similarities between the equations are statistically significant.   
Finally, we substitute the dependent variable of the curvature equation with the IP gap; we thus impose 
the IP gap to be a function of curvature as shown by this equation: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]                                                  , 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 0 1 ε π ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ + − + ⋅ − + + = + − +                          (2.8) 
 
The  forecast  obtained  from  the  above  equation  tracks  quite  well  the  actual  series  of  the  industrial 
production gap. The plot of both series are displayed in the Figure 2.11. Despite the forecast is 
volatile and erratic, it seems to capture quite well the core dynamics of the IP gap. 
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forecast:  forecast  of  the  industrial 
production  gap, dependent variable in 
equation  (2.8).  gap  HP:  industrial 
production gap generated by means of 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Figure 2.11 
 
 
 
2.5   A Cyclical Model for Curvature 
 
In  this  Section  we  provide  some  more  evidence  relating  the  curvature  factor  to  the  cyclical 
component extracted from a structural time series model for industrial production; while, in the next 
Section,  we  develop  and  simulate  joint  macro-econometric  model  of  curvature  and  industrial 
production. In both case we find evidence supporting our main conjecture, that is curvature reflects 
business cycle fluctuations.   60 
The basic structural time series model for industrial production has been introduced by Harvey 
(1989). The industrial production is assumed to have a stochastic trend and a cyclical component; 
the former represents the long-term movement in the time series, while the latter determines the 
entity  of  economic  fluctuation,  i.e.  the  dynamics  of  the  cycle
36.  Two  random  walk  processes 
underlie the stochastic trend ( ):   
   
                                (2.9) 
 
                             (2.10) 
 
  and    are  white  noise  mutually  uncorrelated  disturbances  with        means  and  standard 
deviations   and   respectively. Both the upward and downward movements of the trend are 
driven by the    component; while the steepness of the trend depends on  . Whenever the variance 
of the disturbances collapses to zero the stochastic trend turns into a deterministic one; on the other 
hand, the larger the variances the greater the stochastic movements of the trend. 
The cycle ( ) is technically constructed by means of both the sine and the cosine wave functions. 
The  length  of  a  cycle  is  called  the        ,  which  represents  the  time  taken  to  go  through  its 
complete range of values ( ); while the           ( ) measures how often the cycle is repeated 
in the unit of time
37. The cycle is then characterized by few other parameters, the amplitude ( ) and 
the phase shift ( ). The cyclical component is thus expressed as follows: 
 
                                     (2.11) 
 
A complete formulation for representing the cycle combines both the sine and the cosine waves: 
 
                                                                                                        (2.12) 
 
The time series of industrial production cycle thus can be seen as the summation of the above 
cyclical component plus a white noise error term with      mean. A stochastic pattern for the cycle 
requires parameters   and   to evolve over time; so that, in order to preserve time series continuity 
we make use of the following recursion: 
 
                                                                                     (2.13) 
 
with initial states   and  ; and, where   and   are white noise disturbances. The 
model is identified if either we assume that two disturbances have the same variance or if they are 
                                                 
36 The cyclical component extracted by Kalman filtering the structural trend-cycle model is a reliable indicator of the economic 
conjuncture. It is highly correlated with the growth rate of industrial production and with both the Hodrick-Prescott and Baxter-King 
filtered  series  of  industrial  production.  The  cyclical  component  is  also  negatively  correlated  with  unemployment  and  the 
unemployment annual change. The cyclical pattern of all these variables appear to be significantly related.  
37 Both the sine and the cosine functions have period   and frequency  . The function   has period    with 
frequency   .   61 
uncorrelated. Finally, we introduce a dumping factor ( ) affecting the amplitude of the cycle to 
allow for more flexibility; the following system summarizes the entire structural model for IP: 
 
                                                              (2.14) 
 
Equation (2.14) is the state, or transition, equation of the state-space representation
38. The transition 
matrix on RHS describes the evolution of the unobservable components, so that it captures the 
stochastic behaviour of both the trend and the cyclical components.    
We have not considered the seasonal component since we deal with the seasonally adjusted series 
of industrial production. The IP series is thus decomposed into a trend and a cycle (plus a residual 
component). The model is estimated for both the level of the seasonally adjusted IP series and for 
its log transformation. The estimation of the amplitude is 0.9357 (p-value: 0); it is a stable solution 
( ) that denotes a cycle with decreasing amplitude (i.e. convergence)
39. 
Figure 2.12 plots the cyclical component together with different indicators of the business cycle; 
they appear significantly related. There seems to be a positive and significant relationship with the 
output gap computed with both the Hodrick-Prescott and the Baxter-King frequency filters; while, 
there exists an evident inverse relation with the annual change in the unemployment rate.   
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cycle  KF  prediction:  cyclical 
component  predicted  by  Kalman 
filtering  the  structural  model  for 
industrial  production.  IP  gap  HP: 
industrial  production  gap  obtained by 
apllying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to 
the Industrial Production Index. IP gap 
BK: industrial production gap obtained 
by apllying the Baxter-King band pass 
filter  to  the  Industrial  Production 
Index. U, grw: annual growth of the 
unemployment rate. 
 
Figure 2.12 
 
In the core analysis that follows we consider curvature obtained with the Nelson-Siegel method. 
The forecast of the cyclical component is obtained by Kalman filtering the structural model for IP. 
The  following  diagram  shows  that  the  cyclical  component  of  IP  (continuous  blue  line)  is  highly 
correlated with the curvature factor    -year ahead (semi-dotted black line). The correlation coefficient 
                                                 
38 The state space system is composed by a measurement equation and a transition equation. The observation, or measurement, 
equation relates the actual series of IP to its unobservable components (trend and cycle). The state space system is estimated by 
means of Kalman filtering, an iterative procedure based on the maximum likelihood estimation method.  
39 The estimation of the of the variance of the disturbances are the following. Measurement equation: (0.1588)
2 (p-value: 0); trend 
component: (0.0564)
2 (p-value: 0.0040); and cyclical component: (0.3358)
2 (p-value: 0). The estimate of the amplitude of the cycle 
extracted from the log series of the IP is 0.9461; the variance of disturbances are the following. Measurement equation: (0.0016)
2 (p-
value: 0); trend component: (0.006)
2 (p-value: 0.0030); and cyclical component (0.004)
2 (p-value: 0). In both cases convergence is 
achieved after quite a few iterations.    62 
between these two series is about 0.71. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that curvature slightly 
breaks the forecast standard error (red) bands only during periods of economic downturn. 
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Figure 2.13 
 
Strikingly the curvature factor lies within the standard error bands in the entire sample, suggesting 
how significant the relation between the economic cycle and curvature is.  
The right panel of Figure 2.14 plots both the actual series of the seasonally adjusted IP and its 
predicted value obtained through Kalman filtering the cyclical model. The predicted series seems to 
track quite well the actual one. The forecast error series is serially uncorrelated and does not show 
any evident heteroscedastic pattern. The forecast error series is stationary, as suggested by both the 
autocorrelation function and the unit root tests. Stationarity of the forecast error series is supported 
by both the ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) and the PP (Phillips-Perron) tests that reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root. In addition the KPSS (Kwiatkoswki-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) test confirms 
stationarity. The correlogram of the forecast error series is in the right panel: 
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IP: Industrial Production Index. IP forecast: kalman filter prediction of the industrial production index. forecast error: difference between 
the actual series of industrial production and the forecasted series. correlogram: autocorrelation function of the forecast error.  
Figure 2.14 
 
In what follows we repeat the same analysis for the     series of industrial production. We expect to 
achieve similar results in the sense that (appropriately scaled) the curvature factor should resemble 
the cyclical pattern shown by the cyclical component of the IP     series. The following diagram shows 
the forecast of the cyclical component obtained through Kalman filtering the     IP series (continuous   63 
blue  line)  with  its  standard  errors,  and  the  (rescaled)  curvature  factor  obtained  by  applying  the 
Nelson-Siegel procedure. The plots confirm a close relation between the aforementioned series
40.  
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Figure 2.15 
 
The Kalman filter prediction of     IP co-moves very closely with the actual series (Figure 2.16). 
The      -mean  prediction  errors  are  serially  uncorrelated  and  apparently  homoscedastic.  The 
correlogram of the forecast error is reported in the right panel. 
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lg(IP):  log  of  the  Industrial  Production  Index.  Forecast  lg(IP):  kalman  filter  prediction  of        industrial production.  lg  (IP) forecast error: 
difference between the actual series of industrial production and the forecasted series. Correlogram: autocorrelation function of the forecast error. 
Figure 2.16 
 
As  argued  in  previous  Sections,  in  order  to  show  that  also  the  curvature  from  the  real  TS  is 
informative about the business cycle we repeat the experiment above with the series of real TS 
curvature. The correlation coefficient between the cyclical component extracted by Kalman filtering 
the seasonally adjusted IP series and real TS curvature is almost 0.70. The left panel of the diagram 
below (Figure 2.17) highlights how similar the path of both series are. 
The series of curvature from the real TS is smoothed, so it tracks quite well the IP series without 
breaking the standard error bands. Finally, we verify how robust the relation between the (re-scaled) 
real TS curvature and the cyclical component of seasonally adjusted     IP is. As before, we expect 
to obtain similar results. The right diagram of Figure 2.17 shows the pattern over time of both series 
with the standard errors of the cyclical component
41. 
                                                 
40 In this case it would not make sense to judge whether the curvature series breaks or not the standard error bands of the cyclical 
component, since the curvature is scale-adjusted in order to match the     scale of the IP series.  
41 The correlation coefficient between real TS curvature and the Kalman filtered (   ) business cycle indicator is 0.67.   64 
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gam_for: Kalman filter prediction of the cyclical 
component  of  the  industrial  production.  s.e.: 
standard  errors  of  the  forecasted  series.  real 
curvature:  curvature  factor  obtained  by  Kalman 
filtering the real term structure NS model. 
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curvature:  curvature  factor  obtained  by  Kalman 
filtering the real term structure NS model. 
Figure 2.17   
 
 
 
2.6   A Joint Macroeconometric Model for Curvature and Industrial Production  
 
In this Section we propose an experiment in order to provide more evidence about the economic 
relationship between the curvature factor and business cycle. We develop and estimate a joint structural 
macroeconometric model for both curvature and IP
42. The measurement equations of the model are: 
 
                                                                                  (2.15) 
 
where   is the simulated trended curvature series. In the model above we assume that both the 
trends  follow  first-order  integrated  stochastic  process,  and  the  cyclical  components  are  a 
combination of sine and cosine waves. The model is represented by the following system: 
 
               (2.16) 
                                                 
42 As stressed before the curvature component is a stationary cyclical series. In order to build a joint model with industrial production 
we need to add a stochastic trend to the curvature factor. We estimate the trend and the intercept of the IP series; then we run a 
stochastic  simulation  (with  1000,  5000,  and  10000,  repetitions  achieving  similar  results)  in  order  to  get  the  trended  series  for 
curvature. The OLS regression of (   ) industrial production onto the constant and the trend returns an estimate of 3.41 and 0.0026 
respectively; both coefficients are statistically significant with null p-values. The OLS estimations have been confirmed by both the 
White and the Newey-West corrections.   65 
 
The model has been estimated with data from January 1987 to June 2007. The estimated amplitude 
of the cycle is 0.9311 for IP ( ) and 0.7741 for the simulated curvature factor ( ). These results 
are coherent with a decreasing amplitude of the cycle over time (stability). The covariance between 
the cycles has been imposed to be approximately     . Estimations from January 1984 return very 
similar results regarding the fluctuations of the cyclical component. The amplitude coefficients are 
0.9411 ( ) and 0.5864 ( ); both estimates are again lower than     denoting stable solutions.  
The left panel Figure 2.18 shows the evolution over time of both the predicted states of the cyclical 
components (right scale) and the actual cyclical indicators (left scale); the co-movements with the 
IP growth and the IP gap (HP filtered     IP series) are important. 
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IP  grw:  annual  growth  of  the 
Industrial Production Index. IP gap 
HP:  industrial  production  gap 
(Hodrick-Prescott  filter).  cycle 
CUR  KF  prediction:  Kalman 
prediction  of  the  curvature  factor 
from  the  joint  macroeconometric 
model.  cycle  KF  prediction: 
Kalman  prediction  of  the  cyclical 
component of industrial production. 
IP:  industrial  production.  r-cur  
stands for curvature extracted from 
the real term structure. est: Kalman 
estimated  series.  pred:  Kalman 
predicted series. 
Figure 2.18 
 
As far as the trend component is concerned, Figure 2.19 plots the estimated deterministic trend of 
    IP and the trend series obtained after Kalman filtering the joint model. The predicted series 
displays a slightly larger variance than the estimated one (left panel); both series fluctuate regularly 
around the deterministic trend though. We now show how the decomposition of the seasonally 
adjusted series of     IP into a cyclical component and a trend reliable is. We thus consider the error 
term of the measurement equation for (   ) IP, i.e.   in equation (2.15).  
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KF predicted trend: Kalman prediction of      industrial production trend. KF estimated trend: Kalman estimation of     industrial 
production trend. lg (IP) trend: trend of     Industrial Production Index. lg (IP) Obs. Eq. error:     Industrial Production Index 
observation equation noise. correlogram: autocorrelation of the observation equation disturbance.  
Figure 2.19 
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The residual series is covariance stationary. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test decisively rejects the 
null hypothesis of unit root, as well as the Phillips-Perron test. On the other hand, the Kwiatkoswki-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test does not reject the null of stationarity. In the right panel of Figure 2.19 
we plot the correlogram of the series; the autocorrelations confirm that the noise series is stationary. 
In addition, the Jarque and Bera statistics suggests the normal distribution of the error term
43. 
Before concluding, we repeat the same experiment using the curvature series obtained from the real 
TS. The simulated trended curvature series is obtained by as described above. The model has been 
estimated from January 1987 to June 2007. The estimated dumping factor that affects the amplitude 
of the cycle is 0.9365 for IP ( ) and 0.6926 for simulated curvature ( ). The right panel of Figure 
2.18 shows both the predicted and estimated states of the cycle, together with the annual IP growth 
rate and the output gap (constructed by removing the HP filtered     IP from the actual series). 
There  is  an  evident  relationship  between  the  series  extracted  by  Kalman  filtering  and  the  real 
economic indicators. 
 
 
 
2.7   The Level and the Slope: Empirical Analysis and Macroeconomic Interpretation 
 
The empirical analysis contained in this Section focuses on the interpretation of the first two latent 
factors of the term structure of interest rates, namely level and slope.  
The TS level typically reflects the inflation rate of an economy, since a constant real interest rate 
requires that high inflation is offset by high nominal yields. More precisely, the TS level depends on 
agent’s expectations about future inflation; the level factor, which is actually unobservable, can thus 
be interpreted as the inflation rate targeted by the central bank as perceived by private investors, i.e. 
the expected medium-long run equilibrium rate of inflation. Apart from short run deviations, in fact, 
on average the central bank will achieve its objectives in terms of inflation.  
The slope factor, instead, is associated to the nominal stance of monetary policy; Rudebusch and Wu 
(2004) show that the slope tracks fitted values from the monetary authority’s reaction function      
Taylor. According to the Taylor rule, the central bank has a twofold objective: minimizing the 
fluctuations of output around its long run natural level and stabilizing inflation around a socially 
acceptable low level.  
                                                 
43 We have also run an auxiliary OLS estimation of the     industrial production onto the trend and the cycle. The residual series 
obtained from this regression turns out to be homoscedastic and not serially correlated. The statistical properties of both the error 
series from the measurement equation and the residuals from this auxiliary regression are almost identical. Moreover, since the 
regressors employed in the aforementioned auxiliary regression are generated series (KF estimated trend and cycle), we have also 
employed the instrumental variables method, using as instruments the lagged values of IP. The IV estimated coefficients are actually 
the  same,  and  the  pattern  of  the  residuals  almost  identical.  Trivially,  as  largely  expected,  the  goodness  of  fit  of  the  auxiliary 
regression is practically 1.   67 
In this chapter we provide evidence that the slope is informative about the change in the nominal 
stance of monetary policy, as captured by the annual variation of the effective federal funds rate. 
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lev ,S (kf): level factor extracted by 
Kalman  filtering  the  NS  term 
structure  model  (Section  2.3).  CPI 
inflation: annual rate of growth of the 
seasonally  adjusted  Consumer  Price 
Index  (all  items,  urban  consumers). 
core-CPI  inflation:  annual  rate  of 
growth  of  the  seasonally  adjusted 
Consumer Price Index (all items less 
food  and  energy,  urban  consumers). 
PPI-inflation: annual rate of growth 
of  the  seasonally  adjusted  Producer 
Price Index. 
Figure 2.20 
 
These diagrams show the level factor and some inflation measures constructed using the CPI, the 
core-CPI, and the PPI indexes. The left panel highlights that the core-CPI inflation follows with 
some delay the CPI inflation, being the former smoother than the latter.  
At a first sight the series seem to share important co-movements. However, there is an evident 
decline of the level factor over time which is not reproduced by the inflation measures
44; it might be 
due to the structural stability of monetary conditions achieved in the 1990s during the Greenspan’s 
era. The initial drop of the level factor is certainly determined by the successful strong disinflation 
strategy pursued by president Volcker. Afterwards, the Fed has built a significant reputation for 
gradualism, while it has been promptly responsive to chock off any inflationary pressure. 
Sharp  drops  in  the  price  level  start  during  recessions  and  continues  onward;  consistently  with 
conventional economic theory weak aggregate demand pushes prices down
45. The general downward 
direction of both CPI and core-CPI inflation in the 1990s, instead, is due to structural reasons rather 
than  to  conjunctural  matters.  For  instance,  the  role  played  by  the  technological  progress  was 
determinant to improve efficiency. The boost in productivity the U.S. economy experienced in that 
fortunate decade coupled with relatively low energy prices might explain the gradual lowering of 
inflation. Many other factors might have contributed, such as a relatively accommodative monetary 
policy conduct, the credibility of the monetary regime, the reputation built to tackle the dynamic 
inconsistency issue, a balanced combination of fiscal and monetary policies, a high degree of trade 
liberalization and the consequent increased international competition, etc... 
                                                 
44 Only the core-CPI inflation exhibits the downward trend; the level factor, in fact, tracks more closely the core-CPI inflation rather 
than mere CPI-inflation. In addition, the level factor is higher than CPI-inflation when the actual CPI-inflation rate is particularly 
low; whereas the level is lower than CPI-inflation when this is high. This feature reinforces our conjecture that the cyclical behaviour 
of the level can be considered an appropriate measure of the inflation rate targeted by the central bank.  
45 At the beginning of the 1990s the reduction in price level occurred after the recession since tensions created by the Gulf War have 
kept the price of row materials, particularly the price of oil, unusually high.   68 
The  correlation  matrix  confirms  our  previous  intuition.  In  particular,  the  level  factor  co-moves 
closely with the core-CPI inflation, which can be regarded as the medium-long run equilibrium 
inflation level, since it rules out the more volatile price components (food and energy).  
 
. 
Correlations 
   lev NS (kf)  lev A-LT (kf)  CPI infl.  core-CPI infl.  PPI infl. 
lev NS (kf)  1         
lev A-LT (kf)  0.975  1       
CPI infl.  0.532  0.495  1     
core-CPI infl.  0.843  0.791  0.678  1   
PPI infl.  -0.103  -0.102  0.663  -0.039  1 
. 
 
 
lev  ,S  (kf):  level  factor  extracted  by  Kalman 
filtering the NS term structure mode (Section 2.3). 
lev A-LT (kf): level factor  obtained by Kalman 
filtering  a  standard  affine  TS  model  with  lower 
triangular  transition  matrix.  CPI  infl.:  annual 
growth of the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price 
Index.  core  CPI  infl.:  annual  growth  of  the 
seasonally  adjusted  Consumer  Price  Index  (all 
items  less  food  and  energy).  PPI  infl.:  annual 
growth of the seasonally adjusted Producer Price 
Index.  
Table 2.9 
 
All major monetary institutions agree that their primary task is to deliver price stability; central 
bankers thus operate in order to maintain the inflation rate on a desired path. The level of TS 
reflects agent’s perception about the evolution over time of the aforementioned path.  It is also 
plausible  to  presume  that  the  inflation  rate  targeted  by  the  monetary  authority  is  somewhat 
changeable over time, since it necessarily depends upon the conditions of the economy. Short run 
deviations from the targeted level are thus inevitable, but on average, in the medium-long run, the 
central bank meets the inflation target.  
The  adaptive  learning  measure  of  inflation  implies  that  past  intended  values  of  inflation  are 
corrected for the observed actual realizations: 
 
( )                   , 1 1 ε ρ π ρ + + − = −                                                                                                      (2.17) 
 
Coefficient    ρ   measures  the  weight  given  to  observed  discrepancies  between  actual  (     )  and 
perceived lagged inflation ( 1 −     ); roughly speaking it can be regarded as a smoothing parameter 
according to which inflation expectations adjust over time. As actual inflation (   π ) changes, the 
level factor gets linearly updated by news about current and future inflation. We recall that the level 
factor  represents  the  medium  term  inflation  target  as  perceived  by  private  investors.  The  OLS 
estimation
46 of equation (2.17) returns  973 . 0 ˆ =   ρ  for the sample January 1984 – June 2006.  
In the New-Keynesian literature, the forward-looking Phillips curve implies that current inflation 
depends on expectations about its future values: 
                                                 
46 The coefficient is statistically significant (p-value: 0). Residuals are homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated; the Jarque and Bera 
test suggests residuals are normally distributed. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of unity coefficient. The adjusted goodness 
of fit is 0.983 and the standard error of regression is 0.24. As a further robustness check we have performed the GMM estimation of 
equation (2.17) including the first lag of regressors as instrumental variables; results are statistically significant with an estimated 
AR(1)  coefficient  0.971.  In  addition,  equation  (2.17) has  been  estimated  replacing  CPI  inflation  with  core-CPI  inflation;  OLS 
estimation returns an AR(1) coefficient of 0.965. In both cases the CUSUM test indicates stability of the coefficients’ estimates over 
time. If we restrict the analysis to the Greenspan period (June 1987 – December 2005) results are similar to those obtained by 
Rudebusch and Wu (2004). Using CPI inflation the estimated AR(1) coefficient is 0.976, while using the core-CPI inflation the 
AR(1) coefficient becomes 0.962. For both specifications the standard error of regression decreases to 0.21 in the Greenspan era.   69 
 
( ) [ ]                         , 2 2 1 1 1 π π π π π ε µ π µ π µ ρ ρ π + + + − + = − −                                                            (2.18)  
 
Inflation  expectations  are  captured  by  the  latent  factor  (     );  in  a  sense  this  forward-looking 
component reflects price stickyness which drives firms’ pricing behaviour. 
 
. 
Inflation: Phillips Curve - Equation (2.18) 
  π ρ   1 π µ   2 π µ     µ  
0.0320  1.1915  -0.2363  0.0365 
(0.0014)  (0.0000)  (0.0006)  (0.0236) 
[3.23]  [17.7]  [-3.47]  [2.28] 
           
  π ρ    ( ) 1 1 π π µ ρ   −    ( ) 2 1 π π µ ρ   −     µ  
0.0320  0.1534  -0.2287  0.0365 
(0.0014)  (0.0000)  (0.0006)  (0.0236) 
[3.23]  [17.5]  [-3.49]  [2.28] 
p-values in parenthesis;   -statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 2.10 
 
Equation (2.18) is a traditional aggregate supply (AS) curve which can be obtained by solving 
macro  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium  models  with  nominal  rigidities.  In  particular, 
equation (2.18) implies that prices are set as a mark-up on marginal costs
47. The key parameter    π ρ  
captures  the  importance  of  forward-  relative  to  backward-looking  pricing  behaviour.  Inflation 
inertia enters equation (2.18) through coefficients  1 π µ  and  2 π µ . Finally, actual inflation depends 
upon the IP gap which reflects aggregate demand spending. Estimations for the Greenspan sample 
reported in Table 2.10 are similar to those obtained by Rudebusch and Wu (2004).  
Now we turn to investigate the slope factor. The diagrams show how closely the slope tracks both 
the effective federal funds rate (left diagram) and its annual percentage variation (right diagram). 
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slo  A-LT  (kf):  slope  factor  extracted  by 
Kalman filtering a standard affine TS model 
with  lower  triangular  transition  matrix.  slo 
,S  (kf):  slope  factor  extracted  by  Kalman 
filtering the NS term structure model (Section 
2.3). ffr: effective federal funds rate. ffr grw: 
annual rate of growth of the effective federal 
funds rate.   
Figure 2.21 
 
                                                 
47 In a perfectly competitive labour market marginal costs and the output gap are linearly related. In DSGE models it is commonly 
assumed that firms set price according to the so-called Calvo pricing rule, i.e. each period only a fraction of firms are allowed to 
change prices.   70 
During recession the slope follows the reduction of the fed funds, which is a clear sign of policy loosening. 
In Table 2.11 we report the correlations between the slope factor and the effective fed funds. 
 
 
. 
Correlations 
   slo NS (kf)  slo A-LT (kf)  ffr  ffr grw 
slo NS (kf)  1       
slo A-LT (kf)  0.777  1     
ffr  0.531  0.745  1   
ffr grw  0.555  0.535  0.247  1 
. 
 
 
slo ,S (kf): slope factor extracted by Kalman filtering the 
NS  term  structure  model  (Section  2.3)  .  slo  A-LT  (kf): 
slope factor extracted by Kalman filtering a standard affine 
TS  model  with  lower  triangular  transition  matrix.  ffr: 
effective federal funds rate. ffr grw: annual rate of growth 
of the effective federal funds rate.  
Table 2.11 
 
Correlations are positive and particularly high. We need to consider whether the slope factor is an 
appropriate indicator of either the effective fed funds rate or of its change over time. Therefore, the 
following                 models are considered: 
 
                      , 1 2 1 0 + + + = − α α α                                                                                                    (2.19) 
 
                      , 1 2 1 0 + ∆ + ∆ + = − β β β                                                                                                (2.20) 
   
Both models
48
 are estimated and used to generate predictions. Results support the second specification. 
Simple statistics to compare predictive accuracy are reported in Table 2.12. Also a visual inspection 
of Figure 2.22 suggests that the annual change in the fed funds (right panel) gives a better prediction of 
the slope factor than the effective federal funds itself (left panel). 
 
. 
Federal Funds Rate – Level 
 
Federal Funds Rate - Annual Change 
Equation (2.19) 
 
Equation (2.20) 
1 α   2 α        
 
1 β   2 β        
0.8334  -0.4900 
2
        0.289 
 
-0.4112  0.6450 
2
        0.387 
(0.0111)  (0.1316)     
 
(0.0001)  (0.0000)     
[2.55]  [-1.51]  s.e.  1.314 
 
[-3.86]  [6.01]  s.e.  1.220 
p-values in parenthesis;  -statistics in square 
brackets; s.e. standard error of regression. 
 
p-values in parenthesis;  -statistics in square 
brackets; s.e. standard error of regression. 
           
 
           
RMSE  1.3070     
 
RMSE  1.2133     
MAE  1.1112     
 
MAE  1.0530     
Theil IC  0.2470       
 
Theil IC  0.2272       
.. 
 
RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error. MAE: Mean Absolute Error. Theil IC: Theil inequality coefficient. 
Table 2.12 
 
 
                                                 
48 The choice of including only the first lag is supported by both the Akaike and Schwarz criteria. These statistics drop when we add 
the first lag and remain stable if we add subsequent lags. In addition, the adjusted goodness of fit increases substantially when adding 
the first lag, while only marginally if we include more lags.   71 
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slo ,S: slope factor extracted by  Kalman 
filering  the  NS  term  structure  model 
(Section 2.3). forecast slo (ffr): forecast of 
the  slope  factor  using  equation  (2.19); 
forecast  errors:  difference  between  the 
actual and the predicted series. forecast slo 
(ffr grw): forecast of the slope factor using 
equation (2.20); forecast errors: difference 
between the actual and the predicted series. 
Figure 2.22 
 
It follows the core analysis which allow us to establish the macroeconomic link between the slope factor 
and the nominal stance of monetary policy. We thus perform some estimates of simple Taylor rule-type 
equations  for  both  the  slope  and  the  annual  change  in  the  effective  fed  funds.  Equation  (2.21) 
represents the monetary rule in terms of the slope factor: 
 
( )                     , ε ϕ π ϕ α π + + − + =                                                                                                (2.21) 
 
Coefficient  π ϕ  represents the weight given to deviations of inflation from its targeted level; while its 
complement captures the sensitivity to the cyclical fluctuations of the economy
49. Specification (2.21) 
may well be considered a forward-looking policy rule, since the level factor represents expected 
inflation.  GMM  estimations
50
  suggest  that  both  inflation  and  real  variables  are  important 
determinant of the slope. The estimated inflation deviation coefficient is  644 . 0 ˆ = π ϕ  (p-value: 0); 
while the industrial production gap coefficient is  336 . 0 ˆ =   ϕ  (p-value: 0.002). The adjusted goodness 
of fit of the equation is 0.22
51.   
A similar equation has been GMM estimated for the effective fed funds rate
52. The change of the fed 
funds, rather than its mere level, gives a measure of how the monetary policy stance varies over time:  
 
( )                     ε ϕ π ϕ α π + + − + = ∆                                                                                               (2.22) 
 
Figure 2.23 shows that the fitted series of the variations in the fed funds go hand in hand with the slope 
factor. Slope is more persistent and follows with some delay the movements of the predicted series. 
                                                 
49 The measure of the output gap is either the Hodrick-Prescott or the Baxter-King IP gap. As an alternative cyclical measure we 
have also employed the annual change in the unemployment rate. We report the estimates of the Taylor type monetary rules with the 
HP industrial production gap, since results using the BK gap are similar.  
50 Since expected inflation, i.e. the level factor, and the output gap are generated regressors we need to back the explanatory variables 
using their first lag as instruments. 
51 When the cyclical variable is the annual change in unemployment the estimated coefficient of inflation is 0.724 (p-value: 0); while  
the unemployment coefficient is –0.052 (p-value: 0). The adjusted goodness of fit increases to 0.28.  
52 The first lag of the regressors have been chosen as instruments, since they are highly correlated with the explanatory variables but 
not with the disturbances. The estimated inflation deviation coefficient is 0.166 (p-value: 0.001); while the industrial production gap 
coefficient is 0.147 (p-value: 0). The adjusted goodness of fit is approximately 0.40. When the cyclical variable is the rate of change 
of  unemployment  in  equation  (2.22),  the  inflation  deviation  coefficient  becomes  0.205  (p-value:  0);  while  the  unemployment 
coefficient is -0.025 (p-value: 0). The adjusted goodness of fit of the monetary policy equation with unemployment rises to 0.73. The 
intercept is significant only in equation (2.21) (approximately -1.9).     72 
During  recessions  the  slope  factor  decreases  dramatically as  well  as  the  predicted  series  of  the 
federal  funds  rate  changes,  reflecting  agents’  expectations  about  the  incoming  accommodative 
stance of monetary policy. The slope factor, instead, rises substantially both during the recovery in 
early  1990s  after  the  Gulf  War  (and  the  World  recession
53)  and  during  the  recovery  after  the 
recession that took place at the beginning of the new millennium (2001-2002). 
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slo ,S (kf): slope factor extracted by Kalman 
filtering the NS model (Section 2.3). slo A-LT 
(kf): slope factor extracted by Kalman filtering 
a  standard  affine  TS  model  with  lower 
triangular  transition  matrix.  forecast  ffr  grw 
Taylor  HP:  predicted  annual  change  of  the 
federal  funds  rate  (equation  2.22)  using  a 
Taylor rule where the output gap is measured 
by  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filtered  industrial 
production.  forecast  ffr  grw  Taylor  U,: 
predicted  annual  change  of  the  federal  funds 
rate (equation 2.22) using a Taylor rule where 
the output gap is a measure of unemployment.     
Figure 2.23 
 
A  visual  inspection  of  Figure  2.24  suggests  that  the  slope  factor  dynamics  is  influenced  by  both 
monetary and real variables. The left diagram plots the slope factor against inflation, while the right 
one against the M1 growth rate. During recessions, or immediately after, weak aggregate demands 
causes  a  drop  of  the  inflation  rate.  The  monetary  authority  reacts  to  stimulate  the  economy  by 
expanding money supply, and the slope factor decreases, since it follows the reduction in the fed 
funds.  
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slo  A-LT  (kf):  slope  factor  extracted  by 
Kalman filtering a standard affine TS model 
with lower triangular transition matrix. slo 
,S (kf): slope factor extracted by Kalman 
filtering the NS model (Section 2.3). CPI 
inflation:  annual  rate  of  growth  of  the 
seasonally adjusted Consumer Price  Index 
(all  items,  urban  consumers).  M1  grw: 
annual  rate  of  growth  of  monetary 
aggregate M1. 
Figure 2.24 
 
Figure 2.25 plots the slope factor with real variables. In the left panel we plot the IP gap (HP-
filtered) and the IP rate of growth; while in the right panel it is shown the unemployment series
54.  
 
                                                 
53 Economists agree the Gulf War was not the determinant of the world recession; the war simply made the recession long-lasting 
and more severe.  
54 We recall that the annual rate of change of unemployment has been considered as explanatory variable in the above equations.   73 
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slo  A-LT  (kf):  slope  factor  extracted  by 
Kalman filtering a standard affine TS model 
with lower triangular transition matrix. slo ,S 
(kf):  slope  factor  extracted  by  Kalman 
filtering the NS model (Section 2.3). IP gap 
HP:  industrial  production  gap  obtained  by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. IP grw: 
annual growth rate of the seasonally adjusted 
industrial  production  index.  unemp: 
unemployment rate (civilian).  
Figure 2.25 
 
The sharp decrease of the slope factor during recessions is symptomatic of how concern the monetary 
authority is about the weakening of the economy. This vigorous response also works as an important 
signal for banks and lenders that promptly expand credit and help the economy to recover. The 
estimations, in fact, seem to support the idea that the U.S. monetary policy is extremely sensitive to the 
cyclical fluctuations of the economy, and, in particular, to the changing conditions in the labour market. 
The slope factor simply reflects agents’ expectations which are incorporated in the TS of interest rates. 
We now investigate whether predictions generated by equations (2.21) and (2.22) are influenced by 
some key macroeconomic variables. In the left panel of Figure 2.26 we plot the difference between 
the actual and the predicted slope factor obtained from model (2.21) against the annual standard 
deviation of inflation. It is evident the cyclical behaviour of the forecast errors; slope predictions 
tend to be less accurate when inflation is highly volatile. Mapping the discrepancies between actual 
and  predicted  slope  using  the  business  cycle  seems  to  be  more  controversial;  apparently  large 
deviations tend to occur during period of economic slowdown.    
In the right diagram inflation volatility is plotted against the deviations between the slope factor and the 
fitted values of the federal funds rate changes as of implied by equation (2.22). Again when inflation 
is particularly volatile deviations appear to be large in absolute values. In this case also cyclical 
fluctuations matter in explaining the deviations between the slope and the federal funds dynamics.  
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[slo ,S – slo forecast (HP)]: difference between 
the slope factor obtained by filtering the Ns model 
(Section 2.3) and the slope forecast obtained by 
predicting  equation  (2.21)  using  the  Hodrick-
Prescott filter to derive the measure of the output 
gap.  [slo  ,S  –  slo  forecast  (U,)]:  difference 
between the slope factor obtained by filtering the 
Ns  model  (Section  2.3)  and  the  slope  forecast 
obtained  by  predicting  equation  (2.21)  using 
unemployment as a measure of the output gap. st. 
dev. (x): recursive standard deviation of variable 
 . forecast ffr grw: fitted change of the effective 
federal funds rate using equation (2.22). 
Figure 2.26 
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In order to detect whether there exists a significant relation between prediction errors and the business 
cycle we run the following regressions: 
 
( )                               υ + = + = −
∧
1                                                                                   (2.23) 
 
( )                                 υ + = + = ∆ −
∧
1                                                                               (2.23’) 
 
The dummy variable assumes value   in correspondence of periods of economic slowdown, as highlighted 
by shaded areas in Figure 2.26. The dummies turn out to be statistically significant in both equations.   
Finally, we allow for the possibility that residual from the monetary rules (2.20) and (2.21) are 
eventually correlated. Rudebusch and Wu (2004) argue that discrepancies between the actual slope 
series and the fitted one, occurred mainly in 1992 and 1993, can be attributed to a misspecification of 
the  model  rather  than  to  the  so-called  “credit  crunch”.  We  thus  need  to  estimate  the  following 
specification: 
 
( )



+ =
+ + − + =
−          
             
 
     
1 , ,
,
ε ρ ε
ε ϕ π ϕ α
ε
π
                                                                                             (2.24) 
 
Estimations confirm our previous results. The current output gap becomes not significant though. 
Parameter    ϕ  is still significant if we replace the current value of output gap with its first lag ( 1 −     ).  
In this Section we have provided evidence offering a macroeconomic interpretation of the first two 
unobservable components of the term structure of interest rates
55. 
 
 
 
2.8   The Canadian Term Structure: Latent Factors and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Section 8 provides evidence that the main conclusions of our analysis fit also Canadian data
56. The 
Nelson-Siegel model presented in Section 2.3 has been estimated with Canadian yield data from 
January 1986 to June 2006. The maturity spectrum consists of the 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-, 36-, 48-, 60-, 72-, and 
120-month  yields.  Estimations  results  of  the  system  composed  by  equations  (2.2)  and  (2.3)  are 
reported in               . As expected the level factor is highly persistent. Figures 2.27 and 2.28 
plot  the  latent  factors  together  with  their  macroeconomic  counterparts  (shaded  areas  represents 
NBER recessions). The level and the slope are reported in the following Figure:  
 
                                                 
55  We  have  also  estimated  both  equations  (2.21)  and  (2.22)  imposing  the  restriction 
π ϕ ϕ − = 1   .  Estimation  results  remain 
significant.  Finally,  we  also  have  estimated  equation  (2.21)  allowing  for                           .  The                            
coefficient is statistically significant (0.95). It does not shadow the relevance of the inflation and the output gap though. 
56 Data are described in              . For simplicity in this Section we treat the Canadian economy as if it was a closed one. So that 
we do not consider neither the dynamics of the exchange rate, nor any international commodity price index, nor the eventual effect of 
the U.S. federal funds rate.    75 
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lev ,S (kf): level factor extracted by Kalman filtering the Canadian TS (NS model in Section 2.3). CPI inflation: annual change in the 
seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index. slo ,S (kf): slope factor extracted by Kalman filtering the Canadian TS (NS model; Section 
2.3). Overnight rate: Canadian overnight interest rate. Overnight rate grw: annual change of the Canadian overnight rate.  
Figure 2.27 
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cur ,S (kf): curvature factor extracted by Kalman filtering the Canadian TS (NS model in Section 2.3). IP grw: annual growth of the 
Canadian seasonally adjusted Industrial Production Index. IP gap HP: industrial production gap obtained by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott filter to industrial production. unemp. grw: annual growth of the unemployment rate. unemp.: unemployment rate. 
Figure 2.28 
 
The correlation between the level and the CPI inflation is almost 0.50. The correlation between the 
slope factor and the overnight rate is about 0.8. Although the slope tracks more closely the annual 
change in the overnight rate, the correlation is just above 0.55. The visual evidence in favour of the 
interpretation of curvature as cyclical variable is surprising. 
Co-movements between curvature and the HP filtered IP gap are certainly important, as outlined by the 
plots in Figure 2.28. There is also a significant inverse relation between curvature and unemployment. 
The GMM estimation of the following specification for the New Keynesian Phillips (aggregate 
supply)  curve  returns  significant  coefficient  for  both  the  backward-  and  the  forward-looking 
inflation components
57. 
 
( ) [ ]                       , 1 1 1 π π π π ε µ π µ ρ ρ π + + − + = −                                                                            (2.25) 
 
The slope of the term structure should reflect the nominal stance of monetary policy as captured by 
a Taylor rule: 
 
                                                 
57 The estimate of the forward-looking coefficient is 0.021 ( -value: 0.059). The coefficient of the backward-looking component is 
0.954 ( -value: 0). The output gap coefficient is 0.05. The second and the third lags of inflation have been used as instruments as 
well as the first lag of the industrial production HP gap.    76 
( )                     , ε ϕ π ϕ α π + + − + =                                                                                                (2.26) 
 
The GMM estimation
58 of (2.25) suggests that the slope is sensitive to the inflation deviation from 
the target (       − π ). The estimated coefficient is 0.21 and statistically significant ( -value: 0.05). 
According  to  our  interpretation,  whenever  the  inflation  rate  is  one  percentage  point  above  the 
targeted level, the Canadian monetary authority would raise the policy rate by an amount capable of 
reducing the slope of the term structure by 21 basis points. We can obtain a rule of thumb policy 
measure by performing the following exercise. If the overnight rate is placed as dependent variable 
of equation (2.26) the estimate of the inflation deviation coefficient turns out to be 0.48. We can 
only speculate on our results, by saying that, roughly speaking, the monetary authority should raise 
the policy rate by 48 basis points in order to flatten the yield curve by 21 bps.  
We now turn the economic interpretation of curvature. We start estimating a single equation relating 
curvature to some real variables: the IP gap and the annual change in the unemployment rate.  
 
                       , 12 , 2 1 0 ε ρ ρ ρ + ∆ + + = −                                                                                         (2.27) 
 
Results indicate that curvature can be explained by the actual values of the aforementioned variables; 
both OLS and GMM
59
 estimates are statistically significant. The goodness of fit is not particularly high 
though. The   test rejects the null hypothesis that coefficients are jointly zero.  
 
. 
Curvature – Canada – Equation (2.27) 
           
0 ρ   1 ρ   2 ρ      
coeff    -1.7331  0.4007  -0.4056 
 
OLS   
(0.119)       
  [-14] 
(0.082)  
 [4.8] 
(0.124)       
 [-3.3]  30.43 
WH   
(0.118)      
  [-14] 
(0.078)  
 [5.1] 
(0.152)       
[-2.7]   
NW, 4   
(0.225)       
 [-7.7] 
(0.126)  
 [3.2] 
(0.287)       
 [-1.4]   
    R
2  0.22       
 
           
IV    -1.7396  0.3669  -0.4046   
   
(0.225)       
  [-7.7] 
(0.154)  
 [-2.4]  
(0.294)      
      [-1.4]   
     
   0.22       
 
Standard errors in parenthesis; t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 2.13 
 
                                                 
58 The explanatory variables have been instrumented by their first lag. 
59  Both  the  White  and  the  Newey-West  corrections have  been  employed  to  show  results’  robustness.  In  addition,  as  a  further 
robustness check, also the GMM method  has been used, since IV estimation is acknowledged to handle with both serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity of unknown form. The first lags of the regressors have been chosen as instruments, since they are highly 
correlated with the explanatory variables.   77 
Again we need to point out that curvature is positively linked to the output gap  and inversely 
correlated with the rate of growth of unemployment. As it happens with U.S. data, also Canadian 
evidence  supports  the  view  that  curvature  can  be  considered  a  countercyclical  indicator  of  the 
economic conjuncture.  
As previously done in Section 2.5, we estimate the state-space model for the industrial production 
series in order to derive the cyclical component. The Kalman filtered prediction of the state variable 
is thus compared with the curvature factor
60. Figure 2.29 contains the plots of the series  
The curvature factor lies within the standard error bands of the economic cycle predicted series. The 
correlation coefficient between curvature and the cyclical component of industrial production is 
about 0.32. An analogous exercise has been repeated with the     series of industrial production 
achieving comparable results
61. 
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cur ,S (kf): curvature factor extracted by 
Kalman  filtering  the  Canadian  TS  (NS 
model; Section 2.3). cycle KF prediction: 
cyclical  component  extracted  by  Kalman 
filtering  a  structural  model  for  industrial 
production. 2 std. err.: twice the standard 
error bands. 
Figure 2.29 
 
Finally we use Canadian data to estimate the following system of aggregate demand (IS) curves: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] 




+ − + ⋅ − + + =
+ − + ⋅ − + + =
− − +
− − +
                         
                         
               
               
, 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 0
, 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 0
1
1
ε π ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ
ε π ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ
                            (2.28) 
 
Where the industrial production gap is a function of both its future value (the forward-looking term) 
and its past value (the backward-looking component); the gap is also a function of the realized real 
interest  rate,  i.e.  the  (l  )  difference  between  the  past  nominal  rate  and  actual  inflation
62.  The 
second equation of the system represents an IS curve expressed in terms of the curvature factor. 
GMM and OLS estimation results are reported in the following Table
63. The specification in terms 
of  the  curvature  factor  (right  panel)  presents  more  stability  than  the  IP  gap  specification.  The 
                                                 
60 The estimated amplitude of the cycle is 0.9656 (p-value: 0); value which guarantees convergence. It follows the estimates of the 
variance  of  the  disturbances.  For  the  measurement  equation  there  estimated  variance  is  (0.3513)
2  with  0  p-value.  The  trend 
component: (0.0312)
2 (p-value: 0.0146); and, finally, the cyclical component: (0.5024)
2 (p-value: 0). 
61 It goes without saying that the scale of the predicted cyclical series has to be adjusted in order to match curvature.  
62 The nominal rate is either the overnight rate or the yield with maturity 120 months, since aggregate demand spending depends on 
the long end of the yield curve. We try also the         expected future value of the real interest rate, but coefficients remain not 
significant in both equations.. 
63 To perform the GMM estimation, the explanatory variables have been backed by the contemporaneous value of the output gap, its 
second lag, and the lag of the real interest rate in the form employed in the equation.   78 
magnitude of the coefficient associated to the forward-looking component is absolutely comparable 
to that of the multiplier of the backward-looking term. 
 
. 
AD equation – System (2.28) 
    IP gap     Curvature 
                         
      , 0 ψ     , 1 ψ     , 2 ψ     , 3 ψ       , 0 ψ     , 1 ψ     , 2 ψ     , 3 ψ  
OLS    -0.0092  0.4840  0.9373  0.0032    0.0377  0.5057  1.0239  -0.0056 
   
(0.077)       
 [-0.1] 
(0.044)  
 [10] 
(0.056)   
    [16] 
(0.019)       
[0.2]   
(0.102)        
[0.3] 
(0.034)   
[14] 
(0.054)        
[18] 
(0.021)   
[-0.3] 
GMM    -0.0226  1.3367  0.5300  0.0055    0.0228  0.4525  1.0043  -0.0059 
    (0.140)       
 [-0.1] 
(0.185)  
 [7.2] 
(0.276)   
   [1.9] 
(0.039)       
[0.1]   
(0.039)        
[0.1] 
(0.178)   
[2.5] 
(0.121)        
[8.2] 
(0.012)   
[-0.5] 
   
2     0.55         
2     0.87       
        
Standard errors in parenthesis;  -statistics in square brackets. 
.. 
Table 2.14 
 
The Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the correspondent coefficients. 
In particular individual coefficient tests suggest that    , 1 ψ  is not different from    , 1 ψ  (the statistics of 
the test is  15 . 0
2 = χ ; p-value: 0.70). Moreover, the null hypothesis of equality between    , 2 ψ  and 
  , 2 ψ   cannot  be  rejected.  ( 21 . 1
2 = χ ).  More  important,  the  equality  of  the  weights 
( ) ( )         , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 1 1 ψ ψ ψ ψ − = −  cannot be rejected by the Wald test (the 
2 χ  statistics is about 0.16 with 
an associated p-value of 0.69).   
 
 
 
2.9   A Structural VAR Approach  
 
In this Section we estimate a structural vector autoregressive model including the latent components 
of the term structure of interest rates. We mean to derive the impulse responses in order to assess 
the interrelation between the economy to the yield curve factors. A general form for VAR is 
 
( )                     + = −1                                                                                                               (2.29) 
 
Matrix     describes  the  contemporaneous  relations  among  the  endogenous  variables;  ( )       is  a 
finite-order  matrix  of  polynomial  lags;  vector  [ ]
 
                =   contains  the  most  exogenous 
variables at first, latent factors thereafter, and, finally, policy variables. Macro variables are stacked 
in vector  [ ]
 
          π = , where       is the (log) total capacity utilization and    π  is the CPI inflation.   79 
Theoretical latent factors
64
 are stacked in vector  [ ]
 
                = . Consistently with the view expressed 
in previous Section, our policy variable,      , is simply the annual change of the federal funds rate. 
The vector of structural innovations is  [ ]
   
 
 
 
 
            = . Structural disturbances are assumed to 
be orthogonal, i.e. the covariance matrix is the identity matrix  ( )        
 
    = . 
Pre-multiplying both sides of (2.29) by the inverse of  matrix   we obtain the reduced form: 
 
( )                          
1
1
1 1 −
−
− − + =                                                                                              (2.30) 
 
( )                 + = −1                                                                                                                       (2.31) 
 
This is the reduced form of the Structural VAR,  [ ]
   
 
 
 
 
            =  is the reduced form residuals 
with covariance matrix  ( )
 
         = Σ . There are many possible structural models (2.29) that can be 
represented by a generic reduced form model (2.31). Identification restrictions are imposed since 
the number of parameters to be estimated in the reduced form is smaller than that of the structural 
form. Structural VAR disturbances are linear combinations of the reduced form residuals: 
 
            =                                                                                                                                    (2.32) 
 
              = Σ                                                                                                                           (2.33) 
 
Identification  requires  ( ) 2 1 +       restrictions  both  on  matrix     and   .  The  ordering  of  the    
variables has been described above. The particular form of the upper triangular part of matrix A 
depends upon the relation which links the latent factors, so that it is consistent with the transition 
matrix of the latent factor state space system. 
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Structural identification requires also that macroeconomic variables do not simultaneously respond to 
policy shocks, whilst the relation is permitted in the opposite direction. Traditionally VAR analysis 
has been exploited to assess monetary policy shocks using data with quarterly frequency (Christiano 
                                                 
64 The level is simply the long term yield with maturity 120-month. The slope is the difference between the 60- and the 3-month 
yield. Following Nelson and Siegel (1987), and Diebold and Li (2006), we compute curvature as the difference between twice the 24-
month yield and the summation of the 3- and the 120-month yields (2*y24  - y120m - y3 ).   80 
     , 1996); despite the extensive and popular use of VAR models to gauge monetary policy, the 
reliability of VAR methodology has been questioned and turns out to be controversial
65.  
Estimations are performed with U.S. data starting from January 1985. We compute the impulse 
response functions and we plot them together with the associated standard errors. Each response to 
a shock is measured as a percentage deviation from the steady state level.  
The first panel on the left shows that a one standard deviation innovation that hits the total capacity 
utilization generates a significant response by the curvature factor. After a soft spike the effect 
remains persistent; it vanishes away after    months. 
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CUR: curvature factor. Shock 1: shock 
to  the  real  variable,  the  total  capacity 
utilization. 
 
SLO:  slope  factor.  Shock  6:  shock  to  the 
policy variable, the change in the policy rate 
( the federal funds rate).  
 
LEV: level factor. Shock 2: shock to the 
rate of inflation. 
Figure 2.30 
 
More interesting seems to be the effect of the effective federal funds rate shock onto the slope factor 
(central panel). A negative response of slope follows a positive shock that affects the annual change 
of the effective federal funds. Tightening monetary policy, i.e. an increase of the fed funds, raises 
short rates more than long term rates flattening the yield curve. Or the other way around, when 
monetary policy becomes accommodative, the slope increases since short term rates lower relative 
to long rates. We recall that monetary policy actions exert a direct influence only on the short end of 
the term structure, which is linked to the dynamics of the effective federal funds rate.  
A shock to inflation tends to raise the level of TS as shown in the right panel of Figure 2.30. After a 
significant initial response, the effect of the inflationary shock fades away in six months. 
Canadian impulse responses draw a similar pattern as shown in Figure 2.31. The left panel shows 
that the output gap is sensitive to a shock that hits curvature. Consistently with the view expressed 
in previous sections, curvature either predicts or accompanies the flattening of the yield curve, thus 
anticipating a slowdown in economic activity i.e. the gap enlarges. A positive shock to the annual 
change in the overnight rate generates a reduction of the slope as shown in the central panel. An 
increase of the overnight rate flattens the yield curve since it reflects tightening monetary policy. 
 
                                                 
65 Granger tests have been performed in order to select the ordering of the variables; as shown in the Appendix we use only 
stationary variables. I have selected a 3
rd order VAR, after comparing the Akaike and Schwarz criteria with both the 6
th and the 12
th 
order VAR. Therefore, with monthly data we assume that only the most recent quarter matters.    81 
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Figure 2.31 
 
 
 
2.10   Concluding Remarks 
 
Both  macroeconomists  and  financial  economists  have  always  paid  scrupulous  attention  to  the 
bidirectional relation that links macroeconomics and finance. The yield curve certainly represents 
an appealing bridge to  explore the aforementioned relation.  In this vein, term structure models 
provide an effective framework to summarize in few factors all the information contained in the 
yield curve, which is regarded to be a leading economic indicator. So far, the empirical literature 
has expressed a certain consensus about the macroeconomic interpretation of only two components 
underlying the term structure, namely the level and the slope. The former is associated to the rate of 
inflation  targeted  by  the  monetary  authority,  while  the  latter  is  considered  an  indicator  of  the 
monetary policy stance. This study offers a  refinement of traditional factor-models of the term 
structure since we focus also on the third latent factor.  
Working with U.S. and Canadian data, we provide significant evidence that curvature reflects the 
cyclical behaviour of the economy, as represented by the dynamics of unemployment and industrial 
production. We find evidence, in fact, that a negative shock to curvature seems either to anticipate 
or  to  accompany  a  slowdown  in  economic  activity.  The  curvature  effect  thus  appears  to 
complement the transition from an upward sloping yield curve, prevailing during expansions, to a 
flat yield curve, that is thought to anticipate recessions. Interestingly, our main results hold despite 
the curvature factor is extracted from the real or the nominal term structure of interest rates. In 
particular, U.S. data suggest that curvature from the real term structure of interest rates is related to 
the consumption growth.  
Furthermore, on the basis of the empirical analysis developed in this chapter, we propose that the 
slope factor is related to the annual variation of the effective federal funds rate rather than to its 
level. We thus believe that the yearly change in the fed funds reflects the evolution of the nominal 
stance of monetary policy over time as well as the adjusting preferences of the monetary authority.   82 
Appendix  A2.I   -   Data  
 
Financial variables. All data employed in this chapter have monthly frequency. U.S. yields data between 
January 1984 and December 1998 are from both the McCulloch-Kown database (3-month, 6-month, and 10-
year) and from the Fama-Bliss dataset (1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-year)
66. After January 1999 all yields data are from 
Datastream (U.S. ZCB yields). In this work we consider the sample between January 1984 and June 2007. 
The  effective  federal  funds  rate  is  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Economics  Database  (FRED).  Roughly 
speaking, the cyclical behaviour of nominal yields reveals that the monetary authority has lowered interest 
rates  to  help  recovering  from  unfavourable  economic  conditions.  Table  2.15  reports  some  descriptive 
statistics about yields associated to bonds with different maturities. The mean is increasing with maturity; 
this may be due to a positive liquidity (or inflation risk) premium. The standard deviation tends to be larger 
at short maturities, while it is substantially lower at long maturities. Data confirm that long term yields are 
more persistent than short term yields
67.  
 
   Yields 
maturity:  ffr  3  6  12  24  36  60  120 
mean  5.323  5.173  5.324  5.593  5.963  6.232  6.575  7.054 
stdev  2.395  2.152  2.189  2.225  2.179  2.102  2.008  1.885 
skew  0.088  0.009  0.049  0.129  0.391  0.556  0.825  1.004 
kurt  2.598  2.720  2.871  3.030  3.377  3.542  3.875  4.041 
norm   (0.323)  (0.631)  (0.856)  (0.668)  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ADF  (0.141)**  (0.082)**  (0.093)**  (0.064)**  (0.051)**  (0.051)**  (0.040)**  (0.021)** 
KPSS  0.096**  0.089**  0.093**  0.095**  0.105**  0.115**  0.140**  0.166** 
Sample: jan84-jun07 (282 obs). Normality and ADF tests:  -values in parenthesis.  
KPSS test statistics reported. Exogenous included:*Intercept;**Intercept and trend. 
.. 
Table 2.15 
 
According to the Jarque and Bera test, short term yields tend to be normally distributed around the mean; 
however, this feature no longer holds for longer term yields. Both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) suggest the series are stationary over the sample 1984-2007. 
The ADF test leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root; consistently, the null hypothesis of 
stationarity cannot be rejected by the KPSS test
68. A visual inspection of the correlograms shows that the 
autocorrelations  decay  faster  than  linearly;  the  partial  autocorrelation  function  suggests  the  first-order 
autoregressive structure of yields. Thus, we have estimated an AR(1) regression for each yield obtaining a 
coefficient of approximately 0.98. However, in line with results from the ADF test, the Wald test leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of coefficient equal to     in the first-order autoregressive models for each 
                                                 
66 McCulloch data are available from the Gregory R. Duffee web page; while the Fama-Bliss yields data are from Cochrane and 
Piazzesi (AER, 2005). 
67 The autocorrelation of yields increases with maturity if we consider the entire sample 1964 - 2007. However, as noted by Piazzesi 
(2003), there is evidence that the persistence of short term rates has increased over time. In our sample (1984-2007) the magnitude of 
the estimated AR(1) coefficients decreases with the maturity of yields.   
68 To match the monthly frequency of data, the selected number of lags in the auxiliary regression is always 12. The automatic lag 
selection based on various criteria (Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn) leads to similar results of the stationarity test. The KPSS 
critical values are 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%), and 0.347 (10%) if only the intercept is included in the model. The KPSS test critical 
values  if  both  the  intercept  and  the  trend  are  included  are  0.216,  0.146,  and  0.119  at  1%,  5%,  and  10%  significance  levels 
respectively. We are unable to reject the null of stationarity when the empirical KPSS statistics (reported in the Table) is below the 
critical values.    83 
yield.  According  to  both  the  ADF  and  the  KPSS  test,  the  annual  change  of  the  federal  funds  rate  is 
stationary
69. In the sample from January 1984 to June 2006 only the level of federal funds rate might be 
considered non-stationary; however, we point out that the federal funds rate in the level is never used in the 
following analysis. 
Monetary variables. The inflation series is the annual change in the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index 
for all urban consumers (all items) available from the FRE-Database (source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics). Monetary aggregate M1 is the seasonally adjusted M1 money stock from the FRED (source: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). In our analysis we consider the annual rate of growth. Both 
the ADF and the KPSS test confirm the series are stationary. The auxiliary regression contains 11 lags. The 
KPSS test 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values are 0.74, 0.46, and 0.35 respectively. The  -values associated to 
the ADF test is 0.019 and 0.068 for inflation and M1 growth respectively; thus rejecting the null of unit root. 
The KPSS test cannot reject the null of stationarity. 
Indicators of the real economy. The monthly seasonally adjusted series of industrial production (IP) is from 
the FRE-Database. Different measures of the output gap
70 have been generated: a) the annual (   ) rate of 
growth of industrial production (blue line, right scale); b) the Hodrick-Prescott filter of (   ) IP (red line, left 
scale); c) the Baxter-King cyclical component of     IP (green line, left scale); d) the Christiano-Fitzgerald 
cyclical component of     IP (brown line, left scale). All cyclical indicators are highly correlated. As shown 
in  the  diagram  below,  the  Baxter  and  King  band-pass  filter  is  particularly  effective,  that  is  the  actual 
frequency series matches closely the optimal frequency function.  
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Figure 2.32 
 
The seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate series is from the FRED (source: U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics). The seasonally adjusted real personal consumption expenditures is from 
FRED (source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis). In both cases we consider 
the annual growth rate. According to both the ADF and the KPSS tests (either 11 or 12 lags considered) all 
the real variables series can be considered stationary in the sample between January 1984 and June 2006.  
 
 
                                                 
69 The ADF test performed with 11 lags in the auxiliary regression and no exogenous variables returns a probability value of 0.003. 
The KPSS test (exogenous: intercept) cannot reject the null of stationarity. 
70 To fit the monthly frequency of data the lowest and highest cycle periods have been chosen 18 and 96 respectively; in the Hodrick-
Prescott filter the smoothing parameter has been set equal to 14400. Grey shaded areas indicate NBER recessions; while the yellow 
shaded area indicates the weakening of the economy in mid 1980s.   84 
 
 
   Stationarity 
   IP grw  HP gap  real C grw  un grw 
ADF  (0.021)  (0.000)  (0.056)*  (0.016) 
KPSS  0.146*  0.106*  0.179*  0.193* 
Sample: jan84-jun06. *Intercept. 
. 
 
 
IP grw: annual growth of the Industrial Production 
Index.  HP  gap:  industrial  production  gap  obtained 
applying  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter.    real  C  grw: 
annual growth of the real consumption expenditures. 
un grw: annual change of the unemployment rate.   
Table 2.16 
 
Candian data. Yields data are from the Bank of Canada. Descriptive statistics reveal that the mean increases 
with maturity, while the standard deviation follows the opposite pattern. Both the ADF and the KPSS
71 test 
support stationarity of all yields. The Jarque and Bera test rejects the null of normality. 
 
. 
Yields 
Maturity  rate  3  6  12  24  36  48  60  72  120 
mean   5.720   5.734   5.754   5.867   6.098   6.284   6.440   6.576   6.691   6.984 
stdev   3.128   3.061   2.941   2.753   2.477   2.320   2.222   2.146   2.083   1.991 
skew   1.001   0.952   0.871   0.740   0.603   0.525   0.479   0.451   0.422   0.267 
 kurt   3.033   2.898   2.778   2.598   2.382   2.236   2.139   2.068   1.997   1.723 
norm   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000) 
ADF  (0.098)  (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.083)  (0.081)  (0.079)  (0.076)  (0.079) 
KPSS  0.170  0.182  0.172  0.149  0.121  0.107  0.102  0.101  0.103  0.098 
Sample January 1988 - June 2006. ADF tests are performed with 12 lags in the auxiliary regression, thus matching the monthly 
frequency of data (p-values reported). Intercept and trend not included. KPSS test statistics (12 lags plus trend and intercept) 
. 
Table 2.17 
 
Stationarity of the annual change in the overnight rate is supported by both the ADF and the KPSS tests. The 
CPI price index from which the inflation rate is computed comes from the Bank of Canada. The ADF test 
can rejects the null of unit root only at 10% significance level. While, the KPSS test cannot reject the null of 
stationarity at 5% when the intercept is included in the model.  
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Figure 2.33 
 
Real variables data are obtained from Datastream. The IP gap series are stationary. The ADF test rejects the 
null of unit root for the IP rate of growth of with p-value 0.04. Results for the Hodrick-Prescott filtered gap 
and the unemployment rate are similar. Both KPSS and the Phillips-Perron test confirm stationarity. In these 
                                                 
71 The KPSS test critical values are 0.216, 0.146, and 0.119 at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively.   85 
diagrams we have highlighted the NBER recession; however, Canada suffered the recession of 1990-1991 
with few months delay with respect to U.S.  
 
 
 
Appendix A2.II   -   Estimations  
 
. 
Affine Term Structure Model  
U.S. Nominal TS 
    1 −       1 −       1 −      
      0  0.9876     
p-val    (0.003)     
      0  0.0062  0.9766   
p-val    (0.095)  (0.012)   
      0  0.0036  -0.0142  0.8409 
p-val    (0.325)  (0.133)  (0.019) 
              
diag( )    5.7e-0.7  2.2e-0.7  1.9e-0.7 
p-val     (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
              
  const                   
ΛL  0.0813  0.0210  0.0131  -0.0084 
p-val  (0.091)  (0.002)  (0.077)  (0.098) 
Λs   -0.0509  0.0075  0.0581  0.0042 
p-val  (0.151)  (0.084)  (0.049)  (0.074) 
Λc  -0.0036  -0.0090  0.0159  0.0077 
p-val  (0.232)  (0.220)  (0.021)  (0.002) 
. 
Table 2.18 
 
. 
Nelson-Siegel Model 
U.S. Nominal TS 
    µ   1 −       1 −       1 −      
      0.1087  0.9853  -0.0062  -0.0091 
p-val  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.997)  (0.999) 
      0.0137  0.0113  0.9239  0.0493 
p-val  (0.158)  (0.205)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
      0.0047  -0.0028  0.0724  0.9043 
p-val  (0.364)  (0.583)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
diag(Ω )    0.0576  0.0739  0.5848 
p-val    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 -values in parenthesis. 
. 
. 
Nelson-Siegel Model 
U.S. Real TS 
    µ   1 −       1 −       1 −      
      0.1244  0.9426  0.0038  -0.0012 
     p-val  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.048)  (0.708) 
      -0.0211  0.0203  0.9113  0.0205 
p-val  (0.907)  (0.010)  (0.000)  (0.099) 
      -0.0070  -0.0234  0.0793  0.9510 
p-val  (0.633)  (0.870)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
         
diag(Ω )    0.0327  0.0129  0.0282 
p-val    (0.000)  (0.208)  (0.087) 
 -values in parenthesis. 
 
Table 2.19 
 
                As expected, the intercept is significant only for the level. 
   86 
. 
Nelson-Siegel Model 
Canadian Nominal TS 
    µ   1 −       1 −       1 −      
      0.1287  0.9855  0.0006  -0.0382 
p-val  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.480)  (0.990) 
      0.0143  0.0227  0.9514  0.0262 
p-val  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
      0.1152  0.0058  0.0618  0.8694 
p-val  (0.000)  (0.341)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
diag(Ω )    0.0709  0.2433  0.0685 
p-val    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 -values in parenthesis. 
. 
Table 2.20 
A 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
A ,on Linear Approach for the Term Structure of Interest Rates,    
Term Premia, and Monetary Policy Expectations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
According to the expectations theory rational agents can exploit the informative content of the term 
structure to predict future changes in both interest rates and inflation. However, although appealing, 
the  expectations  hypothesis  has  found  weak  empirical  support.  Risk  aversion,  time-varying  term 
premia, as well as monetary policy uncertainty may represent significant sources of non linearity in 
the analysis of the expectations theory. In this chapter we thus propose to investigate the predictive 
power of the yield spread within threshold models. We find evidence that the informative content of 
the term structure crucially depends either on expectations or on uncertainty about the future stance 
of monetary policy. In addition, we document that the ability of the yield spread to predict future 
output growth is inversely proportional to the level of term premia. In line with previous research 
our approach highlights that an upward sloping yield curve predicts faster output growth. More 
importantly, we provide evidence suggesting that low levels of term premia seem to be of great 
stimulus to economic activity; we interpret this effect as a sign of self-fulfilling expectations. 
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3.1   Introduction 
 
The term structure of interest rates is regarded to be a fundamental indicator of the state of the 
economy. The slope of the yield curve is, in fact, a useful predictor of both future inflation and 
economic growth. In addition, according to the expectations hypothesis, also movements in interest 
rates  can  be  anticipated  by  observing  current  values  of  the  yield  spread.  In  particular,  the 
expectations  theory  asserts  that  long  rates  are  a  maturity-weighted  average  of  spot  rates. 
Unfortunately, although appealing, EH has been almost invariably rejected in empirical studies. 
The expectations theory of the term structure is of primary importance for both macroeconomists 
and financial economists. From a macroeconomic perspective, the level of long rates exerts influence 
on aggregate-spending decisions, while short rates represent the opportunity cost of holding money. 
From a financial perspective, the pricing of derivative securities depends on the evolution of interest 
rates over time. Additionally, understanding the relationship between short and long term rates is 
relevant for              since it has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy and 
for the management of public debt maturity. 
The predictive power of the spread has been usually investigated in linear models. However, in this 
chapter we argue that linear models may be inaccurate to capture the effective ability of the spread 
to anticipate the future path of both macroeconomic and financial variables. For instance, risk aversion 
as well as uncertainty regarding the future stance of monetary policy may introduce significant non 
linear effects in the analysis of EH. We thus propose to analyse the predictive ability of the yield 
spread in a multiple regime framework which, on one side, allows for time variation in term premia, 
and,  on  the  other  side,  reflects  more  effectively  agents’  expectations  about  the  future  stance  of 
monetary policy.  
One of the main advantages of analysing EH within threshold models is that this technique accounts for 
the criticism by Thornton (2004), and Kool and Thornton (2004) who attribute “         ” empirical 
findings in favour of EH to the presence of extreme observations. Hence, clustering observations into 
sub-regimes, as we do, diminishes substantially the effect of outlier data. 
Previous results in the literature suggest that the TS slope is helpful to forecast long term changes in 
short rates (Fama and Bliss, 1987; Campbell and Shiller, 1991); in addition, empirical research has 
highlighted that the spread, at medium-long horizons, is informative about future inflation changes 
(Mishkin, 1990a, 1990b; Estrella and Mishkin 1997) and output growth (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; 
Hamilton and Kim, 2002; Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei, 2006; Wright, 2006). However, detection of non 
linearity can potentially improve the forecasting ability of the spread, since linear models can be 
viewed  as  constrained  non  linear  models.  We  find  evidence,  in  fact,  that  threshold  effects  are   90 
relevant  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  EH.  Working  with  U.S.  data  we  examine  the  informative 
content of the U.S. term structure from 1964 to 2002.  
Our analysis is developed along three different lines. First we assess the ability of the spread to 
anticipate future movements in short rates within a threshold model for term premia. Second, we 
examine whether the yield spread is informative about future inflation once agents’ expectations 
about the incoming stance of monetary policy are appropriately adjusted. Third and finally, we 
investigate the extent to which a regime-switching model for term premia influences the prediction 
of future economic growth.  
The interest in non linear models in general, and in threshold models in particular, is motivated by 
the fact that EH has been traditionally rejected in linear settings. Firstly, our approach accounts for 
the evidence attributing the empirical failure of EH in single equation models to the presence of 
time-varying term premia (Mankiw and Miron, 1986; Fama, 1986; Cook and Hahn, 1989; Lee, 1995; 
Tzavalis and Wickens, 1997). Secondly, inspired by Favero, Kaminska, and Soderstrom (2005) we 
condition EH analysis to a more appropriate informative set by allowing either for non linearity or 
for non neutrality of monetary policy (Feroli, 2004; Ravenna and Seppala, 2006). 
Our work hinges on the crucial assumption that the difference between long and short term rates 
reflects  expectations  regarding  the  incoming  monetary  policy  stance,  as  suggested  by  Laurent 
(1988, 1989), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke (1990), Bernanke and Mihov (1998). The 
rationale works as follows. The monetary authority can easily influence short rates through policy 
interventions; however, long rates are market-driven and depends on a complex variety of factors. 
Moreover,  given  high  persistency  of  long  rates,  which  can  be  regarded  as  a  proxy  for  the 
equilibrium level of short rates, in a Wicksellian sense, the yield spread provides with as a measure 
of relative policy tightness.  
Our findings suggest that the yield spread is extremely informative about future movements in both 
interest rates and macroeconomic variables when the informative content of TS is conditioned to 
non linearity in either term premia or monetary policy expectations. 
On the one hand, our results can be compared with previous studies on the asymmetric effects of 
monetary policy (Morgan, 1993; Rhee and Rich, 1995; Karras and Stokes, 1999; Feroli, 2004). It is, in 
fact, acknowledged that loose monetary policy exerts a weaker impact on output growth than severe 
policy (the traditional Keynesian asymmetry). On the other hand, our findings highlight that term 
premia are inversely related to the business cycle (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Ludvigson and Ng, 
2006;  Backus  and  Wright,  2007;  Mele,  2007).  The  countercyclical  pattern  of  term  premia  is 
coherent with both agents’ consumption smoothing behaviour and basic financial theory, which 
recommends to buy and hold a security offering high payoff in bad times rather than in good times.    91 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we briefly discuss a selected survey of 
the literature. Section 3.3 presents details of the threshold methodology. In Section 3.4 we discuss 
EH  and  present  empirical  evidence  about  the  prediction  of  interest  rates  in  non  linear  models. 
Section 3.5 deals with the non linear relationship linking EH, monetary policy expectations, and 
inflation prediction. In Section 3.6 we examine the ability of the spread to anticipate future growth 
in economic activity within a threshold model for term premia. Section 3.7 concludes. Data are 
presented in            . . 
 
 
 
3.2   Literature Review 
 
An extensive review on the empirical examination of the EH is presented in Chapter 1; hence, we 
only summarize some results succinctly in this Section.  
The  expectations  theory  has  found  weak  support  in  empirical  studies.  Economists  have  offered 
several attempts to rationalize this tricky puzzle; Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) point out 
that linear specifications for testing EH are inappropriate so long as bonds          is not constant 
over time. Campbell and Shiller (1991) find                                                     
                                                                                                           
                                                                           ”.  
The empirical failure of EH might be due to the over-reaction of long rates to the expected change 
in short rates (Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Hardouvelis, 1994) In addition, Campbell (1995) and 
Hardouvelis (1994) attribute the weird sign of long term rates forecasts to large measurement errors.  
EH  equations  imply  a  constant  term  premium  over  time,  thus  a  time-varying  term  premium 
correlated with the spread may well account for the failure of the theory (Fama, 1986; Cook and 
Hahn, 1989; Lee, 1995; Tsavalis and Wickens, 1997). Along this line also McCallum (1994).  
Mankiw and Miron (1986) find that the TS slope is informative about future movements in short 
rates only before the creation of the Fed suggesting that the high predictability is merely due to a 
mean reverting process followed by the short term policy rate. After 1915, instead, the interest rate 
smoothing policy has affected the predictability of short rates thus diminishing the predictive power 
of the spread. Kool and Thornton (2004) find that the apparent support for EH before the creation of 
the Fed is due to the presence of extreme observations (financial panics in 1907–1908). 
EH has been examined in different monetary regimes. Hardouvelis (1988) shows that the spread 
carries substantial predictive power between October 1979 and October 1992. In the same vein, 
Simon (1990) finds that the TS slope significantly anticipates future changes in interest rates during 
the                                         . Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman (1996) provide   92 
evidence in favour of EH using daily data for settlement Wednesdays. Thornton (2005) believes 
these  results  are  contrary  to  common  wisdom.  He  rationalizes  as  follows:  “                    
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                        
                                                                        ”.  
Mishkin  (1990)  examines  whether  the  yield  spread  is  useful  to  predict  future  inflation.  For 
maturities between      and        months the TS slope carries information about future inflation 
but it is not informative about the real TS. Evidence suggests that an inverted yield curve reflects 
expectations of falling inflation. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1997) 
investigate whether the spread is a significant predictor of future output growth. Although results 
differ across countries, they are generally supportive of the predictive power of the spread. A recent 
strand  of  research  has  examined  whether  the  term  premium,  rather  than  the  yield  spread,  is 
informative  about  future  GDP  growth  (Hamilton  and  Kim,  2002;  Favero,  Kaminska,  and 
Soderstrom, 2005; Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei, 2006).  
As outlined in this Section, almost all evidence regarding the predictive power of the spread has been 
worked out in linear models. Although useful linear models might fail to fit data when economic 
variables display non linear features. In particular, there is substantial evidence about the non linear 
conduct of monetary policy. Ruge-Murcia (2003) documents an important asymmetric behaviour of the 
monetary authority towards inflation depending on whether actual inflation is above or below the 
targeted rate. Analogously Dolado      . (2005) find that combining a non linear Phillips with a typical 
quadratic  loss  function  leads  to  a  non  linear  optimal  policy  rule.  Data  evidence  suggest  that  the 
asymmetric conduct of monetary policy is stronger in the Euro area than in U.S. Cukierman and 
Muscatelli (2002) show that in G7 countries the preferences of the monetary authority vary over the 
business cycle and depend on the credibility of the monetary regime. 
There is considerable evidence also linking the steepness of the term structure to the expected stance of 
monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Hence, the informative content of the TS slope should 
reflect non linearity in the monetary policy conduct thus affecting the corroboration of EH. In this 
chapter we suggest that exploiting the informative content of TS in linear models might constitute a 
violation of the rationality principle leading to the rejection of EH. We thus propose a non linear 
regime-dependent model relating the predictive power of the spread to the asymmetric behaviour of 
monetary policy and to agents’ risk aversion.   
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3.3   Examining ,on Linearity in Threshold Models   
 
The non linear nature of economic data is documented in many empirical works; financial series, in 
particular, tend to display non linear features. In this Section we thus review a bit of theory about 
threshold models widely adopted throughout the Chapter. A natural approach for examining non 
linear relationships seems to define some states of the world, or regimes, allowing for the possibility 
of different performance or asymmetric behaviour of economic variables.  
Threshold models offer the possibility of analysing the same issue into different sub-regimes since they 
provide with a cluster of available information, as summarized by the dynamics of a pre-determined 
threshold variable. Threshold models can be regarded as a deterministic version of Markov switching 
models
72, in which the transition between regimes occurs whenever the threshold variable crosses a 
specific value known        . The empirical framework supplied by threshold modelling allows 
exploring the same phenomenon in different regimes, or, basically, from different perspectives. 
One of the goals of this chapter is to understand why EH is weakly supported by data evidence. EH 
suggests that the TS slope should be informative to the extent of anticipating future movements of 
interest rates and inflation. We believe that using linear models to analyse EH provides only with a 
partial and incomplete view on the issue. For instance, the assumption of rationality which lies beneath 
EH might be excessive in some circumstances; it thus seems reasonable to assume that rationality 
might be contingent to the state of the economy. Financial distress as well as imperfect information 
might affect agents risk aversion at an aggregate level thus bounding rationality (Simon, 1957, 
1991).  
Suppose       (  x  ) is the variable of interest, i.e. the dependent variable (where   is the overall number of 
observations); suppose further that a theoretical model suggests       being related to some variables 
(      ) stacked in matrix       (  x  ). A typical linear model for examining the relationship between       
and       would be: 
 
          ε θ + =                                                                                                                                   (3.1) 
 
θ   is  the  (   x   )  vector  of  parameters  that  captures  the  static  relationship  between        and      . 
However, if the relationship linking       and       is not constant over time, it would be recommendable to 
split the entire sample into two (or more) sub-samples, each representing a specific regime. In a 
similar context parameters (   θ ) would become time-varying or regime-dependent. 
                                                 
72 In Markovian models the probability of switching regimes has to be estimated since the transition across regimes is not known in 
advance. The unobservable switch is governed by a first-order stochastic process; hence, the probability of regime shifting depends 
only  on  the  regime  one  period  before.  Markov  switching  models  can  thus  be  considered  a  stochastic  version  of  deterministic 
structural change models.       94 
   1  and     2  are appropriate time-dependent partitions of matrix      . Both     1  and     2  contain all the 
explanatory variables present in      ; they differ from each other because of the temporal distribution 
of  observations.  In  particular  matrix     1   (    x   )  contains  realizations  of        which  corresponds 
chronologically to the observations of the threshold variable below a precise estimated value. While  
    2  (   x  ) includes realizations of       associated to the values of the threshold variable above the 
estimated threshold. 
 
              ε θ θ + + = 2 2 1 1                                                                                                                     (3.2) 
 
The difference between the values of estimated parameters in different regimes is the       threshold 
effect  ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 2 θ θ δ − =   .  
The central limit theorem guarantees that the distribution of a sufficiently high number of  . . . random 
variables,  with  finite  mean  and  variance,  is  approximately  Normal.  Furthermore,  the  consistency 
property of               estimators states that for very large sample size the estimated coefficients 
approach the true population value
73, thus suggesting a unique and stable relationship between the 
dependent  and  the  explanatory  variables.  Ideally,  if  it  was  possible  to  observe  the  true  data 
generating process of an infinitely large number of observations, we would figure out the exact linear 
relationship existing among variables without the need of estimating such relationship. In particular, the 
threshold effect should be null  ) 0 ( →   δ  as   approaches to infinity  ) ( ∞ →   . Since finite samples 
estimations are computed on a partial and incomplete informative set, there is space to analyse data 
with sophisticated techniques that allow detecting for eventual non linearity.  
The key difference between threshold and structural change models is also the main reason behind our 
choice. In a standard two-regime structural change model the entire sample is split at one point in time, 
hence  regimes  are  defined  temporally.  In  structural  change  models  a  continuous  sequence  of 
chronologically ordered data characterizes both regimes. This work, instead, focuses on the possibility 
that  regimes  can  switch  back  and  forth  depending  on  the  estimated  value  of  a  pre-determined 
threshold variable; hence, time continuity is not a matter here. Structural change and thresholds models 
are conceptually similar but accomplish different purposes. Threshold modelling is a flexible tool to 
capture switches in regime that occur frequently over time; the evolution of a key variable, in fact, 
determines a regular stream of new information which allows agents to re-examine expectations.  
Although analogous structural change  and threshold models are technically different. Structural 
change models usually imply a time trend which affects the distribution of the threshold variable; 
                                                 
73 The probability limit that the absolute difference between the estimated coefficient and the true population parameter is smaller 
than any arbitrarily tiny positive number tends to    .   95 
while, the threshold variable should be covariance stationary in threshold models. Equation (3.2) 
can be re-written using the indicator function    ●   
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]                                   ε γ θ γ θ + > + > − = 2 1 1                                                                           (3.3) 
  
where      denotes the selected threshold variable and γ  is the estimated threshold value. Dummy 
variables are useful econometric tools to represent the indicator function:  
 
( ) ( ) γ γ ≤ =
            1         and         ( ) ( ) γ γ > =
            2                                                                      (3.4) 
 
Equation (3.3) becomes 
  
( ) ( )                       ε θ γ θ γ + + = 2 2 1 1                                                                                               (3.5) 
 
Partitioning the regressors as explained above yields  
 
( ) ( )               ε θ γ θ γ + + = 2 2 1 1                                                                                                          (3.6) 
 
The explanatory variables are functions of the estimated threshold. In a more compact form: 
 
( ) ( ) ε γ φ γ + =                                                                                                                                (3.7) 
 
Equation (3.7) can thus be estimated by ordinary least square; the unbiased estimator is merely 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )        
    γ γ γ γ φ
1 ˆ
−
=                                                                                                           (3.8) 
 
After fitting the model and computing residuals we consider the sum of squared residuals 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) γ ε γ ε γ ˆ ˆ
    =                                                                                                                             (3.9) 
 
Minimizing the above quantity is necessary to obtain the threshold estimate  
 
( ) { }     Γ ∈ = γ γ γ min arg ˆ                                                                                                             (3.10) 
 
Finally  we  derive  the  coefficient  estimates  ( ) ( ) γ φ γ φ ˆ ˆ ˆ = .  From  a  computational  perspective,  the 
minimization  process  is  simply  a  grid  search  over  the  range  { } 1 2 1 ..., , , − ∩ Γ = Γ     γ γ γ .  Once  the 
threshold value is known, two separate equations can be estimated; leading to the same outcome of 
a  regression  with  deterministic  dummy  variables.  A  clear  representation  of  the  two-regime 
threshold model is the following: 
 





> + =
≤ + =
γ ε θ
γ ε θ
ˆ
ˆ
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
       
       
     
     
                                                                                                      (3.11) 
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The  optimization  can  be  successfully  computed  if  some  regularities  conditions  are  satisfied.  In 
particular, threshold estimations require processes {   ,     ,    ε } to be strictly stationary and ergodic, 
thus  excluding  time-trended  and  integrated  variables.  Residuals  should also  be      -mean.  The 
fourth moment of both explanatory variables (   ) and noise (   ε ) has to be finite. In addition, the 
quantity 
4
           ε  should  be finite for  all regressors (   ∀ ).  Finally,  some  full-rank  conditions  are 
imposed on the covariance matrixes both to guarantee non-degenerated asymptotic distributions and 
to rule out multi-collinearity.  
 
 
 
3.4   Regime-Dependent Term Premia and the Expectations Hypothesis 
 
According to the expectations hypothesis any long term rate can be expressed as a maturity-weighted 
average  of  short  rates,  thus  the  slope  of  the  term  structure  should  be  informative  about  future 
movements in interest rates.   
Unfortunately, single-equation models fail to corroborate EH when deviations between the expected 
            spread and the         observed spread are large. Such large deviations are usually 
coupled  with  soaring  volatility  in  the  term  premium.  As  Campbell  (1995)  argues,  in  fact,  the 
conventional test of EH does not generate theory-consistent coefficient estimates when the variance 
of rationally expected changes in short rates is small relative to the variance of the term premium.  
In addition, there is lot of evidence that time-varying term premia can be considered responsible of 
the empirical failure of EH (Fama, 1986; Cook and Hahn, 1989; McCallum, 1994, 2005; Campbell, 
1995; Lee, 1995; Tzavalis and Wickens, 1997; Hejazi and Li, 2001). As shown later, term premia 
provide with a measure of the unexpected effect of monetary policy actions onto the TS of interest 
rates, therefore they captures agents’ perception of uncertainty. 
We believe that a non linear model for term premia, rather than a simple linear equation, reflects 
more accurately how investors process available information.  
In this Section we thus estimate a threshold model for EH that allows for a  regime-dependent 
behaviour  of  term  premia.  Evidence  suggests  that  the  yield  spread  is  informative  about  future 
movements in short rates once the risk-averse attitude of economic agents is properly taken into 
account.  
Threshold models offer the possibility of clustering available information allowing heterogeneous 
behaviour  across  regimes.  The  following  intuition  can  give  some  insight  about  the  potential 
usefulness of adopting threshold models to assess the predictive power of the yield spread. Suppose 
the economy is hit by a negative supply shock, like a sudden increase in the oil price; suppose   97 
further the effects on inflation are expected to be long-lasting; hence, it follows a sharp and permanent 
increase in long term rates. The yield curve becomes steeper reflecting the rise in term premia. The 
shock affecting the dynamics of interest rates also increases the probability of switching regime. 
Forward-looking agents rationally expect the transition to the new regime and, in such enriched 
informative context, they can forecast theory-consistent variations in interest rates. Since large values 
of the spread anticipate upward movements in short rates, agents expect future rise in interest rates. 
In addition, rational agent can anticipate future policy tightening as long as the central bank takes 
action to calm down inflationary pressures. Threshold models for risk premia thus provide with a 
technical framework that works as uncertainty reducer augmenting the predictability of interest rates 
dynamics. Agents rationalize their attitude towards risk and process information more effectively. In 
this sense, we speculate there might be consistency between threshold models and the hypothesis of 
complete financial markets, where agents know the payoff in each state of the world.  
In addition, we recall that one of the main benefits of employing threshold models to analyse EH is 
that they are immune to the criticism by Thornton (2004) and Kool and Thornton (2004). 
EH states that long term yields can be expressed as a maturity-weighted average of expected future 
spot rates:  
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   represents rational expectations conditional to the available information at time  . The long term 
rate 
 
     has maturity  , while the short rate 
 
     has maturity   (  <  ). The maturity ratio (     ) is 
an  integer.  The  pure  version  of  EH  implies  a  null  term  premium  ( 0
, =
   
     );  while  the  traditional 
version of EH assumes a constant term premium, i.e. the expected holding period returns are equal 
on bonds of all maturities. Subtracting the short rates from both sides, and readjusting, yields:  
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Expression (3.13) reveals that, when expectations are not rational, the term premium is simply 
computed as the deviations between the expected             and the actual observable spreads, i.e. 
it is the unpredicted component of the yield spread. In addition, the term premium can be viewed as 
the  sum  of  a  liquidity  premium  and  a  risk  premium,  which  capture  respectively  investors’ 
preferences and agents’ risk-aversion. Simple algebra leads to the fundamental EH equation:  
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 where 
   
     
−
+  denotes the forward (implicit) rate prevailing from   to  . According to EH, 
   
     
−
+  
would be the yield associated to any bond issued at time   with maturity  . Both sides of (3.14) 
must be equal to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. Equation (3.14) simply states that a          
strategy (LHS) must guarantee the same rate of return of a           strategy (RHS).  
The following equation captures the predictive ability of the spread to anticipate future movements 
in short yields over the life of the long term bond:   
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Or, equivalently: 
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                                                                                (3.15’) 
 
Thornton (2004) calls the Campbell-Shiller equations (3.15) the                   of EH, since they 
usually return positive estimates of the slope coefficient  β  for any pair ( ,  ). The LHS represents 
the            , or                  , spread. EH holds if coefficients  α  and  β  are      and     
respectively,  i.e.  if  the  actual  spread  perfectly  matches  the               spread.  The   -period 
overlapping errors implied by (3.15) produce serially correlated (MA)               residuals. To 
correct for the presence of               disturbances, both Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Newey 
and West (1987) have suggested a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. 
In this Section we provide evidence that in favour of EH when the dynamics of the term premium is 
allowed to separate regimes: 
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                                                        (3.16) 
 
The  threshold  variable     is  either  the  previous  realization  of  the  term  premium  (
   
    
,
1 − )  or  its 
absolute value. The term premium is a measure of monetary policy uncertainty and it captures 
agents’ attitude toward risk. Separating regimes on the basis of the unexpected component of the 
future  monetary  policy  stance  gives  investors  the  opportunity  of  conditioning  their  aptitude  to 
predict on the perception about future monetary policy uncertainty. A multiple regime framework 
for  risk  premia  accounts  also  for  the  empirical  regularity  that  time  varying  premia  affect  the   99 
corroboration of EH. Finally, as discussed above, conditioning the determination of regimes upon 
the unexpected component of the yield spread allows to reduce aggregate uncertainty.    
Threshold methodology allows us to match two salient features outlined in the empirical literature 
regarding EH. On the one hand, we allow for time variation in term premia; in particular, the term 
premium is also assumed to be regime-dependent  ( )          , , , ˆ γ . Threshold models are a special case 
of Markov switching models in which the probability of switching regime is known        . On the 
other hand, we follow Mankiw and Miron (1986), who suggest that different (monetary) regimes 
could determine considerably different results for EH.  
Some more insight to justify the adoption of threshold modelling follow. Using U.S. yields data 
between  1964  and  2002  from  the  McCulloch-Kown  and  Fama-Bliss  datasets  (depending  on 
maturity) we estimate the Campbell-Shiller equation (3.15) to predict future movements in short 
term interest rates. Regression (3.15) is estimated with a                procedure to emphasize the 
time-varying  pattern  of  the  slope  coefficient.  Each  regression  is  estimated  by  Newey-West 
corrected               with 60 monthly observations. Figure 3.1 shows the         estimation of 
the slope coefficient (β ˆ ) and the associated probability values (null hypothesis  0 ˆ = β ) for both 
couples of maturities (   ,  ) and (  ,  ). 
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years;  : 3 months). CS (60, 3) roll 60: 
beta  coefficient  rolling  estimated  value 
of  the  Campbell-Shiller  conventional 
test  (3.15’)  ( :  5  years;   :  3  months).  
stderr:  standard  error  bands.  p-val: 
probability  value  associated  to  the 
standard  -test. 
Figure 3.1 
 
        estimates of the slope coefficient tend to oscillate around    . However, both in early-mid 
1980s and late 1990s the slope coefficient is far from the EH-implied level. Hence, results might 
suggest the presence of non linearity in the empirical model used to test EH
74. In particular,  β  
estimates are not significant when both the level and the volatility of term premia are large. Figure 3.2 
plots  both  the  term  premium  and  its  volatility  for  the  pairs  of  maturities  (   ,   )  and  (  ,   ); 
volatility is computed as the squares of the first differences. 
  
                                                 
74 Equation (3.15) has been estimated in the entire sample (between 1964 and 2002). In months characterized by high local volatility 
of the term premium the Chow breakpoint test could not reject the null of no structural break.   100 
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Figure 3.2 
 
Therefore, our choice of setting the term premium as threshold variable allows obtaining a cluster of 
volatility as well, since the variability of term premia is strictly associated to the level. 
When the economy experiences high inflation, term premia are unusually large as it happened in the 
1980s. In addition, weak GDP growth boosts uncertainty which is reflected in agents’ risk aversion. A 
similar conjuncture has important policy effect. A negative output gap could induce the monetary 
authority to reconsider its preferences, since it becomes socially optimal including unemployment 
among final targets. The enhanced complexity of the macro scenario coupled with uncertainty about 
monetary policy goals affect investors’ ability to anticipate future movements in interest rates, thus 
generating important downward bias in EH estimations of the slope. 
The threshold methodology thus provides with a useful framework to separate periods with low 
uncertainty from periods characterized by high uncertainty. The term premium not only captures 
agents’ sentiment towards risk but it is also a proxy for (excess) bond returns
75.  
We need to forecast the threshold value since the term premium is not directly observable
76. Ideally, 
once investors know the threshold estimate, they are able to distinguish regimes with certainty; 
threshold modelling is thus appealing because it acts as an uncertainty reducer. Estimation results of 
model (3.16) are reported in Table
77 3.1.  
Single-regime estimates of the traditional Campbell-Shiller equation are reported in the left panel of 
Table 3.1. The central panel shows estimates when the threshold variable is the term premium 
(
   
    
,
1 − ); estimates in the right part refer to the threshold model whose regimes are determined by the 
absolute value of the term premium. 
                                                 
75 Term premia reflect the future evolution of the stochastic discount factor (Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson, 2007) and are perfectly 
correlated with (log) excess bond returns (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005). Campbell and Shiller (1991) point out that term premia 
represent the unexpected component of the yield spread thus reflecting market participants’ inability of anticipating future interest 
rates. Term premia capture the incapacity of anticipating the future stance of monetary policy as summarized by the yield spread 
(Laurent, 1988; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). 
76 Few methods are available to achieve the same objective: Markov switching models, structural change multiple-break models, and 
threshold models. The choice of threshold modelling is motivated by the fact that we wish to avoid constraining regimes to time-
continuity;  in  this  respect  threshold  frameworks  allow  for  greater  flexibility.  As  explained  above,  threshold  modelling  allows 
distinguishing the high uncertainty regime from the low uncertainty regime. 
77 γ  is the estimate of the threshold variable. The joint goodness of fit (j-R
2) is computed as     minus the ratio between the sum of 
squares  of  both  regimes  regressions  and  the  total  sum  of  square  of  the  single  regime  regression.       denotes  the  number  of 
observations. R
2 is the goodness of fit in each regime.  β  the slope estimated coefficient with associated  -values of the  -test (in 
parenthesis). 1 and 2 denote regimes below and above the threshold respectively.   101 
 
 
Interest Rates Prediction 
(n. m)  obs  β      γ   regime  obs  β      γ   regime  obs  β 
   R
2  (p-val)      j-R
2    R
2  (p-val)      j-R
2    R
2  (p-val) 
(120,3)*  400  0.5846      1.223  1  196  1.2489      2.183  1  227  0.9418 
  0.107  (0.001)      0.800    0.753  (0.000)      0.746    0.475  (0.000) 
            2  204  1.0247        2  173  1.0008 
                   0.562  (0.000)            0.573  (0.000) 
(60,3)  465  0.6592      1.460  1  275  0.9724      3.801  1  415  0.7472 
  0.127  (0.000)      0.683    0.384  (0.000)      0.423    0.202  (0.000) 
            2  190  1.0802        2  50  0.9966 
                  0.594  (0.000)            0.784  (0.000) 
(36,3)  465  0.4761      1.184  1  270  0.6860      2.762  1  371  0.7371 
  0.059  (0.010)      0.676    0.245  (0.000)      0.346    0.206  (0.000) 
            2  195  0.8738        2  94  -0.1342 
                   0.424  (0.0000)            0.005  (0.611) 
(24,3)  465  0.3800      0.907  1  268  0.6898      1.972  1  349  0.6378 
  0.036  (0.032)      0.641    0.218  (0.000)      0.351    0.183  (0.000) 
            2  197  0.8480        2  116  0.2096 
                   0.357  (0.000)            0.010  (0.292) 
(12,3)  465  0.3252      0.537  1  276  0.6263      0.924  1  313  0.8200 
  0.027  (0.032)      0.528    0.148  (0.000)      0.285    0.341  (0.000) 
            2  189  0.6747        2  152  0.1001 
                   0.219  (0.000)            0.003  (0.555) 
 
sample jan64-sep02; *jan64-mar97  
Linear model (3.15’) (left columns). Threshold model (3.16) (central and right colums).  
. 
Table 3.1 
 
In the entire sample the estimated slope coefficient increase with the long term maturity  . At the very 
short  end  the  TS  spread  is  not  particularly  informative  about  future  short  rates.  However, 
Rudebusch (1995) documents a significant predictive power of the spread for horizons lower than 
    months using data with different frequency. Our analysis is not comparable with his study since we 
do not consider maturities shorter than   months. At any horizon, the single-regime predictive power of 
the  spread,  as  implied  by  the  regression  goodness  of  fit,  is  definitely  poor.  Results  substantially 
improve  in  the  threshold  setting.  Both  regimes  β   estimates  get  close  to       and  are  statistically 
significant. The joint goodness of fit is much higher in the threshold model; moreover,  
2 is also 
higher in each sub-regime than in the single regime.  
When the absolute value of the term premium discriminate regimes, at short-medium maturity the 
slope coefficient is statistically significant only in regime   characterized by moderate uncertainty; 
while,  regime     estimates  are  not  significant.  Evidence  seems  to  support  the  presence  of  an 
empirical asymmetric effect in the analysis of EH.  
Our results can be interpreted consistently with the idea put forward by Mankiw and Miron (1986). 
Separating regimes on the basis of the term premium allows investors to identify two distinct states   102 
of the world, each characterized by a contingent level of uncertainty; in particular, in both states the 
range of values assumed by the term premium is bounded and term premia volatility limited (Table 
3.4). Hence, in each regime the low variability of term premia allows agents to make more accurate 
predictions. In Figure 3.3 we plot the estimated slope  β  against maturity together with the 95% 
confidence interval bands. In left panel we report the slope estimates obtained with the traditional 
linear model; while, in the central and right panels we plot the slope coefficients against maturity in 
regime   and   respectively. 
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BETA: OLS estimates of the beta coefficient in the entire sample plotted against the long term maturity (left panel). BETA regime 1: 
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of the beta coefficient in the entire sample plotted against the long term maturity (right panel). 95% conf int: 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 3.3 
Despite single-equation evidence, threshold estimates reveal that TS is informative about future 
interest rates movements also at short horizons. Empirical evidence suggests that the predictive 
power of the spread increases with maturity in both the single and in the threshold regimes
78. In the 
single regime the slope coefficient never  reaches     though. Threshold estimates of the slope 
coefficient are quite close to    ; so that, in each regime the predictive power of the yield spread is 
substantial.  In  particular,  the  95%  confidence  interval  at  medium-long  horizons  contains  the 
expectations hypothesis value     (the horizontal dashed line).  
Non linear investigation of EH allows obtaining theory-consistent empirical results since threshold 
modelling provides with a suitable framework to cluster term premia volatility, which is responsible of 
EH failure in linear models. Term premia volatility influences agents’ risk aversion thus affecting their 
rationality. The scatter diagrams in Figure 3.4 show the importance of analysing the predictive power of 
the spread, which reflects investors’ rational expectations, using econometric methods that allow for 
regime shifting. In all the diagrams the regression line captures the relationship between the             
and the actual spread, i.e. a measure of the  β  estimates in the Campbell-Shiller equation (3.15). 
Results in Figure 3.4 regards the pair (   ,  ). The steepness of the red line in both sub-regimes is 
closer to     than that displayed by the single-regime line. In addition, sub-regimes diagrams show 
                                                 
78 However, in regime   when the threshold is the absolute value of the term premium this result does not hold.    103 
by large a better fit. A comparison between the second and the third plot reveal that high values of 
the actual spread are associated to large values for term premia (regime  ).  
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Scatter plot diagrams of the actual spread (spread) against the theoretical spread (Theor. spread). Entire sample (left panel). 
Regime 1 (central panel). Regime 2 (right panel). 
Figure 3.4 
 
In Figure 3.5 we report the scatter diagram for the couple of maturities (  ,  ). Again results show 
by large a better fit in threshold sub-regimes. In both sub-regimes the slope of the red line is close to 
the 45-degree line; hence, the ability of the spread to anticipate future interest rates movements 
improves in sub-regimes.   
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Scatter plot diagrams of the actual spread (spread) against the theoretical spread (Theor. spread). Entire sample (left panel). 
Regime 1 (central panel). Regime 2 (right panel). 
Figure 3.5 
 
The advantages of threshold modelling can also be captured by the kernel density estimate
79 of the 
distribution of the variables of interest. The bottom diagrams of Figure 3.6 show how peaked the 
density estimate are in regime   with respect to the single-regime plots reported in the top panels. 
Density distributions concentrated around the mean are typical of mean-reverting and thus easily 
predictable process.  
 
                                                 
79 The Epanechnikov kernel density estimation is performed with automatic bandwidth selection. These results are obtained by 
focusing on the pair of maturities (  ,  ); similar results hold focusing on other couples of maturities ( ,  ). In the entire sample the 
standard deviation of the  -month yields is 2.62, the kurtosis is 5. In regime   (below the estimated threshold) the standard deviation 
is 2.08 and the kurtosis is 7.18.    104 
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Density distribution of the 3-month rate (left diagrams). Density distribution of the term premium (central panels). Density 
distribution of the theoretical spread (right panels). Density distribution of the variables in the entire sample (top panels). Density 
distribution of the variables in regime 1 (bottom panels). 
Figure 3.6 
 
Regime   density estimate of the short rate process is definitely more concentrated around the mode 
than the distribution obtained with the entire-sample data. According to Mankiw and Miron (1986) 
short  rates  predictability  is  a  crucial  issue  in  the  empirical  assessment  of  EH.  The  empirical 
distribution in regime   is characterized by low values of the term premium. The standard deviation 
of all variables is much lower in regime   than in the entire sample; oppositely the kurtosis is higher 
in regime   than in the entire sample.  
 
 
 
Wald Test   H0:  1 = β  
      Linear   
   
        
, =     
   
        
, =   
     (p-val)    Regime  (p-val)    regime  (p-val) 
(120,3)*    (0.0355)    1  (0.0002)    1  (0.3784) 
          2  (0.6925)    2  (0.9896) 
(60,3)    (0.0434)    1  (0.7948)    1  (0.0006) 
        2  (0.1901)    2  (0.9643) 
(36,3)    (0.0085)    1  (0.0154)    1  (0.0005) 
          2  (0.0897)    2  (0.0000) 
(24,3)    (0.0011)    1  (0.0002)    1  (0.0000) 
          2  (0.0892)    2  (0.0001) 
(12,3)    (0.0000)    1  (0.0010)    1  (0.0058) 
          2  (0.0020)    2  (0.0000) 
sample jan64-sep02; *jan64-mar97. p-values in parenthesis 
.. 
Table 3.2 
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Results of the Wald test are supportive of the better fit of EH equations in the threshold setting. The 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of  1 = β  occurs less frequently. 
Finally, as a further robustness check we run a         estimate of the Campbell-Shiller equation in 
both regimes. The time-varying behaviour of the slope coefficient in each regime (regime   in the 
left panel; regime   in the right panel). Estimates are obtained from         OLS (Newey-West 
corrected) on sequential samples of 50 observations. In both sub-regimes the plot of    β ˆ  over time is 
smooth and fluctuates closely around     (horizontal solid line). Furthermore, in each regime the 
slope coefficients are statistically significant as opposed to the rolling    β ˆ  estimates obtained in the 
single regime setting (Figure 3.1). Figure 3.7 is obtained for the maturity pair (  ,  ); but results are 
similar for other couples of maturities ( , 3).  
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Figure 3.7 
 
An additional way to compare single regime rolling    β ˆ  estimates with sub-regimes estimates is 
shown in Figure 3.8. 
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Kernel density estimation of the (rolling series of) beta coefficients (top panels). Empirical distribution of the (rolling series of) beta 
coefficients (bottom panels). Entire sample (left panels). Regime 1 (central panels). Regime 2 (right panels). 
Figure 3.8   106 
 
The left panel shows the distribution of the estimated coefficient in the single-regime setting (as of 
the right diagram of  Figure 3.1);  while, the  central and the right panel show the estimated    β ˆ  
coefficients in the first and in the second threshold sub-regime respectively. Results are striking. The 
estimates are definitely more concentrated around     in the threshold sub-regimes, in particular 
this is true for regime  , i.e. for low values of the term premium
80.  
Table 3.3 shows some descriptive statistics of the         estimated slope coefficient. The top part of the 
Table reports statistics worked out within each threshold sub-regime. In both regimes the mean of the 
estimated slope coefficient is very close to unity for any combination of maturities ( ,  ). In addition, 
the variability of    β ˆ  is definitely low in the sub-samples. The standard deviation of the            β ˆ  
estimates in the sub-regimes is, in fact, approximately           of the standard deviation computed 
in the single regime model.  
 
 
                                  long term maturity 
      12  24  36  60  120 
regime  1  mean(β)    0.9792  0.9814  0.9871  0.9954  1.0104 
  stdev(β)    0.0496  0.0529  0.0518  0.0578  0.0434 
regime  2  mean(β)    0.9628  0.9930  0.9651  0.9748  0.9848 
   stdev(β)    0.0530  0.0701  0.0776  0.0689  0.0494 
linear   mean(β)    0.5671  0.6323  0.8385  0.9929  0.9401 
  stdev(β)    0.4427  0.5608  0.7087  0.6486  0.5103 
Linear model (3.15’) rolling 60 obs; regimes 1 and 2 rolling 50 obs  
. 
Table 3.3 
 
A financial interpretation rationalizes our empirical results. Campbell (1995) argues that a large bias 
downward of the estimated slope coefficient is due to a small variance of the rationally expected 
changes in short rates relative to the variance of the term premium. Hence, EH holds when investors 
are well informed about future movements in short rates. Equation (3.13) can be readjusted in order 
to express the actual spread in terms of the             spread (     ) and the term premium (   ). 
Therefore, the variance of the spread depends on the variance of both its components plus twice 
their covariance
81: 
 
{ } { } { } { }
{ } { } { }
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⋅ − + =
= ⋅ + + = −
                                                   (3.17) 
 
                                                 
80 Results for other pairs of maturities ( ,  ) are very similar. 
81 The covariance between the             spread and the term premium is negative. At short maturities (  =12, 6) the covariance is 
close to zero, but still negative. The covariance between long and short term rates is positive. The covariance is a negative function of 
the distance between maturities (  -  ). The variance of short term yields is generally larger than the variance of long term yields.    107 
Table  3.4  shows  that  in  the  single-regime  model  for  36 ≤   ,  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
expectations-based component is lower than the standard deviation of the term premium; the slope 
estimate is thus far below unity. Conversely, in each threshold regime the variability of the term 
premium is much lower than the variability of the             spread. Threshold estimates provide 
results consistent with the Campbell (1995) view that a large variance of rationally expected changes 
in short rates generates a small downward bias of the estimated slope coefficient. The augmented 
predictive power of the spread in both regimes follows directly from the lower level of uncertainty 
that characterizes each regime, as captured by term premia volatility. This story is also consistent with 
the idea put forward by Mankiw and Miron (1986), who suggest the low predictability of short rates 
affect the empirical corroboration of EH. In particular, they attribute the lack of empirical support 
for EH to the random walk behaviour of the short rate. They argue that weak empirical evidence in 
favour of EH is due to the policy of smoothing interest rates pursued by the Federal Reserve after its 
foundation in 1914. 
 
 
Standard Deviations 
    long term maturity 
        12  24  36  60  120* 
regime  1  spread    0.4134  0.6880  0.8940   1.0456  1.1649 
  thsp    0.6723  1.0154  1.2508   1.6397  1.6763 
  tp    0.6394  0.9227  1.1256   1.2866  0.8816 
regime  2  spread    0.5074  0.7689  0.9628  1.2448  1.4816 
  thsp    0.7307  1.0909  1.2906  1.7443  2.0250 
   tp    0.6663  0.8824  0.9863  1.1154  1.3404 
linear   spread    0.4656  0.7447  0.9395  1.1693  1.4165 
  thsp    0.9174  1.4810  1.8339  2.1609  2.5069 
  tp    0.9578  1.5253  1.8453  2.0577  2.4383 
. 
 
spread: yield spread. thsp: theoretical spread. tp: term premium. 
Table 3.4 
 
Thornton (2003) points out that the corroboration of EH depends on the ratio between the variances of 
the short and the long rates. In line with Mankiw and Miron (1986) he believes that uncertainty largely 
depends upon the conduct of the Fed. In particular, the more volatile short rates are relative to long rates, 
the closer the estimated β  to    . For any pair of maturities ( ,  ) the values of the ratio between the 
short to long term rate variances are reported in Table 3.5. The relative variance increases with maturity 
  both in the entire sample and in each regime determined by the level of the term premium; while, in 
regimes split by the absolute value of the term premium the relative variance is increasing with maturity 
only below the threshold (regime   .    108 
 
Relative Variance  
    Long term maturity  
     6  12  24  36  60  120 
   
    
,   regime  1  1.0123  1.1532  1.2764  1.5082  1.7252  1.6974 
   regime  2  0.9420  0.9972  1.1255  1.2099  1.4338  1.7357 
   
    
,  
regime  1  0.9896  1.1011  1.2284  1.3662  1.6106  1.7886 
   regime  2  1.1384  1.058  1.1257  1.0957  0.9795  1.7678 
  linear  0.9766  1.0581  1.1339  1.2162  1.2954  1.3748 
. 
 
tp: term premium. 
Table 3.5 
 
In the final part of this Section we wish to test the conjecture put forward by Mankiw and Miron (1986). 
They suggest that, after the creation of the Federal Reserve, monetary policy inertia has lowered the 
predictability of short rates thus affecting the empirical examination of EH. In particular, the short 
rate has become a martingale due to the practice of U.S. monetary authority of smoothing interest rates. 
Mankiw and Miron argue, in fact, that the Fed was committed to “                                    ”. 
On the one hand, if the short rate follows a random walk process its dynamics over time is completely 
casual, and thus unpredictable. On the other hand, yield movements can be inferred if they display a 
mean-reverting pattern;  hence EH should be respected.  It thus follows  a tricky experiment that 
allows checking to what extent the predictability of the fed funds affects EH tests. We compute the 
deviations between the effective fed funds and its moving averages, then we consider the absolute 
value of this mean-reverting measure as threshold variable discriminating regimes in (3.5). We expect 
that β  estimates are close to     below the estimated threshold (regime  ). Mean-reversion implies that 
the federal funds rate is easily predictable as its level gets closer to its local mean, i.e. when deviations 
from its moving average are small. The rationale works as follows. If the fed funds is moving 
towards the mean it will soon catch it up; moreover, if the fed funds is departing from the mean, but 
it is still close to it, it will keep on moving off. Conversely, if the fed funds is far from its local 
mean, it will be difficult to foresee the exact turning point. 
From left to right, top panels of Figure 3.9 plot the fed funds together with its  -,   -, and   -month 
moving averages, and the relative discrepancies. As the black semi-dashed line highlights, the fed funds 
rate tends to revert towards its local mean displaying a mean-reverting pattern
82. The bottom panels 
show the respective absolute value of the deviations between the fed funds and the moving averages.  
                                                 
82 The shorter the horizon to compute the moving average, the higher the speed of adjustment towards the local mean. The dependent 
variable of the equation used to test the mean-reverting property of the fed funds is the difference between the one-period ahead fed 
funds and its current value. The explanatory variables of such equation are the current level of the fed funds and the first lag (and a 
constant). Statistical results are weekly supportive of the mean-reverting behaviour, since the goodness of fit is very low and the 
estimated (negative) coefficient is marginally significant. Mankiw and Miron (1986) adopt this specification as the discrete-time 
version of the short rate diffusion process by Vasicek (1977). Therefore, the qualitative analysis reported in Figure 3.9 would be 
considered as evidence of the mean-reverting behaviour of the effective federal funds rate. Both continuous-time simulations of the   109 
Estimations are reported in Table 3.6. There is evidence suggesting that when the federal funds is close 
to its local mean (regime  ) the estimated slope coefficient is almost    
83. The Wald test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of unity coefficient below the threshold. The predictive power of the spread 
is thus much higher in the threshold model than in the single-regime equation, as suggested by both 
the  joint  and  “individual”  goodness  of  fit  (   
   and   
 ).  The  spread  seems  to  be  particularly 
informative about future interest rate movements at medium-short maturities. Evidence provided in 
this final part of Section 3.4 thus support the theory advanced by Mankiw and Miron (1986). In 
Figure 3.9 we show the scatter diagrams of the relationship between the             and the actual 
spreads both in the single-regime (left panels) and threshold sub-regimes (right panels) for the pairs of 
maturities (  ,  ) and (  ,  ) using threshold deviations computed respectively with the   - and   -
month moving average.  
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diffusion process for the fed funds and algorithms used in technical analysis are, instead, supportive of the fed funds mean-reverting 
pattern.  
83 This is not true only for very long horizon (   ,  )  The number of observations in the first regime is very high; although the LM 
test supports a multi-regime framework, threshold estimations cluster only extreme observations in regime  . Wald test statistics are 
not reported; the Wald test could not reject the null of estimated slope equal to     in regime  .   110 
. 
Expectations Hypothesis - Mankiw and Miron 
  single regime     abs { ffr - MA(12m) }   abs { ffr - MA(24m) } 
(n, m)  obs  β   
γ   regime  obs  β  γ   regime  Obs  β 
   R
2  (p-val)   
j-R
2 
 
R
2  (p-val)  j-R
2 
 
R
2  (p-val) 
(120, 3)  377  0.6442    4.01  1  370  0.5328    2.710  1  311  0.4338 
  0.131  (0.000)    0.167    0.087  (0.000)    0.1649    0.047  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)      2  7  1.8072      2  66  1.1324 
  
        0.888  (0.000)          0.447  (0.000) 
(60 , 3)  442  0.7097    0.418  1  145  1.2584    1.048  1  187  1.2009 
  0.145  (0.000)    0.180    0.102  (0.000)    0.165    0.172  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)      2  297  0.5715      2  255  0.5882 
          0.194  (0.000)          0.151  (0.000) 
(36, 3)  442  0.5103    0.432  1  147  1.1869    1.265  1  226  1.0171 
  0.065  (0.007)    0.120    0.254  (0.000)    0.099    0.1236  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)      2  295  0.3485      2  216  0.3352 
        0.032  (0.003)        0.043  (0.003) 
(24, 3)  442  0.4134    0.475  1  154  1.0453    0.986  1  179  0.8965 
  0.040  (0.0219)    0.091    0.250  (0.000)    0.074    0.105  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)      2  288  0.2324      2  263  0.2591 
        0.011  (0.050)        0.019  (0.026) 
Sample jan67-dec97, spread (  = 120;   = 3); *Sample: an67-dec03, spread( =60;  =3). Sample are 
adjusted since the first 24 observations are missed. The null hypothesis of the LM test is "absence of 
threshold effect".  
. 
Table 3.6 
 
Sub-regime scatter plots denote a better fit than single regime ones. In particular, in regime   the 
distribution of observations is concentrated around the linear interpolant. The slope of the red curve 
is always steeper in regime   thus confirming evidence in favour of EH. 
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Scatter plot diagrams of the actual spread (spread) against the theoretical spread (Theor. spread). Entire sample (left panels). 
Regime 1 (central panels). Regime 2 (right panels). 
Figure 3.10 
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Finally, also a visual inspection at the distributions around the mode of the rolling estimated slope 
coefficients can be interpreted as evidence that EH is closer to be respected in regime   (Figure 3.11).  
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Kernel density estimation of the (rolling series of) beta coefficients (top panels). Empirical distribution of the (rolling series of) beta 
coefficients (bottom panels). Entire sample (left panels). Regime 1 (central panels). Regime 2 (right panels). 
Figure 3.11 
 
 
 
3.5   Monetary Policy Expectations and Asymmetric Inflation Dynamics 
 
Expected inflation is a crucial macroeconomic variable since it contributes to the determination of real 
interest rates, and thus of aggregate demand through the effect on investments and consumption. 
Therefore  forecasting  inflation  is  an  important  goal  for  both  policymakers  and  private  agents. 
Expected inflation is not directly observable though, so that it is necessary to extract information about 
future price dynamics from observable factors. A natural candidate seems to be the term structure of 
interest rates.  
Mishkin (1990a) has developed an empirical model to assess the ability of the yield spread to predict 
future inflation. He finds that at very short maturities TS is not informative about future inflation but it 
contains “                           ” about the real TS; then he finds that TS at medium-long term 
maturities help predict inflation changes (1990b). On the other hand, the model also provides with an 
effective tool to test EH. Unfortunately, in this respect data evidence does not support EH.  
As in the case of interest rate prediction, we believe that linear models might be inappropriate to 
describe  the  dynamic  relationship  between  inflation  and  the  term  structure.  We  suggest  that  the 
informative content of the yield spread about future inflation partially depends on the volatility of the   112 
effective federal funds rate (Figure
84 3.12) and, thus, on the ability of agents to forecast it
85. The 
variability of the fed funds, in fact, not only exerts important influence on the short end of TS, but 
also increases uncertainty regarding the nominal stance of monetary policy.  
In this Section we thus provide evidence that the predictive power of spread improves substantially 
when inflation prediction is conditional to agents’ expectations regarding the effective stance of 
monetary policy, as captured by a strategic measure of the TS slope. Within a threshold model, we 
find a stronger link between inflation and the spread when the expected yield curve is either flat or 
inverted, as reflecting severe stance of monetary policy. Our findings thus imply an asymmetric 
effect running from monetary policy to inflation. 
On one side, a recent contribution by Ravenna and Seppala (2006) has emphasized the role of 
monetary policy to explain EH rejection. Short-run strong monetary non-neutrality implies systematic 
reactions of the monetary authority to movements in endogenous variables. The conduct of the 
central  bank,  which  affects  the  co-variation  between  nominal  and  real  variables,  influences  TS 
dynamics  thus  generating  the  well-known  EH  anomalies.  On  the  other  side,  we  propose  a 
refinement of the study by Tkacz (2004) who finds that “                                              
                                                       ”  signalling  an  asymmetric  effect  of  monetary 
policy on inflation; he also finds the Canadian asymmetry works in the opposite direction. 
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Figure 3.12 
 
The volatility of the fed funds seems coupled with sharp variations in the long-short yield spread as 
shown in Figure 3.13 (left panel); moreover, when the economy experiences a two-digit inflation 
rate  the  volatility  of  the  fed  funds  shoots  exponentially  (right  panel).  High  and  unpredictable 
inflation thus is related to uncertainty regarding the stance of monetary policy as captured by both 
the federal funds and the TS slope.  
 
                                                 
84 Figure 3.12 shows that whenever the volatility of the fed funds increases (bottom left panel), the         (  -month window) 
estimated slope coefficient in equation (3.18) becomes insignificant being very distant from     ( -value of the  -test plotted in the 
bottom part of right panel).  
85 For an extensive review of the literature on the point, please refer to Section 1.4 of Chapter 1.   113 
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Figure 3.13 
 
We thus propose to consider a non linear model for inflation prediction in which regimes transition 
depends  a  measure  of  the  TS  slope  that  explicitly  incorporate  agent’s  expectations  about  the 
effective stance of future monetary policy. 
The  basic  idea  developed  in  this  chapter  is  also  consistent  with  the  prevalent  view  that  the 
unpredictable pattern of short rates affect the empirical analysis of EH (Mankiw and Miron, 1986; 
Campbell,  1995;  Thornton  2004;  Ravenna  and  Seppala,  2006).  Unpredictability  of  short  rates 
trivially  implies  indeterminacy  of  the  yield  spread,  and  thus  uncertainty  on  monetary  policy 
expectations. 
Additionally, analysing EH within threshold models accounts for the criticism by Thornton (2004), 
and Kool and Thornton (2004) who attribute anomalous EH empirical findings to the presence of 
extreme observations. Clustering data into threshold sub-regimes reduces significantly the effect of 
outlier data. 
We suggest constructing the threshold variable as the spread between the observed long rate and 
some measure of the expected policy rate  ( ) 1 + − =    
 
                . The policy rate is the federal funds 
rate as inferred by computing a time-adjusting Taylor-type reaction function
86. The              , 
rather than the market spread, incorporates updated agents’ expectations about the incoming stance 
of  monetary  policy.  Our  approach  is  in  line  with  the  view  expressed  by  Favero,  Kaminska,  and 
Soderstrom (2005). With the aim of testing the predictive power of the spread, in fact, they argue that 
deriving a recursive prediction of the short rate exploiting real time information provides with a 
more realistic analysis, since it forces econometricians to use the same informative set available to 
                                                 
86 The GMM rolling model for the fed funds rate is estimated over a sample of five years. The explanatory variables are the first lag 
of the policy rate (monetary policy inertia); past inflation, a measure of the output gap, either the HP filtered (   ) IP series or 
unemployment. The instruments are the first lag of the regressors. Our approach is thus to estimate a         model for the fed funds 
at any point in time using historical available information, and then projecting (predicting) the short rate one-period ahead. The 
iterative procedure of updating and predicting allows obtaining a realistic measure of the market sentiment about future movements 
in the short rate. The method of estimating and simulating the model forward put the econometrician on the same level of market 
participants’ who elaborate real-time available information. Finally, the choice of estimating a         rather than a           model is 
motivated by the fact that the         methodology better captures the evolution of the economy without preserving an excessive long 
memory of past events.   114 
market participants. Therefore, we believe that our measure of the              , rather than the 
market spread, appropriately reflects investors view about imminent monetary policy.  
Finally, the choice of considering the              , rather than the mere market spread, derives 
from  Bernanke  (1992)  “                                                                                   
                                         , ...                                                     
                                                                                                       
                    ”. 
Constructing the               with the actual observed long term rate and a predicted short rate is 
also consistent with the empirical regularity that long rates are smooth and persistent while short 
rates are quite volatile. So that, on the one hand, it seems superfluous to use a predicted series for 
long rates since their dynamics is particularly smooth; however, on the other hand, predicting short 
rates is necessary because it reflects effective investors behaviour and their changing view about the 
state of the economy.  
According to Mishkin the expectations theory can be tested using the following equation: 
 
( )  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ε β α π π + − + = −                                                                                                       (3.18) 
 
Where, as before,   and   represent the long and the short maturity respectively; π  is the inflation 
rate. EH holds if the estimated slope coefficient  β  is     and the intercept is     . Newey-West 
corrected         estimations, on a window of 60 monthly observations, return the pattern of β  over 
time as reported in Figure 3.12. The coefficient is often lower than    . In particular, the weak 
statistical  significance  of  β   suggests  that  model  (3.18)  may  be  mis-specified.  We  argue  that 
misspecification derives from non linearity in the spread-inflation relationship in conjunction with 
the pattern of volatility displayed by the fed funds. We thus estimate the threshold model (3.19) 
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                                                                   (3.19) 
 
Estimating the non linear model by using the market spread (
 
 
 
            − = ) as threshold variable 
does not deliver any significant improvement, as reported in Tables 3.7 (a, c, e). In Tables 3.7 (b, d, 
f)  we  report  threshold  estimates  when  regimes  are  split  on  the  basis  of  the                 
( ) 1 + − =    
 
                .  
We briefly comment on the empirical results. Hereafter, for sake of parsimony we refer to model 
(3.19) as the financial model when the threshold variable is the market spread; and we label model   115 
(3.19) the              when the threshold variable is the              
87. As expected, in the        
      the estimated threshold increases with the maturity of the long term bond; this effect is absent 
in case of market spread. A significant implication is that the number of observations in the        
       threshold  sub-samples  are  balanced  compared  to  the  sample  size  in  sub-regimes  of  the 
financial model. Therefore in the financial model there seems to be a weak threshold effect; or more 
precisely,  as  in  Tkacz  (2004),  the  threshold  methodology  merely  seems  to  remove  extreme 
observations from the entire sample. Few observations are in fact clustered in regime  , i.e. below 
the estimated market spread (right column of Tables 3.7 a, c, e).  
 
. 
single regime      market spread 
(n, m)  obs    β  Wald     γ   regime  obs    β  Wald 
   R
2    (p-val)              R
2    (p-val)    
(36,3)  528    1.2080  0.0858    0.27  1  84    1.2642  0.6331 
  0.159    (0.000)          0.060    (0.156)   
              2  444    1.0747  0.6460 
                0.090    (0.000)   
(60,3)  504    1.3228  0.0014    -0.30  1  31    -0.6167  0.0808 
  0.256    (0.000)          0.016    (0.295)   
              2  473    1.2317  0.0508 
                0.187    (0.000)   
(120,3)  444    1.2275  0.0239    -1.10  1  14    -0.0791  0.4583 
  0.253    (0.000)          0.000    (0.902)   
              2  430    1.1983  0.0801 
                        0.208    (0.000)    
. 
Table 3.7 (a) 
 
. 
policy spread IP     policy spread UN 
(n,m)  γ   regime  Obs    β  Wald     γ   regime  obs    β  Wald 
         R
2    (p-val)              R
2    (p-val)    
(36,3)  1.48  1  358    1.4923  0.0017    1.11  1  332    1.5363  0.0017 
      0.205    (0.000)          0.199    (0.000)   
    2  170    0.4508  0.0114      2  196    0.3590  0.0011 
      0.025    (0.016)          0.017    (0.043)   
(60,3)  1.55  1  316    1.1887  0.1352    1.54  1  336    1.2833  0.0279 
      0.2210    (0.000)          0.230    (0.000)   
    2  188    1.0539  0.7825      2  168    0.8511  0.4370 
      0.135    (0.000)          0.106    (0.000)   
(120,3)  1.83  1  270    1.0541  0.6432    1.94  1  292    1.0775  0.5184 
      0.233    (0.000)          0.217    (0.000)   
    2  174    0.7283  0.1290      2  152    0.6800  0.0864 
         0.088    (0.000)              0.082    (0.000)    
. 
Table 3.7 (b) 
 
EH-consistent estimates of the slope coefficients  ( ) γ β ˆ  are by large better in the              than in 
the financial model. The improvement occurs at almost any combination of maturities ( ,  ). In 
                                                 
87 We apologize for the eventual abuse of terminology in the latter case.   116 
addition,  results  indicate  that  EH  is  close  to  be  respected  particularly  when  the  long  yield  is 
associated to a long term bond (5 or 10 years). The long end of the yield curve seems to carry 
relevant information about future inflation, whereas little information can be extracted from the 
short end of the yield curve. This confirms previous evidence that the information extracted from 
the entire spectrum of TS maturities is relevant to infer the future state of the economy.  
In the financial model the improvement usually occurs only in one regime, whereas in the        
      it occurs in both regimes. However,              parameter estimates are significant above 
the threshold rather than below
88. 
 
. 
  single regime    market spread 
(n,m)  obs    β  Wald     γ   regime  obs    β  Wald 
   R
2    (p-val)              R
2    (p-val)    
(36,6)  528    1.4117  0.0001    0.14  1  74    1.7506  0.2235 
  0.266    (0.000)          0.102    (0.057)   
              2  454    1.0866  0.5052 
                0.134    (0.000)   
(60,6)  504    1.4156  0.0000    -0.30  1  30    0.4780  0.6188 
  0.351    (0.000)          0.007    (0.560)   
              2  474    1.3054  0.0021 
                0.270    (0.000)   
(120,6)  444    1.2802  0.0020    -0.66  1  21    -0.2634  0.2885 
  0.313    (0.000)          0.002    (0.671)   
              2  423    1.1273  0.2178 
                        0.221    (0.000)    
. 
Table 3.7 (c) 
 
. 
  policy spread IP    policy spread UN 
(n,m)  γ   regime  obs    β  Wald     γ   regime  obs    β  Wald 
         R
2    (p-val)              R
2    (p-val)    
(36,6)  1.00  1  304    1.8106  0.0000    1.12  1  335    1.7565  0.0000 
      0.397    (0.000)          0.3753    (0.000)   
    2  224    0.4176  0.0015      2  193    0.2820  0.0004 
      0.023    (0.054)          0.0102    (0.178)   
(60,6)  1.69  1  336    1.2440  0.0112    1.44  1  326    1.3334  0.0012 
      0.336    (0.000)          0.3467    (0.000)   
    2  168    1.2811  0.1879      2  178    0.9920  0.9663 
      0.179    (0.000)          0.1358    (0.000)   
(120,6)  1.74  1  260    1.0405  0.6858    1.94  1  292    1.0793  0.4317 
      0.295    (0.000)          0.2839    (0.000)   
    2  184    0.9186  0.6266      2  152    0.7209  0.1275 
         0.142    (0.000)              0.0946    (0.000)    
. 
Table 3.7 (d) 
 
More importantly, our results highlight an important asymmetric effect regarding the reaction of 
inflation to the expected              . In the              estimates of the slope coefficients in 
                                                 
88 Although not reported, we find that estimates of the intercept turn out to be not significantly different from     . This result is 
particularly evident when the               is adopted as the regime determinant variable.   117 
regime   are significantly higher than in regime  . It means that in the regime characterized by low 
values of the               the change of inflation is highly responsive to the yield spread. This can 
be interpreted as evidence that inflation strongly responds to monetary policy actions when the 
monetary authority is expected to be severe. Conversely, when the expected               denotes 
loose monetary policy,  i.e. the  yield curve is significantly upward sloping, the  effectiveness of 
monetary policy on inflation seems to be weaker. From the analysis it thus seems that emerges a 
threshold effect which is analogous to the so-called                                
89; it appears, 
in  fact,  that  severe  monetary  policy  is  rapidly  effective  in  influencing  inflation,  whereas 
accommodative monetary policy marginally affects inflation changes
90. 
 
. 
single regime      market spread 
(n,m)  obs    β  Wald     γ   regime  obs    β  Wald 
   R
2    (p-val)              R
2    (p-val)    
(60,12)  504    1.2939  0.0004    -1.11  1  20    3.1214  0.0859 
  0.332    (0.000)          0.284    (0.001)   
              2  484    1.2638  0.0055 
                0.270    (0.000)   
(120,12)  444    1.1045  0.2239    -1.26  1  21    1.2583  0.7689 
  0.272    (0.000)          0.099    (0.005)   
              2  423    0.9889  0.9088 
                        0.188    (0.000)    
. 
Table 3.7 (e) 
 
. 
policy spread IP     policy spread UN 
(n,m)  γ   regime  obs    β  Wald     γ   regime  obs    β  Wald 
         R
2    (p-val)              R
2    (p-val)    
(60,12)  1.15  1  276    1.2048  0.0189    1.28  1  302    1.2114  0.0180 
      0.413    (0.000)          0.3823    (0.000)   
    2  228    1.0955  0.5406      2  202    1.0263  0.8687 
      0.179    (0.000)          0.1729    (0.000)   
(120,12)  1.59  1  245    1.0266  0.7535    1.64  1  258    0.9909  0.9204 
      0.376    (0.000)          0.317    (0.000)   
    2  199    0.6858  0.0349      2  186    0.6759  0.0315 
         0.098    (0.000)              0.099    (0.000)    
. 
Table 3.7 (f) 
 
The asymmetric effect is clear from a visual inspection of Figure 3.14 (a). A symmetric outcome 
would imply strong similarity between regime   and regime   scatters. But, the concentration of 
observations in different regions of the charts gives a clue of how different the outcome of threshold 
                                                 
89 Only negative monetary policy shocks display significant effect on output. 
90 Although not reported, estimates for short maturities of the long term rate (  =   ,              ) show that the slope coefficient is 
statistically significant only in regime  , i.e. above the estimated threshold. In respect with these short horizons, monetary policy 
expectations imply a strong influence of the actual spread on inflation changes only when the steepness is significantly positive (even 
though on medium-short horizons). Thus there seems to exist a reverse Keynesian asymmetry effect at very short horizons, since 
monetary policy affects inflation when it is either expected or perceived accommodative.      118 
equations may be. In Regime   observations tend to be concentrated in the mid-south area of the 
scatter; while, in Regime   data points are located in the north-east part. More specifically, in the 
left panel we report the scatter diagrams for regime   while in the left we report that of regime  . 
The range of variation of the actual spread along the  -axis is almost identical for both scatter plots; 
however, only in regime   (left plot) inflation changes assumes important negative values, denoting 
a sensible reduction of inflation when the yield curve is either flat or inverted. In addition, the linear 
interpolant is steeper in regime  ; once again, a stronger reaction of inflation to monetary policy 
expectations, as captured by the actual spread, occurs when the               highlights incoming 
severe actions. Figure 3.14 (b), instead, shows the scatter plots of the actual spread against inflation 
changes in threshold sub-regimes obtained by the financial model, i.e. when regimes discrimination 
is driven by the mere market long-short yield spread. As noted above, there is a clear concentration 
of observations in regime   (above the estimated threshold) which are symmetrically distributed 
below and above the      value of the  -axis (inflation change). In this case it seems that a certain 
number of outlier data points are relegated in regime   once the threshold technique is applied.    
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Sub-regimes  (policy  model)  scatter 
diagrams  of  the  inflation  changes 
(inflation  change)  against  the  actual 
yield spread (spread). Regime 1 (left 
panel). Regime 2 (right panel). 
Figure 3.14 (a) 
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Sub-regimes (financial model) scatter 
diagrams  of  the  inflation  changes 
(inflation  change)  against  the  actual 
yield spread (spread). Regime 1 (left 
panel). Regime 2 (right panel). 
Figure 3.14 (b) 
 
We report some more evidence that a threshold model fit data better than a linear one. The rolling 
estimate of equation (3.18) is reported in Figure 3.12. Figure 3.15 shows the rolling estimated slope   119 
coefficient in both threshold sub-sample for the pair (  ,  ). The pattern of the estimated coefficient 
closely fluctuates around     till data point corresponding to the mid-1990s. The value     (semi-
dotted horizontal black line) is contained for most of the sample in the standard error bands. The 
statistical significance is not always guaranteed though, as long as sometimes also the      line lies 
within the standard error bands. 
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Figure 3.15 
 
Figure  3.16  reports  the  distribution  of  the  estimated  rolling    β ˆ   coefficients.  The  single  regime 
model (left diagram) denotes a clear bi-modal distribution, which constitutes strong evidence in 
favour of a non linear  analysis.  In addition,  as stressed  above, there is a significant difference 
between  the  distributions  of  the  coefficients  in  the  first  and  second  threshold  sub-regimes. 
Estimated coefficients in regime   are peaked around an higher values compared to coefficients in 
regime   confirming the relevant asymmetric effect.  
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Kernel density estimation of the (rolling series of) beta coefficients (top panels). Empirical distribution of the (rolling series of) beta 
coefficients (bottom panels). Entire sample (left panels). Regime 1 (central panels). Regime 2 (right panels). 
Figure 3.16 
 
Finally, we report also the quantile-quantile plot of estimated coefficients in both the linear model 
and in threshold sub-regimes. Consistently with the left diagrams of Figure 3.16, extreme actual   120 
quantile-values  of  the  single  regime  rolling  estimated    β ˆ   denote  both  fat  and  long  tails  of  the 
distribution. In regime  , instead, there is an important concentration of empirical    β ˆ  quantiles 
around the theoretical normal quantiles. The large gaps at the edges of regime      β ˆ  qq-plot (right 
panel) reflect the shape of the tails of the empirical    β ˆ  distribution. 
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QQ-plots of the rolling beta estimated coefficients. Entire sample (left panel). Regime 1 (central panel). Regime 2 (right panel).  
Figure 3.17 
 
The forecasting power of the yield spread is usually related to the predictability of short rates, and, 
as we argue in this chapter, to the dynamics of the federal funds rate which contributes to the 
determination of the               thus reflecting expectations of the future effective monetary 
policy stance. For the combination of maturity (  ,  ) we have obtained a kernel density estimate of 
the fed funds distributions in both the entire sample and in sub-regimes (threshold             ).  
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Kernel density estimation of the federal funds rate. Entire sample (left panel). Regime 1 (central panel). Regime 2 (right panel). 
Figure 3.18 
 
The kernel density estimate of the federal funds rate in regime   is evidently peaked (right panel). 
This  might  reveal  easy  predictability,  which  is,  in  fact,  consistent  with  the  EH-implied  slope 
coefficient estimate in regime   (Table 3.7 b). The variance of the estimated distribution is much 
larger in the entire sample (left panel).  
In this chapter we have provided evidence that the spread is particularly informative about future 
inflation at medium-long horizons (  = 120, 60, 36). We can only speculate that this result is linked 
to the dichotomy between real and nominal variables. Aggregate demand spending and private   121 
investments are related to the long end of the yield curve (Walsh, 2003). However, the opportunity 
cost  of  holding  money  depends  on  short  rates.  We  speculate  that  inflation  dynamics  might  be 
related to the TS maturity spectrum which lies between these extreme cases. The                    
      states that the price level is merely determined by the money stock in the long run; therefore 
nominal variables do not influence real variables. However, the adjustment process in the medium-
short run displays real effects on the economy. Ravenna and Seppala (2006) relate the changing 
correlation between nominal and real variables to monetary policy actions, i.e. money is not neutral 
in the short run. We acknowledge that, in most modern countries today, short run stabilization 
policies are carried out by the monetary authority rather than the fiscal one. Suppose there is a 
permanent increase in the money growth. If prices are flexible enough, as reasonably expected at 
medium  term  horizons,  growing  money  supply  reduces  real  money  balances,  since  expected 
inflation rises more than the change in the money stock. It follows an upward jump of nominal rates 
which raises the opportunity cost of holding money reducing agents’ desired amount of real money 
balances. If the price level increases more rapidly than money stock does, inflation exceeds the rate 
of money growth. If prices are fully flexible this occurs when the central bank change the money 
supply; if prices are not perfectly flexible, the adjustment is smoothed over a longer period. The 
dynamics at medium TS maturities thus might reflect this process without affecting the long end of 
the yield curve which drives aggregate spending decisions.  
As  a  final  robustness  check,  and  consistently  with  methodology  adopted  above  (the          
regressions), we prove that within threshold sub-samples there is no evidence of structural breaks.  
While the Chow breakpoint test performed on the estimated EH equation over the entire sample 
reveals the existence of several breaks, the Chow tests performed within threshold sub-regimes will 
not detect any break. Hence, on the one hand, the Chow test suggests splitting the linear model into 
sub-samples, on the other hand, the test supports the success of the threshold method. 
We have performed a battery of         Chow breakpoint test to check for parameter stability within 
threshold sub-regimes. In a threshold setting it seems appropriate to check whether the eventual 
structural break occurs in correspondence of any observation, i.e. at any point in time. The Hansen 
(2000) stability test has been inspired by a rolling application of the Chow test. The statistics for the 
test  is  built  as  follows.  Let  1     and  2     denote  the  number  of  observations  in  regime     and    
respectively. First, we estimate a regression within the sub-regime computing the restricted sum of 
squared residuals (    ). Second, focusing on in regime   we allow for the possibility of a structural 
break at any point of the ( 60 1 −   ) central observations; this means that we split regime   (below 
the estimated threshold)) into two further sub-samples of variable size       and        − 1  respectively. 
Moving   from 30 to ( 30 1 −   ) we estimate sequential regressions on the obtained sub-samples     122 
and   ,  being     the  point  of  structural  break  under  examination.  Residual  sum  of  squares  are 
computed for regressions in the two sub-sample,    Ai and    Bi respectively. We obtain ( 60 1 −   ) 
sequential tests and thus an ( 60 1 −   )-dimensional vector of probability values associated to the 
tests. The statistics takes the form: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]            
             
   
     
⋅ − +
+ −
2 /
/
1
  ~           2 , 1−                                                                                    (3.20) 
 
where   is the number of parameters to be estimated in each regression; and the sample size in the 
threshold regime   is            + = 1 . The statistics, under the null hypothesis of no structural break, 
is distributed like an   with   and (     ⋅ −2 1 ) degrees of freedom. The test is repeated for threshold 
sub-regime     to  check  coefficient  stability  also  in  the  second  threshold  sub-regime  (above  the 
estimated  threshold).  In  each  diagram  the  probability  values  associated  to  the  Chow  test  is 
approximately    ; therefore null hypothesis of absence of structural break can never be rejected. 
The Chow tests provide evidence supporting that no structural breaks occur within the threshold 
sub-samples. 
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Rolling Chow Breakpoint test. Regime 1 (top panels). Regime 2 (bottom panels). F-statistics: rolling sequence of the F-statistics 
values. p-value: rolling sequence of the probability value associated to the F-test. 
Figure 3.19 
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3.6   Term Premia, ,on Linearity and Future Economic Activity 
 
A vast portion of economic literature has examined whether the informative content carried by the TS 
of interest rates helps to predict future economic activity. Following Stock and Watson (1989), who 
have included the yield spread among leading economic indicators, early contributions have examined 
the role of the yield spread in anticipating real variables. Harvey (1988, 1989) has shown that the real 
TS is informative about future consumption and output growth. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) provide 
evidence  that  the  spread  between  the  10-year  T-bond  and  the  3-month  T-bill  rates  is  a  useful 
predictor of future GDP. Estrella and Mishkin (1997) essentially confirm previous evidence. Dueker 
(1997) employs a        model reinforcing empirical findings “                                  
                                                                ”. Also Wright (2006) shows that the 
yield spread anticipates recessions with a relatively high probability; moreover, he finds that the 
predictive ability of the spread is robust and does not fade away after the inclusion of a policy 
variable (the effective fed funds). 
Recently the literature has turned to investigate whether term premia are informative about the 
business cycle. In particular, researchers have focused on the possibility that a decomposition of the 
yield spread, into the expected change in short rates and a term premium, can be helpful to examine 
movements in future output. Hamilton and Kim (2002) find that the aforementioned decomposition 
of the spread is useful to predict future GDP. Coefficient estimates of both components turn out to 
be positive and statistically significant; but the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the effect of 
the term premium is as important as that of the expected change in short rates. Ang, Piazzesi, and 
Wei (2006) compare the predictive power of the spread with that of its decomposition. They find 
extremely  useful  the  decomposition  since  it  substantially  increases  the  goodness  of  fit  of  the 
predictive model; however, the term premium turns out to be not significantly different from     . 
Favero      . (2005) claim that the aforementioned decomposition leads to a better understanding of 
the predictive model; they find a positive sign for the coefficient of the term premium indicating 
that  a  lower  term  premium  predicts  slower  output  growth.  Reduced-form  empirical  analysis 
performed by Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007) suggests, instead, that a reduction in term 
premia stimulates economic activity thus challenging previous evidence. 
In this Section we offer an innovative approach to exploit the decomposition of the spread for 
forecasting  future  economic  activity.  As  argued  in  Section  3.4,  we  suggest  that  term  premia 
introduce  some  noise  in  the  linear  analysis  of  the TS  informative  content;  we  thus  propose  to 
interpret evidence of time-variation in term premia as support of non linearity.  
In  Figure  3.20  we  report  the  β   coefficient,  together  with  standard  error  bands  and  the   -test 
probability value, of the following equation estimated with a         window of 60 observations:    124 
 
( )  
 
 
 
               ε β α + − + = ∆ + ,                                                                                                         (3.21) 
  
Where  ( ) ( )                        + + ⋅ = ∆ ln 1200 ,  is the monthly-adjusted rate of growth of industrial production 
(  =   ). Although the left panel shows that the spread carries substantial predictive power over time, 
the  right  diagram  highlights  that  there  is  a  clear  connection  between  the  lack  of  statistical 
significance  of  model  (3.21)  and  the  level  of  the  term  premium.  A  multiple  regime  model  to 
examine the predictive ability of the spread can thus account for the aforesaid connection.     
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Figure 3.20 
 
Term  premia  reflect  agents’  risk  aversion  and  provide  with  a  measure  of  monetary  policy 
innovation;  according  to  equation  (3.13),  in  fact,  term  premia  represent  the  unanticipated 
component of the yield spread. We suggest that the ability of the TS slope to anticipate future 
output movements is inversely related to the level of term premia.                , on the one hand, 
given a value of the yield spread, lower term premia imply stronger expectations of accommodative 
monetary policy. On the other hand, low term premia also reveal little uncertainty regarding the 
expected future monetary policy stance. A combination of these complementary effects induce self-
fulfilling activities, since agents not only expect the monetary authority to accommodate output 
growth, buy also they are confident about the conduct of the central bank. 
In  order  to  capture  the  dynamics  described  above,  we  outline  the  following  framework  where 
threshold regimes are determined by the first lag of the term premium (    = 
   
    
,
1 − ). 
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The following Tables report the empirical results. We test the ability of the spread to anticipate 
future output growth on both industrial production (left panel) and total capacity utilization (right 
panel).   represents the forecasting horizon length (  months ahead). We consider only two pairs of 
maturities (   ,  ) -top panel- and (  ,  ) -low panel-. The threshold variable (   ) is the term 
premium. The magnitude of the estimated slope coefficients is by large greater in regime   (below   125 
the threshold estimate) than in regime  . In addition, when term premia are lower than the threshold 
estimated  value  the  goodness  of  fit  of  the  predictive  model  substantially  increases.  The  joint 
goodness of fit of the threshold model almost doubles with respect to the linear model; moreover, in 
regime   the empirical model fits data much better than in regime  .  
 
. 
Output Growth Prediction 
  Industrial Production    Total Capacity Utilization 
k  obs  β 
 
γ   regime  obs  β 
  Obs  β 
 
γ   regime  obs  Β 
   R
2  (p-val) 
  j-R
2     R
2  (p-val) 
  R
2  (p-val) 
        R
2  (p-val) 
12  372  1.6710    0.684  1  146  3.4419    372  0.5039               
  0.269  (0.000)    0.408    0.554  (0.000)    0.023  (0.112)           
  LM  (0.000)      2  226  1.0890                 
           0.182  (0.000)                       
24  372  1.4384    -0.171  1  118  2.9198    372  1.5198    1.193  1  159  2.5015 
  0.385  (0.000)    0.520    0.692  (0.000)    0.255  (0.000)    0.432    0.470  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)      2  254  1.0202    LM  (0.000)      2  213  1.5083 
          0.313  (0.000)            0.319  (0.000) 
36  372  0.8631    -1.720  1  38  0.8861    372  0.9932               
  0.265  (0.000)    0.354    0.320  (0.000)    0.117  (0.003)           
  LM  (0.000)      2  334  0.852   
   
         
        0.283  (0.000)             
12*  432  1.7602    1.030  1  202  2.5759    432  0.2325           
  0.218  (0.000)    0.438    0.487  (0.000)    0.001  (0.567)           
  LM  (0.000)      2  230  1.7227                 
  
        0.247  (0.000)                       
24*  432  1.5131    1.527  1  248  2.1579    432  1.4661    2.028  1  279  2.2169 
  0.307  (0.000)    0.479    0.457  (0.000)    0.142  (0.000)    0.424    0.327  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)      2  184  1.2692    LM  (0.000)      2  153  1.2893 
           0.392  (0.000)            0.183  (0.000) 
36*  432  0.9939    1.775  1  267  1.3630    432  1.2662           
  0.249  (0.000)    0.336    0.339  (0.000)    0.114  (0.001)           
LM  (0.000)      2  165  0.7246   
   
         
            0.247  (0.000)                   
Sample jan67-dec97, spread (n = 120; m = 3); *Sample: jan67-dec03, spread(n = 60; m = 3). The null hypothesis of the LM 
test is "absence of threshold" 
. 
Table 3.8 
 
Empirical results are clearly supportive of the inverse relationship between the predictive power of 
the spread and the level of term premia. Low term premia tend to be associated to faster output 
growth in the future. The huge threshold effect, i.e. the large gap between the magnitude of the 
estimated  β   coefficient  in  different  regimes,  can  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  self-fulfilling 
expectations. This is particularly true when the forecasting horizon is between    and    months 
ahead. In a credible monetary regime, low term premia reflect agents’ accurate expectations of an 
accommodative stance of monetary policy as displayed by a positively sloped yield curve. The 
expected  increase  of  money  supply  encourages  individuals  to  raise  consumption  spending  and 
private investments, and leads financial institutions to expand credit; the final impact on aggregate 
demand  is  thus  substantial.  Conversely,  when  term  premia  are  high  (regime   )  the  greater 
uncertainty  regarding  the  future  stance  of  monetary  policy  prevents  agents  from  increasing   126 
consumption  spending  and  borrowing.  Figure  3.21  reports  the  scatter  plots  of  the  relationship 
between IP growth and the yield spread for the pair (   ,  ) when   is 12 (top panels) and 24 
(bottom panels) months respectively. 
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Scatter plot diagrams of the future Industrial Production Index growth (IP grw) 12 months (top panels) and 24 month (bottom 
panels) ahead against the yield spread between the 120-month and the 3-month yields (spread). Entire sample (left panels). 
Regime 1 (central panels). Regime 2 (right panels).  
Figure 3.21 
 
The regression line is definitely steeper in regime   (central panels) then in regime  ; in addition, 
regime   scatter plots display a closer concentration around the regression line. 
Table 3.9 shows that previous results are robust to different model specifications. Following Wright 
(2006) we check whether the predictive power of the spread, i.e. the statistical significant of  β , 
does not vanish after the introduction of the federal funds rate among explanatory variables. 
 
( )
( ) 




> + + − + = ∆
≤ + + − + = ∆
+
+
γ ε ρ β α
γ ε ρ β α
ˆ
ˆ
2 2 ,
1 1 ,
              
              
   
 
 
 
       
   
 
 
 
       
                                                                 (3.23) 
  
The estimated yield spread coefficient remains positive and it is higher in regime   than in regime  . 
The negative coefficient of the federal funds rate reveals that high values of the policy rates are 
associated to reduction in future economic activity. The inclusion of the federal funds rate improves 
the fit in both regimes without affecting the significance of the yield spread coefficient. 
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Output Growth Prediction 
  Industrial Production 
k  obs  β  p   
γ   regime  obs  β  p 
   R
2  (p-val)  (p-val)    j-R
2     R
2  (p-val)  (p-val) 
12  372  0.6565  -0.7375    0.853  1  147  0.8946  -1.6733 
  0.433  (0.038)  (0.000)    0.588    0.733  (0.015)  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)        2  225  0.1520  -0.5872 
           0.359  (0.514)  (0.000) 
24  372  0.8812  -0.4050    0.525  1  144  2.0085  -0.4801 
  0.479  (0.000)  (0.000)    0.603    0.692  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)        2  228  0.3103  -0.4162 
             0.457  (0.034)  (0.000) 
36  372  0.6189  -0.1774    -1.720  1  38  2.9200  1.3680 
  0.298  (0.000)  (0.029)    0.432    0.509  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)        2  334  0.5127  -0.2477 
           0.359  (0.000)  (0.000) 
12*  432  0.9090  -0.5573    1.030  1  202  1.8836  -0.3933 
  0.325  (0.000)  (0.000)    0.461    0.509  (0.000)  (0.004) 
  LM  (0.000)        2  230  1.3137  -0.2494 
  
        0.272  (0.000)  (0.010) 
24*  432  1.0854  -0.2800    1.868  1  271  1.0694  -0.5066 
  0.358  (0.000)  (0.002)    0.525    0.499  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  LM  (0.000)        2  161  1.5239  0.1636 
              0.446  (0.000)  (0.012) 
36*  432  0.8980  -0.0628    1.821  1  270  0.9842  -0.1948 
  0.252  (0.000)  (0.333)    0.373    0.352  (0.000)  (0.019) 
LM  (0.000)        2  162  1.0111  0.1966 
 
        0.362  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sample jan67-dec97, spread (n = 120; m = 3); *Sample: jan67-dec03, spread(n = 
60; m = 3). The null hypothesis of the LM test is "absence of threshold" 
. 
Table 3.9 
 
 
 
3.7   Concluding Remarks 
 
Linear models have been largely adopted to test the predictive ability of the spread. However, the 
empirical failure of the expectations theory has encouraged researchers to find alternative ways to 
analyse the informative content of the slope of the term structure of interest rates. The goal of this 
chapter is thus to examine the predictive ability of the spread in threshold models. 
Our interest in non linearity moves from the empirical failure of EH in linear models; in addition, 
the choice of a multiple regime frameworks accounts for the criticism by Thornton (2004) who 
attributes the eventual and unusual empirical support for EH to the presence of outlier observations. 
Time variation in risk premia have been advocated as a possible explanation of the expectations 
puzzle. We thus propose to associate threshold sub-regimes either to the dynamics of term premia 
or to the expectations about the future stance of monetary policy.  
We find that the slope of the term structure is informative about future movement in short rates 
once the risk averse attitude of private agents is properly taken into account. We also provide   128 
evidence that future inflation prediction is conditioned to the expected stance of monetary policy. 
Finally we document an important inverse relationship between the level of term premia and the 
ability of the spread to anticipate future output growth.  
To summarize, this chapter provides significant evidence of asymmetry affecting the predictive 
power of the yield spread.  
 
 
 
Appendix A3.I   -   Data 
 
All data employed in the analysis have monthly frequency. United States ZCB yields data from January 1964 
and December 1998 are from either the McCulloch-Kown database (3-month, 6-month, and 10-year) or from 
the Fama-Bliss dataset (1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-year)
91. From January 1999 to June 2007 all yields data are from the 
Datastream  database  (ZCB  yields).  The  effective  federal  funds  rate  series  is  from  the  Federal  Reserve 
Economics Database (FRED). Below we plot the federal funds rate, the 3-month, and the 60-month yields 
from January 1964 to June 2002, the range over which the empirical analysis is performed. Rather than in 
yields’ level we are interested in the spreads. We compute the spread between long term yields and the 3-
month yield. Shaded areas in the following figures indicate periods of recession
92; the spreads tend to be 
negative, i.e. the yield curve either inverted or flat, immediately before recessions. This is consistent with the 
prevalent  view  that  an  inverted  yield  curve  reflects  agents’  expectations  of  a  severe  tightening  in  the 
monetary policy conduct. 
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ffr:  effective  federal  funds  rate. 
y3m:  3-month  yield.  y60m:  60-
month  yield.  spr  (n,  m):  spread 
between the  -month yield and the 
 -month yield. 
Figure 3.22 
 
Campbell and Shiller (1991) show that the yield spread can be decomposed into the expected change in short 
term rates (
 
    ) and a term premium, according to the following: 
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91 McCulloch data are available from the Gregory R. Duffee web page; while the Fama-Bliss yields data are from Cochrane and 
Piazzesi (AER, 2005). 
92 NBER recessions: 1969q4 – 1970q4; 1973q4 – 1975q1; 1980q1 – 1980q3; 1981q3 – 1982q4; 1990q3 – 1991q1; and 2001q1 – 
2002q1 (q stands for        ).   129 
 
where   is the long term maturity;   is the short term maturity and 
   
    
,  is the term premium associated to 
the combination of maturities ( ,  ). The first element on the RHS is the expectational component, otherwise 
known as the            , or                  , spread. The table below show some descriptive statistics about 
the spread and its two components (  = 3). The sample ends in September 1997 which is the most recent 
available observation for the             spread associated to the 10-year bond. 
 
 
  long term maturity 
    6  12  24  36  60  120* 
spread  mean    0.2306   0.4216   0.6446   0.8116   1.0064   1.3204 
  stdev   0.2348   0.4656   0.7447   0.9395   1.1693   1.3977 
  normality   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.085) 
thsp  mean    0.0058   0.0174   0.0339   0.0538   0.0820  -0.0690 
  stdev   0.5492   0.9302   1.4742   1.8200   2.1443   2.4942 
   normality   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.018)   (0.088)   (0.108)   (0.006) 
tp  mean    0.2463   0.4221   0.6185   0.7545   0.9159   1.3697 
  stdev   0.6017   0.9926   1.5284   1.8281   2.0629   2.4257 
  normality   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.372)   (0.787)   (0.614)   (0.000) 
.*ssample jan64-sep97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
spread:  yield  spread.  thsp:  theoretical 
spread. tp: term premium. mean: sample 
average.  stdev:  sample  standard 
deviation.  normality:  probability  value 
associated to the Jarque and Bera test. 
Table 3.10 
                                                                                                                                     
The mean of both the spread and the term premium is increasing with maturity ( ); whereas the mean of the 
theoretical  spread  is  almost  constant.  Similar  results  are  obtained  by  Campbell  (1995).  The  standard 
deviation of all variables is increasing with maturity. The null hypothesis of normality is almost invariably 
rejected (Jarque and Bera test).  
According to Campbell, the empirical failure of the expectations theory can be rationalized by noting that the 
standard deviations of the expected changes in the interest rates (            spread) are smaller relative to 
the standard deviations of the term premia. With our data this occurs for medium-short horizons (   ≤ 36). 
An implication of the magnitude of relative variance is the downward bias of the estimated slope coefficient 
(lower than unity) in the single equation model to test the expectations hypothesis. Term premia reflect the 
unexpected future changes in interest rates, i.e. the unpredictable evolution of the yield curve, which is 
regarded to be a measure of investors’ risk aversion; in addition, when agents are well informed about future 
movements in interest rates the variability of term premia should be lower than the variability of the         
          spread. Consistently with this idea, Mankiw and Miron (1986), among others, suggest that the 
empirical failure of the expectations hypothesis can be attributed to the increased unpredictability of interest 
rates after the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914.  
As shown in the following figure, the term premium tends to rise before recessions.  
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tp (n, m): term premium between 
the   -month  and  the   -month 
maturities. 
Figure 3.23 
 
All the time series considered are covariance stationary. The results of both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests are reported below. The upper part of the 
table reports the probability values of the ADF test. In the bottom panel the LM statistics values of the KPSS 
test are displayed. 
 
 
  long term maturity (n) 
     6  12  24  36  60  120 
spread(n,3)  adf  (0.000)*  (0.000)*  (0.000)*  (0.003)*  (0.011)*  (0.017)* 
thsp(n,3)  adf  (0.000)*  (0.001)*  (0.000)*  (0.002)*  (0.013)*  (0.017) 
tp(n,3)  adf  (0.000)*  (0.000)*  (0.000)*  (0.001)*  (0.019)*  (0.108) 
spread(n,3)  kpss  0.661*  0.087*  0.374*  0.449*  0.084**  0.076** 
thsp(n,3)  kpss  0.079*   0.182*  0.243*  0.318*  0.080**  0.206** 
tp(n,3)  kpss  0.152*  0.217*  0.490*  0.083**  0.143**  0.208**
a 
Exogenuos: *Intercept, **Intercept and Trend; 
a18 lags 
. sample jan64-sep02 
 
 
 
 
spread:  yield  spread.  thsp: 
theoretical spread. tp: term premium. 
adf:  probability  value  associated  to 
the  augmented  DickeyFuller  test. 
kpss: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin test statistics. 
Table 3.11 
The ADF test leads to the rejection of the unit root hypothesis; whilst, the null hypothesis of stationarity 
cannot be rejected by the KPSS test
93. 
The rate of inflation has been calculated as the expected annual percentage (   ) variation in the Seasonally 
Adjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI all urban consumers, all items). The series has been obtained by the 
FRE-Database (originally from U.S. Department of Labour: Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
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In the above formula   = 12 (monthly frequency);   is a time index that indicates the horizon extent. The 
change in inflation over time is given by the difference 
 
 
 
  π π − . The difference 
 
 
 
  π π −  indicates the 
evolution of the inflation rate over the horizon  -  (with   >  ). In the analysis of the ability of the spread to 
                                                 
93 To match the monthly frequency of data, the rule of thumb selected number of lags in the auxiliary regression is 12; in few cases 
the number of lags is different but very close to 12. The automatic lag selection based on different criteria (Akaike, Schwarz, 
Hannan-Quinn) is consistent with our choice. Unit root test results obtained with the automatic lag selections are similar. The KPSS 
critical values are 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%), and 0.347 (10%) when the intercept is included in the model. The KPSS test critical 
values if also the trend is added are 0.216, 0.146, and 0.119 at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively.    131 
predict inflation we fix the short term maturity ( ) equal to 12 months. In the left panel of the following 
figure we plot the differences 
12
 
 
  π π − , while in the right panel we show the yield spreads ( , 12). 
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infl (n, m): inflation change between 
the   -month  and  the   -month 
inflation. spr(n, m): spread between 
the  -month and the  -month yield.  
Figure 3.24 
 
Between 1964 and 2002 the mean is approximately zero for all the series, whereas the standard deviations 
rise with the long term maturity ( ). Both the ADF and the KPSS test suggest these series are stationary 
(integrated of order zero) as shown in the table
94.  
 
 
sample jan64-sep02  long term maturity (n) 
obs 405     24  36  60  120 
infl(n,12)  stdev   0.4373   0.6925   0.8946   1.0945 
  adf  (0.000)*  (0.001)*  (0.009)*  (0.002)* 
   kpss  0.127*  0.152*  0.274*  0.664* 
spread(n,12)  stdev   0.3919   0.6131   0.8810   1.1414 
  adf  (0.019)*  (0.038)*  (0.043)*  (0.044)* 
  kpss  0.092**  0.072**  0.076**  0.073** 
Exogenuos: *Intercept, **Intercept and Trend 
 
 
 
 
infl:  inflation  change.  spread:  yield 
spread. adf: probability value associated to 
the  augmented  DickeyFuller  test.  kpss: 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  test 
statistics.  
Table 3.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 See previous note.    132 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Forecasting Economic Activity using 
the Conditional Volatility of Term Premia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The empirical rejection of the expectations hypothesis has often been attributed to time variation in 
term  premia.  Following  recent  developments  in  the  literature,  we  believe  that  the  informative 
content of term premia partially offsets the weak predictive power of the slope of the term structure. 
Deriving term premia as the difference between the         observed and the         expected long 
term rates, we check for the time-varying nature of term premia; we then obtain the conditional 
variance of term premia by Kalman filtering an empirical macro-model. In this chapter we provide 
evidence  suggesting  that  the  conditional  volatility  of  term  premia  is  informative  beyond  term 
premia and the yield spread. We find significant evidence that the conditional variance of term 
premia, which we reckon as a measure of financial distress, is a significant predictor of future 
economic activity. In particular, high volatility of term premia is associated with slower output 
growth in the future. Finally, in line with Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007) we document an 
inverse correlation between term premia and the business cycle. 
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4.1   Introduction 
 
The expectations hypothesis asserts that the yield spread is informative about future changes in 
interest  rates.  However,  although  appealing  the  expectations  theory  has  found  weak  empirical 
support. A large portion of the empirical research has suggested the time-varying pattern of term 
premia as a possible explanation for the expectations puzzle (Mankiw and Miron, 1986; Fama, 1986; 
Cook and Hahn, 1989; Lee, 1995; Tzavalis and Wickens, 1997; Hejazi and Li, 2000). In this chapter 
we examine whether the variability of term premia, rather than the level, is informative about the 
economy. 
Predicting future economic activity is a recurrent theme in empirical economics (Stock and Watson, 
1989; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1997; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, among 
others);  in  particular,  the  slope  of  the  term  structure  is  believed  to  anticipate  business  cycle 
fluctuations.  Bond  prices,  in  fact,  summarize  quite  accurately  agents’  expectations  about  the 
incoming stance of monetary policy  since financial markets are  efficient at distilling economic 
information. 
A recent strand of the literature has focused on the possibility that the term premium, rather than the 
yield spread, is capable of predicting future economic activity (Hamilton and Kim, 2002; Favero, 
Kaminska, and Soderstrom, 2005; Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei, 2006; Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson, 
2008). In this chapter the term premium represents the gap between the observed yield spread and 
the            , or                  , spread; alternatively the term premium is computed as the 
difference between the actual (observable) and the         (expected) long term rate. In principle, 
large values of the yield spread are due either to an expected accommodative stance of monetary 
policy  or  to  the  presence  of  large  risk  premia  required  by  investors.  These  effects  are 
complementary as long as, for a certain value of the yield spread, the larger the term premium the 
lower  the  rationally  expected  level  for  the  long  rate,  and  viceversa.  Hence,  the  term  premium 
captures the unexpected change in the monetary  policy stance. The decomposition of the  yield 
spread into an expectations-based component and a risk premium allows distinguishing the effect of 
risk aversion from that of monetary policy as implied by rational expectations.  
In this chapter we augment traditional predictive models by allowing for the possibility that the 
variability of term premia can anticipate future output growth, suggesting that financial distress, 
rather  than  mere  risk  aversion,  is  informative  future  output  fluctuations.  To  some  extent,  the 
inspiration of this work derives from the effort of the existing literature to improve the forecasting 
model by incorporating macro variables in reduced-form empirical models (Evans and Marshall 
2001; Favero, Kaminska, and Soderstrom 2005; Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson, 2007).    134 
In particular, Favero      . (2005) claim that the decomposition of the spread into an expectational 
component and a term premium leads to a better understanding of the forecasting model since it 
allows separating the effect of future monetary policy from that of risk aversion. We thus propose to 
improve upon their suggestion by analysing the effect of term premia variability which reflects 
financial distress rather than simple agents’ risk-averse attitude. Moreover, although several studies 
have highlighted that the time-variation of term premia is a significant component of the yield spread, 
so far no one has proposed to investigate the dynamic properties associated to the time-varying nature 
of term premia for forecasting macroeconomic variables. Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) find that 
the aforementioned decomposition improve the forecasting performance of the predictive model; 
however, there is weak statistical evidence to support an active role for term premia. 
Rather  than  focusing  on  term  premia,  we  examine  whether  volatility  is  informative  about  the 
economy. In this chapter we thus find robust evidence that the conditional variance of term premia 
prediction errors, rather than term premia, helps to predict future economic activity. We follow 
Engle’s (1982) suggestion that the conditional variance, i.e. the variance conditional upon available 
information  at  the  time  of  forecasting,  rather  than  the  unconditional  variance,  is  what  really 
influences agents’ behaviour. 
Despite interest rate variability is an important determinant of both the term premium and the yield 
spread, Hamilton and Kim (2002) document it is not informative about future output. We provide a 
refinement of their model by considering the conditional variability of term premia, which, instead, 
appears to carry useful information for predicting future industrial production growth. We believe 
that future economic activity is related to term premia volatility rather than to interest rate volatility. 
We  thus  emphasize  the  role  of  both  financial  distress  and  risk  aversion  as  opposed  to  the 
unpredictability of monetary policy. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next Section contains a brief survey of the 
literature. In Section 4.3 we discuss the macroeconomic foundation of term premia stressing out 
their non linear nature. In Section 4.4 we present empirical evidence about future output prediction. 
Section  4.5  concludes.  All  data  are  presented  in               .  Finally,  in                  we 
outline the Hansen method to check for coefficient stability. 
 
 
 
4.2   Literature Review 
 
In a seminal work Stock and Watson (1989) find that the yield spread can be considered a leading 
economic indicator for predicting future output changes. The predictive ability of the yield spread 
has found significant support afterwards. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) find that the slope of the   135 
yield curve, i.e. the spread between the   -year T-bond and the  -month T-bill rates, is a good 
predictor of future real GDP growth. They document that the predictive accuracy of the spread for 
cumulative changes from   to   quarters ahead is quite impressive since the spread explains more 
than one third of the variations of output changes. Although results differ across countries and 
across  maturities,  Estrella  and  Mishkin  (1997)  roughly  confirm  previous  empirical  results  after 
extending the analysis to some European countries. A        model returns significant positive 
probability  of  the  yield  spread  to  anticipate  recessions.  Consistently  with  Estrella  and  Mishkin 
(1997), both Dueker (1997) and Wright (2006) have shown that the yield spread is a relatively good 
predictor of recessions.  
Generally speaking, the effect of the spread on future output growth is positive, since small values 
of the spread, reflecting agents’ expectations of tight monetary policy, tend to predict slower growth 
in economic activity. However, Feroli (2004) points out that the predictive ability of the spread is 
contingent on the monetary authority’s reaction function; in particular, the predictive power of the 
spread depends on the accuracy of the expectations about the future stance of monetary policy. 
Consistently with this view, in the previous chapter of the thesis we have, in fact, provided evidence 
of the asymmetric predictive power of the spread. Feroli (2004) develops a small macro model in 
which the informative content of the term structure depends on the parameters of the monetary 
policy reaction function. Simulation results show that, depending on parameters’ values, the model 
can  account  for  the  diminished  predictive  power  of  the  spread  after  1979.  Also  Ravenna  and 
Seppala (2006) have explored the connection between monetary policy and the predictive ability of 
the spread. They find that short run monetary non-neutrality captured by a simple monetary policy 
rule can account for the empirical failure of EH, and thus can affect the predictive power of the 
yield spread. 
After analysing the predictive power of the yield spread, researchers have focused on the role of 
term  premia.  Hamilton  and  Kim  (2002)  propose  to  decompose  the  yield  spread  using          
observed short rates data instead of         expected rates. The spread decomposition reflects the 
effect of expectations about future monetary policy, as captured by the expected future changes in 
short rates, and risk aversion capture a term premium. They show that both components help predict 
real  GDP  growth.  The  estimated  effect  of  both  components  is  significantly  positive.  On  the 
contrary, Ang, Piazzesi and Wei (2006) find that the term premium is not statistically significant. 
However, they acknowledge that, on the one hand, the distinction of both components is important 
to  obtain  a  clear  understanding  of  the  forecasting  model,  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  leads  to  a 
substantial  improvement  in  the  goodness  of  fit.  Along  the  same  line,  Favero,  Kaminska,  and 
Soderstrom  (2005)  decompose  the  spread  into  an  expectational  component  and  a  pure  term   136 
premium.  They  show  that  adding  some  macroeconomic  variables  in  a  reduced-form  empirical 
model improves the forecasting ability of the spread. Using quarterly data, they find that the spread 
between 5-year and 3-month interest rates, and the term premia associated to those maturities, are 
reliable predictors of the GDP quarterly change. Consistently with previous findings, they provide 
evidence that a lower term premium predicts slower GDP growth. Kim and Wright (2005) employ a 
standard  arbitrage-free  dynamic  latent  factor  term  structure  model  to  obtain  a  measure  of  risk 
premia. They ascribe the so-called conundrum, i.e. the decline in long term rates in response to a 
policy tightening action in 2004, to a fall in term premia. Wright (2006) finds that low term premia 
raise the probability of a recession in the future. The        model associate to the yield spread a 
significant probability of future recessions. Moreover, the inclusion of the policy rate in the model 
improves  the  forecasting  power  both  in-  and  out-of-sample.  Also  Hejazi  (2000)  adopts  the 
aforementioned decomposition to analyse the informative content of the term structure. Differently 
from  Hamilton  and  Kim  (2002),  his  findings highlight  that  the  variability  in  interest  rates  is  a 
significant empirical determinant of the future changes in the industrial production index. High 
interest rate variability is associated to future contraction in economic activity.  
In  this  chapter  we  suggest  that  the  decomposition  of  the  spread  into  an  expectations-based 
component and a risk factor can be further improved upon. We thus focus on the volatility of term 
premia,  rather  than  on  the  variability  of  interest  rates,  with  the  aim  of  analysing  whether  the 
conditional variance of term premia helps to predict economic activity. Results are encouraging 
since  we  find  significant  evidence  that  the  volatility  of  term  premia  is  informative  about  the 
business cycle. 
 
 
 
4.3   Term Premia and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
The empirical rejection of EH is often attributed to time variation in term premia. Tzavalis and 
Wickens (1997), as well as Fama (1984) and Hardouvelis (1988), among others, provide evidence 
that the EH failure is due to the omission of a time-varying term premium, which is correlated with 
the term spread, from the predictive model. Also Cook and Hahn (1986) suggest that the weak 
support for EH can be attributed to small changes of the term premium over time.  
We  recall  that  the  expectations  theory  is  built  on  the  crucial  assumption  of  rationality.  The 
traditional version of EH implies a constant term premium over time; while the pure EH theory 
implies  the  term  premium  equal  to     .  In  this  chapter  we  consider  the  softer  version  of  EH 
allowing for the presence of term premia. Adopting the notation introduced by Campbell and Shiller   137 
(1991), we define term premia as the difference between the long term yield (
 
    ) and its EH-
implied value, i.e. an average of expected short term yields (
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Where   represent the monthly long term maturity, while   is the short term maturity.    denotes 
expectations. In this chapter we consider     and    months as long maturities ( ) and   month as 
short maturities
95
 ( ). 
Standard dynamic asset pricing theory emphasizes the time-varying nature of term premia. The 
fundamental asset pricing equation asserts that the price of a security can be seen as the discounted 
value of its expected future payoffs. The time   price of a  -period bond is simply the expected 
discounted value of its price    -period ahead. If the bond expires in period  , the current discount 
factor is deterministic, i.e. it is known with certainty. On the other hand, if the maturity date is far 
into the future (  >  ), the actual discount factor is stochastic since it depends upon the sequence of 
future    -period discount factors  ( ) ( ) ( ) { }                               + + + ,..., , , 2 1 . We recall that the iterated law of 
expectations  (tower  rule)  implies  ( ) { } ( )                           + + − + = 1 .  In  asset  pricing  theory  the  stochastic 
discount  factor  (     )  represents  a  convenient  way  to  model  uncertainty;  the  current  price  of  a 
security can thus be expressed by appropriately discounting future state-contingent payoffs: 
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The price of the bond at time     is the present value of its future payoff  ( )
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Substituting this expression in formula (4.2) yields: 
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Using the law of iterated expectations, and iterating the process recursively forward yields:  
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The price of a unit of currency delivered at time   is trivially     dollar  1
0 = +       (   ∀ ). The price of 
a bond thus depends upon the sequence of future stochastic discount factors along the entire life of 
the  bond.  The  microeconomic  foundation  of  the  stochastic  discount  factor  derives  from  an 
intertemporal  optimization  problem  of  resource  allocation.  Defining  the  marginal  utility  of 
                                                 
95 The empirical analysis is performed with data from January 1988 and June 2007 in different geographical areas. We consider 
United States, the Euro area, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Samples are automatically adjusted as imposed by equation (4.1); 
recent observations are thus lost due to the expectations of future short yields. Data are presented in              .   138 
consumption  as  the  first  derivative  with  respect  to  consumption  of  a  standard  Von  Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, the stochastic discount factor is:  
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Where δ  is the subjective discount factor, i.e. a parameter describing the temporal preferences of 
the representative agent. The lower δ , the lower the weight given to future consumption, and the 
more impatient the consumer. The utility function is increasing, so that it reflects the desire for 
more  consumption  (positive  first  derivative).  The  concave  shape  of  the  utility  function  ( ) •    
indicates risk aversion and justifies the desire for intertemporal substitution. The risk-averse attitude 
of households implies preference for a smooth stream of consumption both over time and across 
states of nature. Optimizing behaviour implies a steady state consumption level which depends on 
agents’ preferences and endowments. The stochastic discount factor in (4.5) represents the marginal 
rate  of  substitution,  i.e.  the  condition  describing  the  representative  agent’s  willingness  to  shift 
consumption between two points in time, from present to  future or viceversa.  In principle, the 
higher the savings rate, the lower the actual level of aggregate consumption, the greater the demand 
for financial securities. Therefore, the demand for assets depends upon the relative convenience of 
saving  to  consuming.  In  absence  of  shocks  and  with  homogeneous  preferences,  individual 
preferences are consistently reflected at an aggregate level; but, if a shock hits the economy the 
following  happens.  In  a  complete  contingent  claim  market,  risk  sharing  implies  that  agents’ 
consumption moves together, since only aggregate risk matters. In complete markets the marginal 
rate of substitution of any investor equals the contingent claim price ratio, so that all individuals 
share all risks equally. Any shock hitting the economy thus affects all people equally; shocks to 
consumption are perfectly correlated across individuals. Risk sharing does not imply that all agents’ 
will  afford  the  same  level  of  consumption  though,  since  it  depends  on  individual  initial 
endowments;  hence,  consumption  smoothing  is  possible  only  to  the  extent  that  there  is  no 
uncertainty regarding endowments (risk sharing is also Pareto optimal). The stochastic discount 
factor model of risk sharing is similar to the insurance principle: financial markets allow people to 
make consumption independent of contingent income volatility.   
From (4.1) term premia can be seen as the difference between the long rate and its EH-consistent 
rationally  expected  value.  Exploiting  the  famous  inverse  relationship  between  bond  prices  and 
yields ( ( )
 
 
 
        log 1 − = ), we can highlight the dependence of term premia on the summation of the 
future path of stochastic discount factors: 
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The stochastic discount factor is a useful device that allows to determine the price level of a security 
from the future path of expected payoffs. The stochastic discount factor, or pricing kernel, is a 
random variable that features the law of one price, i.e. the absence of arbitrage opportunities. 
The stochastic discount factor may respond to a great variety of shocks that hit the economy, such 
as monetary and fiscal shocks; in addition, also technological and institutional changes affect the 
dynamics of the stochastic discount factor. There is large evidence of inverse correlation between 
excess returns and the cyclical behaviour of the economy; this result holds both for stocks (Lettau 
and Ludvigson, 2001) and for bonds (Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005). The variability of the discount factor 
over the business cycle is documented both by Constantinides and Duffie (1996), who argue that risk is 
high during recessions, and by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), who suggest that risk-aversion increases 
in bad times. In light of these considerations, the derivation of the term premium in (4.6) provides a 
theoretical justification for modelling term premia by means of a multifactor time-varying model. 
We assume term premia are functions of variables acknowledged to be important macroeconomic 
determinants in the macro-finance empirical literature. It follows a qualitative analysis. 
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U.S. data. Scatter plot diagrams of the term premium (Term Premium) against macroeconomic variables: the effective federal funds 
rate (ffr), unemployment rate (unemp), inflation, and the yield spread (spread). Term premium computed from the 120-month and the 
3-month maturities (top panels). Term premium computed from the 60-month and the 3-month maturities (bottom panels).  
Figure 4.1 (a)   140 
 
-2
0
2
4
6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
policy rate
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
Canada  -  (120, 3)
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
unemployment
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
Canada  -  (120, 3)
 
-2
0
2
4
6
0 2 4 6 8 10
inflation
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
Canada  -  (120, 3)
 
-2
0
2
4
6
-2 0 2 4 6 8
spread (60, 3)
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
Canada  -  (120, 3)
 
-2
0
2
4
6
0 4 8 12 16 20
policy rate
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
U.K.  -  (120, 3)
 
-2
0
2
4
6
2 4 6 8 10 12
unemployment
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
U.K.  -  (120, 3)
 
-2
0
2
4
6
0 2 4 6 8 10
inflation
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
U.K.  -  (120, 3)
 
-2
0
2
4
6
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
spread (60, 3)
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
U.K.  -  (120, 3)
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Fi-Euribor
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
EMU  -  (120, 3)
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 9 10 11 12
unemployment
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
EMU  -  (120, 3)
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 2 4 6 8 10
inflation
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
EMU  -  (120, 3)
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
spread (60, 3)
T
e
r
m
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
EMU  -  (120, 3)
 
 
Scatter  plot  diagrams  of  the  term  premium  (Term  Premium)  against  macroeconomic  variables:  the  policy  rate,  unemployment, 
inflation, and the yield spread (spread). Term premium computed from the 120-month and the 3-month maturities. Canadian data (top 
panels). U.K. data (middle panels). European data (bottom panels). 
Figure 4.1 (b) 
 
U.S. scatter plots between the term premium and macro variables are reported in Figure 4.2 (a). 
From  left  to  right  the  term  premium  is  plotted  against  the  effective  fed  funds,  unemployment, 
inflation, and the slope of the  yield curve
96. The term premium seems positively related to the 
federal funds and inflation; while the greater dispersion of the observations around the regression 
line tends to suggest a weaker effect of both the unemployment rate and the yield spread. Figure 4.2 
(b) plots the scatter diagrams of the term premium against macroeconomic variables for Canada 
(top  panels),  U.K.  (middle  panels),  and  the  Euro  Area  (bottom  panels).  The  plot  of  Canadian 
observations are not so concentrated around the interpolant line. In particular, there seems to be an 
awkward negative effect of inflation on the term premium. However, we point out that the term 
premium is always positive and the fit is definitely weak. We might speculate this is a consequence 
of the successful Canadian inflation targeting regime. A visual inspection of U.K. scatter diagrams 
suggest that results for U.K. are in between the U.S. and the Canadian ones. U.K. inflation has a 
                                                 
96 The term premium is derived applying equation (4.1). In the top panels the term premium is computed rolling the  -month rate on 
the    -month horizon. In the bottom panels the term premium is obtained rolling the  -month yield on the   -month horizon. In 
order to avoid any multicollinearity issue, the yield spread is the (  ,  ) in the former case, and the (   ,  ) in the latter case.      141 
positive  effect  on  the  term  premium.  Also,  in  the  Euro  zone  the  term  premium  appears  to  be 
positively affected by the inflation rate. Delivering price stability is, in fact, the primary objective of 
the  European  Central  Bank,  so  that  investors  require  a  positive  liquidity  premium  when  the 
monetary authority fails; in addition, consistently with this story, the positive relationship between 
the term premium and the policy rate reflects the attempt of monetary policy to calm inflation down 
when the price dynamics tends to move out of control.  
We specify the following multifactor model
97 for term premia: 
 
( )
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
     
   
                 
,
4 3 2 1 0
, + − + + + + = β π β β β β                                                              (4.7) 
 
The above equation has been estimated for different combination of maturities ( ,  ) and for all 
countries
98 (U.S., the Euro zone, Canada, and U.K.). Different statistical and econometric tests have 
been performed on the linear equation (4.7) in order to detect instability. Evidence of non linearity 
is provided in            .  . 
The idea of deriving the dynamic properties of term premia from a time-varying model and then to 
gauge the ability to predict the future level of economic activity finds inspiration in Rudebusch 
Sack, and Swanson (2007). They observe that both the effect of term premia on output and the 
ability of term premia to predict future activity depend on the nature  of shocks affecting term 
premia.  A  time-varying  approach  thus  might  be  particularly  effective  since  it  deals  with  the 
unpredictable  nature  of  disturbances  that  influence  both  macro  and  financial  variables.  The 
conditional  variance  of  term  premia  forecast  errors,  in  fact,  emphasizes  the  joint  effect  of  two 
sources  of  uncertainty.  On  the  one  hand  we  consider  the  noise  associated  to  idiosyncratic 
disturbances; on the other hand, uncertainty derives from the evolutionary behaviour of parameters 
in (4.7). The idea of allowing for time-varying coefficients seems to be consistent with the large 
evidence attributing EH failure to variation of term premia over time. Kalman filtering is a recursive 
method widely employed in economics and finance which suits for our purposes, since it represents 
a convenient procedure to describe how agents process available information. The main advantage 
of the filter is to generate expectations in a continuously updated Bayesian fashion. Kalman filtering 
thus matches agents’ rational behaviour since, at any point in time, the up-to-date filtration process 
becomes part of the current informative set.  
In  this  chapter,  for  different  pairs  of  maturities  ( ,   )  we  derive  term  premia  as  a  residual 
component of the yield spread, which can be decomposed into an expectations-based component 
(first RHS term) and a term premium (second RHS element):  
                                                 
97 According to (4.7) term premia depend on a constant, the policy rate or a proxy of it, the rate of unemployment, inflation, and a 
measure of the yield curve slope. 
98 The policy rates are the following. The effective fed funds rate for U.S.; the overnight rate for the Canadian economy; the Libor 
and the Fibor/Euribor for U.K. and the Euro area respectively.   142 
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The term premium in (4.8) is also consistent with the term premium obtained from the Campbell 
and Shiller (1991) equation (4.1). In general, term premia can be viewed as the sum of a liquidity 
and a risk premium (Hamilton and Kim, 2002; Favero, Kaminska, and Soderstrom, 2005).  
We recall that our final goal is to examine whether the dynamic properties of term premia can be 
exploited to infer future output growth. In this chapter we thus propose a time-varying multifactor 
model for risk premia. Term premia are assumed to be a dynamic function of the policy rate, the 
rate of unemployment, the inflation rate, and a measure of the term structure slope, i.e. the yield 
spread
99. Risk premia are associated to the monetary policy stance as captured by the policy rate
100. 
The level of the policy rate is usually tied to its variability, hence this model accounts also for the 
conjecture by Hamilton and Kim (2002) who argue that the interest rate variability is a determinant 
of  term  premia.  Unemployment  affects  term  premia  through  risk  aversion.  Backus  and  Wright 
(2007) provide evidence of the cyclical behaviour of term premia reaching high levels when the 
unemployment rate raises. According to Cochrane (2005) “                                             
                                                                                                            
                                                                                                         
            ”. Inflation is another important determinant of term premia as long as economic agents 
aim at preserving the real value of their assets. Ang and Bekaert (2002, 2006) show that the positive 
slope of the yield curve is due to a inflation risk premium indeed. Finally, Lee (1995) emphasizes 
the role of the yield spread in explaining the magnitude and the variability of risk premia. The state 
space form of the Kalman filter is represented by two basic equations. The observation equation, or 
the measurement equation, is: 
 
   
             
   
            
,
, , ,
,
, + + = β                                                                                                                  (4.9) 
 
The observation equation relates the dependent variable to the explanatory variables; the subscript   
indicates the country.        ,  is a country specific stochastic disturbance  ( ) ε σ , 0 . . .       . The state, or 
transition, equation captures the evolution of coefficients over time: 
 
                    , , 1 , + + = − β µ β                                                                                                                 (4.10) 
  
                                                 
99 Since the influence of both CPI-inflation and the yield spread on U.S. term premia seems statistically weak, these variables have 
been replaced by the PPI-inflation and the effective exchange rate. 
100 In this framework  we do not explicitly allow  for the credibility of the  monetary regime or the reputation of the monetary 
authority, although both aspects are regarded to affect risk premia on international financial markets. We believe that the time-
varying pattern of coefficients implicitly captures both effects.   143 
      ,   is  an  idiosyncratic  noise  ( )         σ , 0 . . . .  It  is  common  practice  to  assuming  a  random  walk 
behaviour  for  regressing  coefficients  (Kim  and  Nelson,  1998;  Kim  and  Nelson,  2006;  Boivin, 
2006); matrix   in equation (4.10) is thus the identity matrix. The Kalman filter is an iterative 
algorithm which we summarize here by means of by the following expressions:  
 
( )( ) [ ]
 
                    1 | 1 | 1 | − − − − − = β β β β                                                                                                   (4.11) 
 
Equation  (4.11)  represents  the  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the  coefficients  conditional  on 
information up to    ; equation (4.12) is the forecast of the term premium based on information 
available up to time    ; equation (4.13) represents the prediction error, while equation (4.14) is its 
conditional variance. 
 
1 | 1 | − − =                β                                                                                                                                (4.12) 
 
1 ! 1 | 1 | − − − − = − =                              β η                                                                                                   (4.13) 
 
[ ]
2
1 |
2
1 | 1 | ε σ η + = = − − −
 
                                                                                                                               (4.14) 
 
Briefly  focus  on  expression  (4.14).  Kalman  filtering  implies  that  two  sources  of  uncertainty 
characterize the conditional variance of the forecast error ( 1 | −       ): one form of uncertainty is due to 
the  evolutionary  behaviour  of  estimated  coefficients,  the  other  is  a  random  noise  associated  to 
future  unpredictable  disturbances,  such  as  political,  institutional,  or  technological  shocks.  Risk 
premia are a function of the expected path of the stochastic discount factor, which is regarded to 
respond to a variety of shocks. Hence, the assumption of a constant variance of nominal shocks to 
term premia within a country  over time does  not seem  realistic; the  variance  conditional upon 
available information at the time of forecasting is assumed to be time-varying due, for instance, to a 
continuously changing regime, as captured by evolutionary behaviour of  β  coefficients, or to some 
unpredictable shocks that hit the economy, as captured by the stochastic noise. The main advantage 
of Kalman filtering is that expectations are continuously updated over time depending on the state 
of  the  economy.  For  each  country,  the  Kalman  filter  estimation  of  the  time-varying  parameter 
model (4.7) returns, in fact, by large a better fit that linear OLS estimations. Linear estimations of 
equation  (4.7)  return  serially  correlated  residuals,  whereas  the  time-varying  coefficient  model 
generates  a  more  suitable  pattern  for  disturbances.  High  residual  autocorrelation  implies  a 
predictable pattern for disturbances thus affecting estimation efficiency. Residuals predictability is, 
on the one hand, a sign of model mis-specification, and, on the other hand, provides with a clue to 
improve forecasts of the dependent variable. Residuals are a core variable in this study, since we 
exploit the dynamic properties of disturbances to make inference about the future level of economic   144 
activity. We claim that the less informative residuals are, the more robust our empirical results 
should be. The conditional variance of a serially correlated series may be trivially informative since 
it  is  obtained  by  processing  data  which  are  themselves  informative.  Obtaining  the  conditional 
variance from a plain and uninformative series, instead, makes the empirical analysis more robust 
since it prevents the predictive model from being redundant.  
In the following Section we present empirical evidence highlighting that the conditional variance of 
term premia forecast errors is informative beyond the yield spread and the term premium about 
future business cycle fluctuations. 
 
 
 
4.4   Empirical Evidence 
 
In  this  Section  we  report  empirical  results  showing  that  not  only  term  premia  but  also  their 
conditional variances are informative about the business cycle. Let        ,  denote the time   level of 
the seasonally adjusted industrial production index in country   (U.S., the Euro area, Canada, and 
U.K.);           , + ∆  represents the annualized rate of growth of    over the period   to    : 
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                                                                                                           (4.15) 
 
   indicates  the  length  of  the  forecast  horizon  ( ,    ,    ,    ,      months).  Four  different 
specifications of the predictive model will be estimated: 
 
       
   
                         , , 4
,
, 3 0 , + ∆ + + = ∆ + α α α                                                                                (4.16) 
 
       
   
   
   
                                   , , 4
,
, 3
,
, 1 | 2 , 1 | 1 0 , + ∆ + + + + = ∆ − − + α α η α α α                                               (4.17) 
 
       
   
     
   
                          , , 4
,
, 3
,
, 3 0 , υ α α α α + ∆ + + + = ∆ +                                                                  (4.18) 
 
       
   
     
   
     
   
                                  , , 4
,
, 3
,
, 3
,
, 1 | 2 , 1 | 1 0 , υ α α α η α α α + ∆ + + + + + = ∆ − − +                                 (4.19) 
 
Where, according to equation (4.8) the 
 
 
 
 
   
             − =
,  between the long ( ) and the short ( ) 
term yield can be decomposed into the term premium (
   
    
, ) and the expectations-based component 
(
   
      
, ), i.e. the            , or                  , spread;  1 | −        is the conditional variance of term 
premia  prediction  errors  and  1 | −     η   is  the  term  premia  forecast  errors.  The  actual  value  of  the 
industrial production growth (∆     ) has been included in order to show that the predictive ability 
(i.e.  the  statistical  significance)  of  the  financial  indicators  is  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  a  real   145 
variable. All equations have been estimated imposing the Newey-West (1987) correction to handle 
with overlapping nonspherical disturbances.  
Mishkin (1982) and Pagan (1984) pointed out that generated regressors in the above equation might 
influence the distribution of test statistics, and, consequently, invalidate the inference procedure to 
verify parameters’ significance. In order to prove our results are robust we have estimated quite a 
few  augmented  specifications  of  the  above  regressions.  These  equations  include  additional 
explanatory variables such as the policy  rate, the effective exchange rate, the nominal bilateral 
exchange rates between two economies among the four considered. Results are definitely robust to 
different model specifications. In addition, we can count on a sufficiently large number of available 
observations
101. Third, the functional form of coefficient  2 α  has also been chosen to avoid any 
potential  multicollinearity  problem  in  equations  (4.17)  and  (4.19).  Following  Kim  and  Nelson 
(1989) coefficient  2 α  has been set to be a function of the term premium conditional variance: 
( )               , 1 | , 1 , 0 , 2 ln − + = φ φ α . Both the two-step estimation procedure and the joint estimation confirm 
results  are  robust
102.  Finally,  as  shown  in  the  following  tables,  we  carry  out  the  instrumental 
variables estimations in order to back generated regressors with observable variables
103. Once again 
results are encouraging, the estimated coefficient of the term premia conditional variance remains 
statistically  significant  and  preserve  the  negative  sign.  Empirical  results  are  presented  in  the 
following Sections.  
It follows a deeper overview about the method adopted in this chapter to derive the term premium, 
explaining  also  the  econometric  methodology  employed  to  estimate  equations  (4.16)  –  (4.19). 
Equations (4.1) and (4.8) imply that the yield spread can be decomposed into two terms. One is the 
difference between short term rate expected over the next   periods and the current interest rate; the 
other is the time-varying term premium, which can be viewed as the summation of a liquidity 
premium and a pure risk premium (Kim, 2000). After adjusting for a constant scaling factor, the 
term premium implied by the Campbell and Shiller equation (4.1) is exactly the same obtained by 
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). Thus, if a fall in the yield spread is expected to anticipate recessions 
it might be that this is due either to a temporary high short rate indicating an incoming slowdown in 
economic activity or to a fall in the premium on long bonds (relative to short bonds) suggesting an 
imminent recession. Since short rates rise relative to long rates before a recession, “                  
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                    
                                                 
101 Depending on the pair of maturities considered ( ,  ) the lowest number of observation is 117, so that statistical inference is 
based on distributions with 112 degrees of freedom. When the long term maturity is 60-month inference is based on statistics with 
177 degrees of freedom. 
102 Also dropping the forecast errors term from the equations does not affect the significance of term premia conditional variance.  
103 Each regression has been estimated using the first lag of explanatory variables as instruments.     146 
                                ” (Hamilton and Kim, 2002). Analyzing this effect directly from 
the data yields to the following reasoning. The spread between the  -period yield and the  -period 
yield is: 
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After ruling out the contemporaneous real variable in equation (4.16) we substitute (4.20): 
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In equation (4.21) the forecasting contribution of the term premium and of the rationally expected 
change  in  short  rates  is  clearly  distinct.  A  generalization  of  equation  (4.21)  would  imply  this 
different terms to have a different impact on future output; we thus should estimate the following: 
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Let     + ξ  denote the error in forecasting the future short rate: 
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Actually (4.22) can be written as: 
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We now focus on the disturbance term    which is a combination of both the output prediction error 
  ω  and of the interest rate forecast noise     + ξ  according to the following: 
 
( )               + − + = ξ α α ω 3 3                                                                                                                 (4.25) 
 
Under rational expectations, the error term    should be uncorrelated with any know variable at time  . 
Thus (4.24) can be estimated using the instrumental variables technique with any variable dated at t 
or earlier as instruments. Equation (4.24) is the basic empirical version of the models we are going 
to  estimate  in  the  following  Sections.  Favero,  Kaminska,  and  Soderstrom  (2005)  criticize  the 
approach by Hamilton and Kim (2002) providing with a decomposition of the spread using   -     
observed interest rate data to substitute for   -     expected values. Favero      . (2005) try to 
improve upon also the model by Ang, Piazzesi and Wei (2006) who estimate a VAR and then 
projects expectations for the short term rate. Favero, Kaminska and Soderstrom (2005) thus suggest 
estimating and simulating forward a reduced macro-finance model to derive reliable “real-time”   147 
short term rate expectations to substitute in (4.20) in order to derive a realistic measure of the term 
premium. In this chapter we construct the term premium following Hamilton and Kim, but we also 
improve upon their model to assess the predictive ability of the conditional variance of the term 
premium,  which  is  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  financial  distress,  which  is,  in  turn,  a  symptom  of 
incoming financial fragility. 
 
 
 
4.4.1   Evidence for U.S.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the dynamics of both the yield spread, the term premium, and the conditional 
variance of the term premium prediction errors before NBER recessions (grey shaded areas). The 
yield spreads decrease, and eventually become negative, before recessions (left panel). The term 
premium appears to anticipate a decline in real activity as well since it rises substantially before 
recessions (central panel). More importantly, the clear spike of term premia conditional variance 
which  occurs  either  immediately  before  or  at  the  beginning  of  slowdowns  seems  to  be  quite 
informative about business cycle fluctuations (left panel). 
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spread (n, m): yield spread between the  -month and the  -month yields. tp (n, m): term premium computed from 
the  -month and the  -month maturities. U.S. tp cvar (n, m): U.S. term premium conditional variance. 
Figure 4.2 
 
U.S. empirical results suggest that the conditional variance of term premia is a powerful predictor of 
the future growth in the industrial production index. Negative values of  1 α  in equations (4.17) and 
(4.19) indicate that high term premia conditional variance predicts slower economic growth in the 
future.  Therefore,  financial  distress,  as  reflected  in  excess  volatility  of  term  premia,  tends  to 
anticipate  future  slowdown  in  economic  activity.  Data  evidence  seems  thus  to  support  the 
hypothesis that the conditional variance of term premia forecast errors is informative beyond the 
yield spread and term premia about future business cycle fluctuations. The adjusted-R
2, in fact, 
increases substantially when we include a measure of the volatility of term premia. We interpret the 
conditional variance of term premia as a sign of financial fragility which reflects uncertainty about 
the future evolution of the economy. The rational works as follows. A typical Keynesian equation 
implies  that  actual  investments  depend  negatively  on  the  (real)  interest  rate  and  positively  by   148 
expected level of income. Financial distress reflected in high term premia volatility exerts direct 
influence on interest rates variability and, moreover, it affects expectations about future GDP. A 
primary effect on future aggregate demand thus derives from the channel of uncertainty regarding 
capital accumulation. Secondly, as highlighted above, uncertainty reduces aggregate consumption 
through the diminishing marginal propensity to consume since rational agents shift to precautionary 
savings. The perverse effect is amplified in a traditional dynamic multiplier Keynesian framework 
explaining why financial distress may anticipate a weaker economic growth. 
Results suggest that also coefficient  2 α  tends to be negative and statistically significant; business 
cycle movements are thus inversely related, not only to the volatility of term premia as captured by 
the conditional variance, but also to the magnitude of prediction errors. 
The second important result is that the level of term premia is inversely related to the future level of 
real activity (Rudebusch, Sack, Swanson, 2007). Coefficient    3 α  is negative in equations (4.18) and 
(4.19).  
In line with Favero      . (2005), our results confirm that splitting the yield spread into the term 
premium and the theoretical spread leads to a better understanding of the forecasting model. If we 
compare, in fact, the goodness of fit from regressions on the left with that of the ones on the right 
the improvement occurs particularly at long horizons. Table 4.1 report results for U.S. when term 
premia are computed from term structure maturities (  =  ,   =    ).  
Term premia forecast errors and the associated conditional variance can anticipate movements in 
real activity up to three years ahead.  
Many authors have documented that lower term premia tend to predict slower GDP growth, since 
the estimated    3 α  coefficient turn out to be positive
104. We claim that this is contrary to common 
wisdom,  as  long  as  risk  aversion  should  exert  a  negative  effect  on  output.  Consistently  with 
Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007), our results suggest an inverse correlation between actual 
term premia and future economic activity. Interestingly, the expected component of the yield spread 
(   3 α )  seems  to  be  uninformative  about  future  movements  in  the  business  cycle.  Finally,  the 
coefficient of the yield spread ( 3 α ) tends to be positive, but its statistical significance is not robust  
to  different  empirical  specifications.  Large  values  of  the  spread  are  typically  associated  to 
accommodative stance of monetary policy and stimulus to real economic activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 Hamilton and Kim (2002); Favero, Kaminska, and Soderstrom (2005); Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006).    149 
. 
U.S. Future Industrial Production Growth  -  (120, 3) 
 Horizon     α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2 
  α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T     (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val) 
(+6)          -0.2405  -0.0033  0.0424 
0.361          0.0569  0.0437 
0.161 
        (0.000)  (0.901)  (0.000)        (0.149)  (0.024) 
    -0.1319  0.2657  -0.2116  -0.0550  0.0480  0.478    -0.1944  0.2407  -0.0348  0.0457  0.402 
   
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.107)  (0.008)    (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.323)  (0.006) 
IV    -0.5218  0.8902  -0.0092  -0.1698  0.0749 
0.000    -0.3803  0.8071  -0.1336  0.0674 
0.042 
    
(0.077)  (0.062)  (0.947)  (0.142)  (0.011)    (0.002)  (0.086)  (0.045)  (0.006) 
(+12)        -0.2260  -0.0038  0.0395  0.486        0.0530  0.0407  0.215 
        (0.000)  (0.903)  (0.020)        (0.093)  (0.009) 
    -0.0523  0.1450  -0.2076  -0.0186  0.0418  0.505    -0.1215  0.0883  -0.0024  0.0401  0.347 
   
(0.076)  (0.159)  (0.000)  (0.604)  (0.018)    (0.000)  (0.432)  (0.950)  (0.006) 
IV    -0.2520  0.5170  -0.0798  -0.0627  0.0516 
0.141    -0.2612  0.3355  -0.0760  0.0487 
0.133 
   
(0.078)  (0.206)  (0.252)  (0.404)  (0.025)    (0.000)  (0.551)  (0.148)  (0.007) 
(+18)   
      -0.1723  0.0111  0.0341  0.158          0.0573  0.0352  0.233 
        (0.000)  (0.5532)  (0.000)        (0.045)  (0.013) 
    -0.0648  0.0809  -0.1447  -0.0051  0.0362  0.493    -0.1129  0.0406  0.0071  0.0335  0.367 
   
(0.023)  (0.387)  (0.017)  (0.890)  (0.023)    (0.001)  (0.671)  (0.848)  (0.014) 
IV    -0.3232  0.4744  -0.0076  -0.0762  0.0573  0.000    -0.2433  0.2704  -0.0588  0.0428  0.150 
   
(0.064)  (0.245)  (0.928)  (0.316)  (0.006)    (0.000)  (0.523)  (0.249)  (0.005) 
(+24)          -0.1576  0.0169  0.0320 
0.486          0.0618  0.0331 
0.265 
        (0.016)  (0.578)  (0.017)        (0.033)  (0.005) 
    -0.0517  0.0913  -0.1460  -0.0029  0.0338  0.523    -0.1038  0.0571  0.0150  0.0321  0.399 
   
(0.076)  (0.254)  (0.022)  (0.929)  (0.009)    (0.007)  (0.508)  (0.664)  (0.003) 
IV    -0.2644  0.3891  -0.0295  -0.0628  0.0471 
0.020    -0.2226  0.2856  -0.4663  0.0417 
0.183 
    
(0.077)  (0.208)  (0.684)  (0.348)  (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.439)  (0.327)  (0.000) 
(+36)    -0.1149  0.0196  0.0199  0.338    0.0537  0.0209  0.180 
        (0.079)  (0.497)  (0.147)        (0.027)  (0.097) 
    -0.0546  0.1070  -0.1030  -0.0016  0.0222  0.392    -0.0911  0.0825  0.0116  0.0209  0.316 
   
(0.084)  (0.146)  (0.092)  (0.956)  (0.095)    (0.011)  (0.263)  (0.698)  (0.082) 
IV    -0.2836  0.3430  0.0153  -0.0669  0.0317 
0.000    -0.2864  1.2749  -0.1373  0.0375 
0.000 
   
(0.073)  (0.288)  (0.806)  (0.319)  0.020    (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.069) 
sample 1988 – 1998 
. 
Table 4.1 
   
In Table 4.2 we reports results for U.S. when the term premium is computed using the pair of 
maturities (  = 60,   = 3).  
As far as the conditional volatility of term premia is concerned, results are similar to those obtained 
from  the  couple  of  maturities  (   ,   ).  Coefficient  1 α   is  always  statistically  significant.  The 
variability of financial markets’ sentiment thus seems to display a significant negative effect on the 
economic  conjuncture  ( 0 ; 0 2 1 < < α α ).  Term  premia  forecast  errors  ( 2 α )  are  not  robust  to  the 
instrumental variables specification though. Again the level of term premia tends to be inversely 
related  to  the  business  cycle,  but  the  statistical  significance  is  robust  only  for  prediction  of 
economic activity    to    months ahead; over those forecasting horizons a decline in term premia 
tends to be a stimulus to economic activity. 
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. 
   U.S. Future Industrial Production Growth - (60,3) 
Horizon  α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2    α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)    
(+6)        -0.0385  0.0218  0.4064  0.209          0.0490  0.4694  0.175 
      (0.495)  (0.546)  (0.017)          (0.177)  (0.004)   
  -0.1186  -0.1834  0.0222  0.0583  0.3536  0.271    -0.1331  -0.2057  0.0776  0.3816  0.262 
   (0.024)  (0.054)  (0.644)  (0.096)  (0.043)      (0.011)  (0.045)  (0.025)  (0.030)   
IV  -0.1530  0.2279  0.1139  0.2934  0.7741  0.699    -0.3085  -0.6288  0.0433  -0.1818  0.092 
  (0.000)  (0.191)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.048)  (0.569)  (0.596)   
(+12)        -0.1551  -0.0768  0.1420  0.190          -0.0273  0.3029  0.108 
      0.104  0.271  0.503          (0.666)  (0.127)   
  -0.1072  -0.1352  -0.1127  -0.0538  0.0490  0.253    -0.1244  -0.1869  -0.0133  0.1559  0.213 
  (0.009)  (0.093)  (0.265)  (0.466)  (0.839)      (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.828)  (0.453)   
IV  -0.2013  -0.1464  -0.1376  -0.0662  -0.2010  0.228    -0.2136  -0.4003  -0.0183  -0.0276  0.146 
  (0.003)  (0.532)  (0.208)  (0.404)  (0.563)      (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.776)  (0.924)   
(+18)        -0.2335  -0.1516  0.0494  0.415          -0.1453  -0.0522  0.290 
      (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.803)          (0.004)  (0.813)   
  -0.1272  0.0140  -0.1912  -0.1362  -0.2703  0.485    -0.1670  -0.0127  -0.1257  -0.4149  0.440 
   (0.003)  (0.862)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.236)      (0.000)  (0.881)  (0.005)  (0.054)   
IV  -0.3146  0.1512  -0.1451  -0.1264  -0.8062  0.322    -0.3386  0.1166  -0.1245  -0.8875  0.283 
  (0.006)  (0.529)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.046)      (0.000)  (0.684)  (0.001)  (0.003)   
(+24)        -0.2149  -0.1992  -0.3679  0.582          -0.2038  -0.4275  0.581 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.047)          (0.000)  (0.000)   
  -0.1575  0.0556  -0.1521  -0.1632  -0.6491  0.727    -0.1524  0.0595  -0.1616  -0.6027  0.727 
   (0.000)  (0.275)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)       (0.000)  (0.279)  (0.000)  (0.000)    
IV  -0.2484  0.1811  -0.1367  -0.1100  -0.4286  0.423    -0.1068  -0.2001  -0.0092  0.4861  0.644 
  (0.004)  (0.409)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.165)      (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.776)  (0.011)   
(+36)      -0.3077  0.8440  -0.3304  0.654        1.0856  0.1827  0.571 
      (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000)  (0.140)   
  -0.1275  0.0933  -0.3640  0.7960  -0.4039  0.771    -0.1241  0.6497  1.1037  0.4980  0.718 
   (0.009)  (0.907)  (0.535)  (0.066)  (0.061)        (0.011)  (0.378)  (0.029)  (0.010)    
IV  -0.2939  0.5625  -0.1798  0.9818  0.8797  0.352    -0.3288  -0.3203  1.1514  1.1019  0.00 
  (0.018)  (0.802)  (0.771)  (0.051)  0.010      (0.012)  (0.228)  (0.077)  (0.002)   
sample 1988 - 2005  
. 
Table 4.2 
 
We remark our main result that the effect of term premia conditional variance is robust to different 
model  specifications,  and  it  does  not  vanish  after  the  inclusion  of  the  current  level  of  output 
growth
105.  
Equations (4.17) and (4.19) have also been estimated for the sample between the two recessions: 
from April 1991 to December 2000. The coefficients of the conditional variance remain statistically 
significant but decrease in magnitude. This result may reflect the slowdown in industrial production 
occurred in the mid 1990s. 
We recall that our goal is not to prove a direct influence running from financial markets to the real 
economy; we rather aim to detect whether distress on bond markets, as captured by the conditional 
volatility  of  term  premia,  is  informative  about  business  cycle  fluctuations.  We  thus  provide 
                                                 
105 Our results are comparable with those by Schwert (1989), who analyses the relation between stock market volatility and the 
business  cycle  during  financial  crisis.  He  finds  that  stock  market  volatility  increases  substantially  after  stock  prices  drop;  in 
particular, financial markets volatility remains high, or increases, during recessions. Empirical evidence thus tends to support the 
popular view that stock market volatility is a significant cyclical indicator. Our analysis complements that by Schwert as long as we 
focus on bond markets rather than on stock markets. We find evidence that the conditional volatility of bond risk premia is an 
important indicator of future fluctuations in economic activity.     151 
evidence suggesting that financial markets may anticipate future movements in real activity. In this 
chapter we thus emphasize the signalling role of uncertainty without insinuating the existence of 
any causality implication. We may only suggest that agents heavily discount expected future events 
in current prices through the stochastic discount factor when great uncertainty is reflected in bond 
markets. In addition, we may observe that current uncertainty might encourage further perverse 
behaviours,  such  as  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard,  which,  in  turn,  would  contribute  to 
worsening the expectations about future economic conjuncture. The adverse effects on the economy 
thus mirror rational agents’ concern of bearing an excessive, or unnecessary, risk. 
So far we have examined the effect on output exerted by term premia obtained from the entire 
length of maturity spectrum of the term structure (  = 120, 60;   = 6, 3). If we focus on the medium 
and short end of the yield curve (  = 36, 24) results are not so encouraging. In particular, when the 
long term rate is   = 36, the estimated coefficient  1 α , which describes the effect on output by the 
conditional variance of term premia, is informative about business cycle only over short forecasting 
horizon, i.e. from     to     quarters.  
 
 
 
4.4.2  Evidence for the Euro Area 
 
Also in the Euro area the conditional variance of term premia turns out to be a useful predictor of future 
growth in industrial production, which is acknowledged to be an important engine that moves the 
overall economy. Our empirical findings highlight that the forecasting power is significant from   to    
months ahead when the conditional variance is extracted from term premia on bonds with maturities 
(  ,  ); while, for predicting movements of industrial production over longer horizons (from    to    
months ahead) it is useful to exploit information from longer maturities of the term structure (  =    ). 
The forecasting ability of term premia conditional variance is robust to different specifications of the 
predictive model as described above. In addition, instrumental variables estimations suggest that the 
statistical significance of the generated variables can be considered robust
106.  
Two further results needs mentioning. First, including the conditional variance of term premia in the 
predictive model substantially increases the  goodness of  fit. Second, results suggest that future 
output growth tends to be inversely related to the actual level of term premia; coefficient    3 α  is 
negative but not always statistically significant. In particular, differently from U.S. estimates, EMU 
results highlight that the decomposition of the spread into a term premium and an expectational 
component  improves  the  forecasting  ability  of  the  model  mainly  because  of  the  effect  of  the 
                                                 
106 We instruments the explanatory variables with their first lag; instruments and regressors are thus highly correlated.   152 
expected component of the yield spread. The adjusted goodness of fit of equation 4.18 (left panel of 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4) is generally greater than the adjusted fit of equation 4.16 (right panel). 
 
. 
EMU Future Industrial Production Growth  -  (120, 3) 
 Horizon     α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2 
  α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T     (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val) 
(+24)           -0.2703  0.7348  -0.3351 
0.25          0.7859  -0.2771 
0.14 
        (0.480)  (0.012)  (0.001)      (0.000)  (0.005) 
    -0.1072  -0.0248  -0.5072  0.5977  -0.3723  0.28    -0.0525  -0.3216  0.6795  -0.2851  0.14 
   
(0.067)  (0.816)  (0.183)  (0.028)  (0.000)    (0.334)  (0.057)  (0.045)  (0.011) 
IV    -0.1289  0.4568  -0.7117  0.5340  -0.4312 
0.25    -0.0632  1.4965  0.5116  -0.2363 
0.00 
      (0.037)  (0.153)  (0.100)  (0.071)  (0.002)    (0.366)  (0.145)  (0.246)  (0.297) 
(+36)      0.3580  0.2007  0.0244  0.02    0.2842  -0.0469  0.01 
        (0.497)  (0.514)  (0.883)        (0.235)  (0.679) 
    -0.1954  -0.0894  -0.0602  -0.0453  -0.0438  0.12    -0.1947  -0.0934  -0.0443  -0.0426  0.12 
   
(0.033)  (0.593)  (0.929)  (0.898)  (0.777)    (0.010)  (0.569)  (0.899)  (0.749) 
IV    -0.2133  -0.3863  0.0031  0.0034  -0.1414  0.10    -0.2133  -0.3860  0.0034  -0.1414  0.10 
   
(0.026)  (0.408)  (0.996)  (0.992)  (0.572)    (0.006)  (0.545)  (0.992)  (0.502) 
sample 1988 – 1999 
 
 
Table 4.3 
 
 
. 
EMU  Future Industrial Production Growth -  (60, 3) 
 Horizon     α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2 
  α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T     (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val) 
(+6)          -0.2015  0.5521  0.4118 
0.41          0.5010  0.4931 
0.28 
        (0.477)  (0.013)  (0.000)        (0.011)  (0.000) 
    -0.4331  0.1839  -0.2950  0.7812  0.4600  0.45    -0.3821  0.1602  -0.0818  0.3695  0.32 
   
(0.011)  (0.023)  (0.295)  (0.109)  (0.000)    (0.002)  (0.058)  (0.829)  (0.000) 
IV    -0.5558  -0.2336  -0.5169  0.7574  0.4462 
0.36    -0.5305  -0.2516  -0.2772  0.2885 
0.23 
      (0.006)  (0.464)  (0.221)  (0.107)  (0.013)    (0.000)  (0.427)  (0.534)  (0.042) 
(+12)        -0.1752  0.1002  -0.2174  0.37        0.8131  -0.1029  0.08 
        (0.506)  (0.000)  (0.043)        (0.003)  (0.352) 
    -0.6281  0.1591  -0.5425  0.1033  -0.1910  0.51    -0.5536  0.1244  -0.2303  -0.3236  0.25 
   
(0.000)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.003)  (0.110)    (0.000)  (0.151)  (0.532)  (0.017) 
IV    -0.7449  -0.2923  -0.7996  0.0969  -0.1671 
0.42    -0.7097  -0.3173  -0.4620  -0.3860 
0.11 
   
(0.000)  (0.230)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.260)    (0.000)  (0.304)  (0.314)  (0.0162) 
(+18)           -0.0116  0.9479  -0.3622  0.31          0.7877  -0.2691  0.11 
        (0.967)  (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.003)  (0.008) 
    -0.4844  -0.0975  -0.5155  0.7442  -0.3024  0.46    -0.4249  -0.1252  -0.2659  -0.4083  0.27 
   
(0.001)  (0.297)  (0.089)  (0.053)  (0.019)    (0.048)  (0.211)  (0.521)  (0.011) 
IV    -0.5165  0.3934  -0.4273  0.7639  -0.3634  0.32    -0.4929  0.3766  -0.2032  -0.5107  0.12 
      (0.011)  (0.078)  (0.231)  (0.093)  (0.028)    (0.086)  (0.183)  (0.675)  (0.008) 
sample 1988 – 2005 
. 
Table 4.4 
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European  data.  Scatter  plot 
diagrams  between  the 
industrial  production  future 
growth  rate  (IP  grw),  or  the 
unemployment  rate  (right 
panel),  and  the  conditional 
variance of the term premium 
(cVar) computed from the  -
month  and  the   -month 
maturities. 
Figure 4.3 
 
 
 
4.4.3   Evidence for the Canadian Economy 
 
Estimations for the Canadian economy return similar results as well. The predictive ability of term 
premia conditional variance is negative and statistically significant. Surprisingly, Canada results 
return a positive coefficient estimate for the level of term premia (   3 α ); term premia thus seem to 
anticipate faster, rather than weaker, growth in industrial production.    
 
, 
. 
CAN Future Industrial Production Growth  -  (120, 3) 
 Horizon     α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2 
  α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T     (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val) 
                                         
(+12) 
      -0.1152  0.0947  -0.4569  0.37        0.9082  -0.4555  0.38 
       
(0.066)  (0.045)  (0.000)        (0.085)  (0.006) 
    -0.2691  -0.0141  0.0747  0.0622  -0.4813  0.46    -0.2721  -0.0076  0.5969  -0.4791  0.46 
   
(0.006)  (0.865)  (0.251)  (0.163)  (0.000)    (0.006)  (0.919)  (0.222)  (0.001) 
IV 
  -0.5901  0.3237  0.1522  0.1130  -0.4953 
0.32    -0.6285  0.2544  0.9936  -0.5122 
0.37 
   
(0.070)  (0.590)  (0.172)  (0.022)  (0.000)    (0.065)  (0.602)  (0.026)  (0.000) 
(+18) 
 
      0.0575  0.0429  -0.5191  0.37          0.4074  -0.5238  0.38 
        (0.240)  (0.339)  (0.000)        (0.393)  (0.000) 
    -0.3478  0.0877  0.0118  0.0290  -0.5645  0.52    -0.3364  0.0766  0.3171  -0.5598  0.52 
   
(0.001)  (0.159)  (0.790)  (0.407)  (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.144)  (0.395)  (0.000) 
IV 
  -0.8464  0.1644  0.0087  0.0576  -0.6623  0.08    -0.7524  0.2289  0.6706  -0.6087  0.25 
   
(0.007)  (0.799)  (0.940)  (0.145)  (0.002)    (0.031)  (0.680)  (0.056)  (0.000) 
(+24)          0.1648  0.1007  -0.0826 
0.10          0.08791  -0.0611 
0.11 
        (0.021)  (0.061)  (0.515)        (0.125)  (0.630) 
    -0.3580  0.0932  0.1053  0.0604  -0.1538  0.28    -0.3661  0.1167  0.5087  -0.1361  0.28 
   
(0.002)  (0.306)  (0.125)  (0.182)  (0.151)    (0.001)  (0.159)  (0.279)  (0.190) 
IV    -1.074  0.4368  0.1241  0.0895  -0.3863 
0.00    -1.1104  0.3686  0.7821  -0.3970 
0.00 
    
(0.002)  (0.664)  (0.347)  (0.074)  (0.006)     (0.005)  (0.663)  (0.023)  (0.002) 
(+36)    0.0712  -0.0085  -0.0951  0.32    -0.0179  -0.3220  0.15 
        (0.022)  (0.762)  (0.643)        (0.934)  (0.003) 
    -0.3470  -0.0153  0.0767  0.0294  -0.2855  0.43    -0.4214  0.0132  0.3884  -0.4232  0.40 
   
(0.078)  (0.760)  (0.099)  (0.470)  (0.203)    (0.008)  (0.779)  (0.276)  (0.006) 
IV    -1.1190  0.6306  0.1487  0.1016  -0.1183 
0.00    -1.1208  0.4398  1.1607  -0.3856 
0.00 
   
(0.183)  (0.577)  (0.138)  (0.162)  (0.893)    (0.097)  (0.557)  (0.018)  (0.259) 
sample 1988 – 1998 
. 
Table 4.5 
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The decomposition of the spread into a term premium and an expectations-based component does 
not seem to improve the forecasting ability; the adjusted goodness of fit remains unchanged passing 
from equation (4.16) to equation (4.18). The forecasting ability improves substantially only for very 
long forecasting horizons (  =    months ahead). This result holds in spite of the derivation of term 
premia from the (   ,  ) rather than the (  ,  ) maturity field. 
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Canadian  data.  Scatter  plot 
diagrams between the industrial 
production  future  growth  rate 
(IP grw), or the unemployment 
rate  (right  panel),  and  the 
conditional variance of the term 
premium (cVar) computed from 
the   -month  and  the   -month 
maturities. 
Figure 4.4 
 
 
. 
   CAN Future Industrial Production Growth - (60,3) 
Horizon  α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2    α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)    
(+6)      0.0758  0.1171  0.0983  0.17        0.1184  0.1024  0.17 
      (0.0.57)  (0.000)  (0.180)          (0.000)  (0.162)   
  -0.1668  0.0630  0.0799  0.0972  0.0185  0.21    -0.1746  0.0555  0.0967  0.0163  0.22 
   (0.043)  (0.429)  (0.214)  (0.000)  (0.860)       (0.033)  (0.438)  (0.000)   (0.881)    
IV  -0.4038  0.9885  -0.2031  0.1189  -0.2610  0.00    -0.8947  0.8041  0.0948  -1.5566  0.00 
  (0.086)  (0.055)  (0.020)  (0.004)  (0.380)      (0.130)  (0.617)  (0.421)  (0.267)   
(+12)      0.0459  0.0739  0.2423  0.13        0.0748  0.2465  0.13 
      (0.384)  (0.003)  (0.087)          (0.003)  (0.085)   
  -0.1877  0.0367  0.0506  0.0497  0.0961  0.20    -0.1872  0.0371  0.0498  0.0963  0.21 
   (0.003)  (0.576)  (0.358)  (0.067)  (0.474)       (0.001)  (0.544)  (0.064)  (0.477)    
IV  -0.3415  0.7915  0.1378  0.0654  0.0067  0.00    -0.6095  1.0364  0.0591  -0.6823  0.00 
  (0.062)  (0.140)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.975)      (0.020)  (0.388)  (0.433)  (0.145)   
(+18)      0.0040  0.0363  0.0860  0.02        0.0424  0.0785  0.02 
      (0.950)  (0.329)  (0.598)          (0.271)  (0.631)   
  -0.2704  0.0366  0.0546  0.0229  -0.1631  0.22    -0.2520  0.0480  0.0189  -0.1395  0.22 
   (0.000)  (0.572)  (0.368)  (0.441)  (0.331)       (0.000)  (0.417)  (0.536)  (0.368)    
IV  -0.5195  -0.6389  0.0785  0.0270  -0.5416  0.00    -0.4186  -1.0800  -0.0029  -0.3947   
  (0.017)  (0.731)  (0.760)  (0.678)  (0.017)      (0.005)  (0.538)  (0.965)  (0.108)  0.00 
(+24)      0.0019  -0.0189  -0.0070  0.02        -0.0186  -0.0141  0.00 
      (0.973)  (0.685)  (0.960)          (0.689)  (0.919)   
  -0.3057  0.0281  0.0560  -0.0072  -0.2402  0.34    -0.2838  0.0481  -0.0074  -0.2394  0.31 
   (0.000)  (0.670)  (0.194)  (0.815)  (0.052)       (0.000)  (0.439)  (0.823)  (0.051)    
IV  -0.5775  0.6642  0.1824  0.0594  -0.3735  0.00    -0.5024  0.1972  0.0441  -0.4353  0.27 
  (0.021)  (0.715)  (0.442)  (0.442)  (0.117)      (0.000)  (0.787)  (0.327)  (0.001)   
(+36)      0.0349  -0.0446  0.0347  0.320        -0.0475  -0.1385  0.13 
      (0.052)  (0.002)  (0.586)          (0.001)  (0.040)   
  -0.2309  0.0079  0.0434  -0.0072  -0.2314  0.431    -0.3006  0.0346  0.0017  -0.4019  0.37 
   (0.070)  (0.812)  (0.025)  (0.760)  (0.110)        (0.004)  (0.329)  (0.933)  (0.000)    
IV  -0.5983  -0.1478  0.0548  0.0614  -0.6787  0.00    -0.5703  -0.2089  0.0562  -0.6455  0.00 
  (0.001)  (0.710)  (0.189)  (0.048)  (0.020)      (0.000)  (0.804)  (0.104)  (0.000)   
sample 1988 – 2005 
. 
Table 4.6 
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4.4.4   Evidence for U.K. 
 
Finally, we analyse whether the conditional variance of bond term premia is informative about 
future fluctuations in economic activity also for the British economy. Results for U.K. are not so 
encouraging. Firstly, the conditional variance of term premia seems to be informative about future 
economic activity only if information about term premia is extracted from the entire yield curve, i.e. 
when  the  long  term  maturity  is      years  (   =     ).  The  conditional  variance  for  term  premia 
obtained from the pair of maturities (  ,  ) does not help to predict future industrial production.  
Second, the predictive ability of conditional variance is not significant for short forecasting horizons 
(less than    months). Finally, although the fit is weak a visual inspection of Figure 4.5 reveals that 
the  future  growth  in  the  industrial  production  index  (    months  ahead)  seems  to  be  positively 
related to the conditional variance of term premia, which clearly contradicts previous evidence.    
 
. 
U.K. Future Industrial Production Growth  -  (120, 3) 
 Horizon     α1  α2  α3a  α3b  α4  a-R
2 
  α1  α2  α3  α4  a-R
2 
T     (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)        (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val)  (p-val) 
                                         
(+18)   
      -0.0064  0.0521  -0.4838  0.76          0.5434  -0.4738  0.73 
        (0.833)  (0.005)  (0.001)        (0.011)  (0.000) 
    -0.1779  -0.0024  -0.0007  0.0301  -0.5293  0.82    -0.2033  -0.0174  0.2813  -0.5355  0.81 
   
(0.003)  (0.957)  (0.978)  (0.030)  (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.687)  (0.0.64)  (0.000) 
IV    -0.2948  -0.6591  -0.0955  -0.0062  -0.7652  0.00    -0.2603  -0.1855  -0.1452  -0.7450  0.74 
   
(0.020)  (0.569)  (0.586)  (0.980)  (0.682)    (0.214)  (0.615)  (0.958)  (0.001) 
(+24)          -0.0021  0.0329  -0.5707 
0.73          0.9739  0.0548 
0.56 
        (0.947)  (0.127)  (0.000)        (0.000)  (0.625) 
    -0.2215  0.0038  0.0171  0.0229  -0.5122  0.85    -0.2719  0.0217  0.3376  -0.2353  0.68 
   
(0.000)  (0.905)  (0.432)  (0.087)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.605)  (0.058)  (0.027) 
IV    -0.2752  -0.7682  -0.0775  0.0006  -0.9718 
0.00    0.4707  -0.5545  0.2661  -0.5428 
0.02 
    
(0.013)  (0.655)  (0.707)  (0.987)  (0.300)     (0.067)  (0.500)  (0.954)  (0.166) 
(+36)    0.0723  0.0667  0.1552  0.18    0.6749  0.1597  0.19 
        (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.346)        (0.002)  (0.308) 
    -0.4613  -0.0059  0.0808  -0.0004  -0.0277  0.79    -0.3887  0.0404  0.1753  -0.1480  0.70 
   
(0.000)  (0.898)  (0.000)  (0.975)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.360)  (0.228)  (0.263) 
IV    -0.5448  -0.0446  0.0639  -0.0274  -0.4576 
0.75    -0.5915  -0.5816  -0.2085  0.6313 
0.00 
   
(0.000)  (0.918)  (0.173)  (0.081)  (0.049)    (0.041)  (0.627)  (0.591)  (0.330) 
sample 1988 – 1998 
. 
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U.K.  data.  Scatter  plot  diagrams 
between the industrial production 
future  growth  rate  (IP  grw),  or 
the  unemployment  rate  (right 
panel),  and  the  conditional 
variance  of  the  term  premium 
(cVar)  computed  from  the   -
month  and  the   -month 
maturities. 
Figure 4.5 
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In  this  chapter  we  have  developed  an  innovative  method  to  extract  valuable  information  from 
financial markets. Our approach highlights the role of term premia volatility in forecasting future 
business  cycle  fluctuations.  Results  are  robust  across  countries  and  our  findings  suggest  a 
statistically significant predictive power of term premia conditional variance over different horizon 
lengths.  
 
 
 
4.5   Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we provide evidence confirming that the informative content of the term structure 
helps to predict future economic activity. In particular, we suggest that the conditional variance of 
term premia forecast errors is informative beyond both the yield spread and term premia about 
future output fluctuations.  
After decomposing the yield spread into an expectations-based component and a term premium we 
examine the time-varying pattern of term premia. First, consistently with other studies we document 
that the aforementioned decomposition leads to a better understanding of the predictive model and 
allows obtaining more accurate forecasts of future economic activity. Hence, we separate the effect 
of monetary policy expectations and risk aversion in the prediction of future output. In contrast with 
previous evidence but in line with Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007), our findings highlight an 
inverse correlation between term premia and the business cycle; therefore declining term premia 
tend to anticipate faster output growth, and viceversa. 
Our  core  analysis  regards  the  predictive  ability  of  term  premia  conditional  variance  which  we 
interpret as a sign of financial distress. Data evidence seems to support the hypothesis that adding 
the conditional variance of term premia to the traditional predictive equation for real economic 
activity leads to a considerable improvement in the forecasting model. Our main result is that high 
values of term premia conditional variance anticipate slower output growth in the future. This result 
seems robust across countries and to different model specifications. However, we do not argue that 
exists a direct influence running from financial markets to the real economy; we simply examine 
whether  distress  on  bond  markets,  as  captured  by  the  conditional  volatility  of  term  premia,  is 
informative about future business cycle fluctuations.  
In  this  chapter  we  thus  focus  on  the  signalling  role  of  uncertainty.  We  may  speculate  that 
uncertainty  might  encourage  perverse  behaviours,  such  as  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection, 
which, in turn, could contribute to worsening the expectations about future economic conjuncture. 
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Appendix A4.I  -  Data 
 
All data have monthly frequency; the sample starts in January 1987. The core econometric analysis, after 
Kalman filtering, is thus performed from January 1988 since we rule out the first 12 observations.  
Industrial Production and Unemployment. The U.S. series of seasonally adjusted industrial production is 
from the FRED database (Federal Reserve Economic Data). The European industrial production growth 
index is from           (ticker: EUIPEMUY). Both the Canadian and the U.K. series of seasonally adjusted 
industrial production is from the IMF database (available from           ). The U.S. seasonally adjusted 
unemployment  rate  series  (civilian  unemployment)  is  from  the  FRED  database;  the  source  is  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Labour  (Bureau  of  Labour  Statistics).  The  European  rate  of  unemployment  is  from 
Bloomberg  (UMRTEMU).  The  Canadian  unemployment  rate  series  (seasonally  adjusted  percentage  of 
civilian labour force) is from the OECD database (available from           ). The U.K. unemployment rate 
series is from IMF financial statistics (          ).   
The log-industrial production growth and the unemployment rate are covariance stationary as suggested by 
both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test. 
 
. 
Stationarity  U.S.  EMU  CAN  U.K. 
IP grw  ADF  (0.050)*  (0.030)*  (0.064)*  (0.033)* 
KPSS  0.159*  0.154*  0.179*  0.223* 
unemp  ADF  (0.019)*  (0.103)*  (0.027)*  (0.004)* 
KPSS  .  .  .  . 
sample 1988 - 2007 - *Intercept ** Intercept and trend (p-values) 
. 
 
 
 
IP grw: annual growth rate of 
the  Industrial  Production 
Index. Unemp: unemployment 
rate. 
Table 4.8 
 
The ADF test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root; while the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be 
rejected by the KPSS test. To match the monthly frequency of data, the rule of thumb selected number of 
lags in the auxiliary regression is either 11 or 12. The automatic lag selection based on different criteria 
(Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn) is consistent with our choice. Unit root test results obtained with the 
automatic lag selections are similar. The critical values of the KPSS test are 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%), and 
0.347 (10%) when the intercept is included in the auxiliary model. The compute KPSS statistics never falls 
in the critical region. The KPSS test tends to reject the null of stationarity for the unemployment series.  
Interest Rates. U.S. yields data are from different sources. Before January 1999 the 3-and 6-month, and the 
10-year yields are from the McCulluch database, while the yields associated to the remaining maturities (1-, 
2-, 3-, 5-year) are from the Fama and Bliss CRSP database, as reported by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). 
After 1999 U.S. data series are the ZCB yield from           . The U.S. effective federal funds rate is from 
the FRED database. Yields data for Canada are from the central Bank of Canada. Yields data for U.K. are 
from the Bank of England, while yield data for Europe are either from the European Central Bank (after 
2006) or from          . The Fibor (before January 1999) and the Euribor (afterwards) is from           . 
Precisely, Fibor is the Germany Interbank 3-month offered rate; while Euribor is the 3-month offered rate. In 
the Figure below we plot the series of the U.S. federal funds, the Canadian overnight rate, and the Fi-Euribor.   158 
Spreads. According to both the ADF and the KPSS tests the yield spreads are stationary. KPSS critical 
values when both the intercept and the trend are included in the regression are 0.216 (1%), 0.146 (5%), and 
0.119 (10%) 
. 
Stationarity 
spread  U.S.  EMU  CAN  U.K. 
(120, 3)  ADF  (0.032)*  (0.017)*  (0.127)**  (0.093) 
KPSS  0.213  0.676  0.089**  0.131** 
(60, 3)  ADF  (0.068)*  (0.020)**  (0.076)  (0.035) 
KPSS  0.124*  0.099**  0.534*  0.338* 
sample 1988 - 2007 - *Intercept ** Intercept and trend (p-values) 
. 
Table 4.9 
 
Exchange Rates. The nominal bilateral exchange rates series between U.S. Dollar, and both the Canadian 
and U.K. currencies are from the FRED database. The nominal bilateral exchange rate between the Canadian 
Dollar  and  the  U.K.  Sterling  has  been  derived  from  the  two  above  series.  The  nominal  exchange  rate 
between U.S. and the Euro area is from Bloomberg. Selecting an appropriate number of lags, and including 
either the intercept both the intercept and a trend the ADF test suggests that these series are stationary. Also 
the KPSS test supports stationary (empirical statistics are lower than the critical values). 
Term Premia. Term  premia  as  obtained  by  equation  (4.1) can  be considered  a  proxy  for  excess  bond 
returns
107. We discuss some descriptive statistics about term premia. Keeping the maturity   of the short 
term yield constant (either  , or  , or    months) the mean is increasing with the maturity   of the long term 
yield; similarly, given the maturity   of the long term yield, the mean diminishes with the increase of the 
short  term  maturity   .  The  standard  deviation  of  term  premia  is  higher  at  shorter  horizons.  With  few 
exceptions, the highest standard deviation is displayed by term premia whose longer maturity is    months. 
These descriptive statistics are consistent with some stylized facts in bond pricing. Firstly, at long horizons 
investors require a positive liquidity premium, which is increasing with maturity. Secondly, the medium-
short end of the yield curve is more volatile than the long end. Yields are quite volatile at short maturities; 
whereas, long term rates tend to be smooth and persistent.  
 
 
 
Appendix A4.II   -  Testing for Parameter Constancy 
 
In this          we outline a testing procedure outlined by Hansen (1992) who puts forward a test which has 
larger applications than the traditional Chow breakpoint test since no prior knowledge about the structural 
break is required. Furthermore, the Hansen test overcomes the drawbacks of both the CUSUM and CUSUM of 
squares tests. In particular, the former has been criticized for merely detecting instability of the intercept; the 
                                                 
107 After adjusting for a scaling factor, term premia implied by (4.1) are identical to bond risk premia, or excess log returns, as in 
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).   159 
latter, instead, suffers from poor asymptotic power while the Hansen test has locally optimal power. We start 
by estimating parameters ( )
2 ˆ , ˆ σ β
   by applying                        to equation (4.7); 
 
   
   
     
        
, , + = β                                                                                                                          (4.7’) 
 
where    is the usual matrix of explanatory variables, which are assumed to be weakly dependent process (no 
deterministic or stochastic trend are allowed). Residuals have to be stationary as well. In addition, usual 
conditions hold: a     -mean disturbance term  ( ) 0 =           ; a constant second moment  ( )
2 2 σ =       ; null 
covariance between noise and regressors  ( ) 0 =  
 
        . Residuals are computed as follows: 
 
β ˆ ˆ ˆ
, ,  
 
   
   
   
           − = =                                                                                                                   (4.21) 
Rewriting the first-order conditions in a slightly different way yields: 
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1
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2 2 = − ∑
=
 
 
    σ                                                                                       (4.22)                                                                                                                             
 
Defining a new variable       : 
 



−
= 2 2 ˆ ˆ
ˆ
σ  
    
    
   
                                                                                                                                 (4.23) 
 
Expressions (4.22) is equivalent to: 
 
∑
=
=
 
 
    
1
0                                                                                                                                       (4.24) 
 
the  variables         are  the  first-order  conditions,  and  are  akin  to  the         in  the  maximum  likelihood 
estimation. The Hansen test statistics are based on the cumulative sums of the       , namely: 
 
∑
=
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1
                                                                                                                                     (4.25) 
  
Two versions of the tests are available. To check for individual parameter stability the test is based on the 
following statistics: 
 
∑
=
=
 
 
  
 
 
   
  
1
2 1
                                                                                                                              (4.26) 
 
where       is the cumulative sum of 
2
     . Asymptotic critical values for the individual parameter stability test 
are given by Hansen (1992). At 5% significance level the critical value is 0.47; the 10% critical value is 
0.353. Large values of the test statistics (   ) implies a violation of the first-order conditions, and thus 
suggest rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter stability. The     test by proposed by Hansen is similar 
to the  -test to assess significance of individual parameter of an OLS regression. The test statistics to assess 
joint parameter stability is:   160 
 
∑
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− =
 
 
 
 
       
 
  
1
1 1
                                                                                                                         (4.27) 
 
where  ( )                   , 1 2 1 ,..., , + = ,  ( )                   , 1 2 1 ,..., , + = , and  ∑ = =
 
 
 
         
1 . Under the null hypothesis of 
parameter constancy, the first-order conditions are mean zero, thus the cumulative sum tend to be distributed 
around zero. Under the alternative hypothesis of parameter instability, the cumulative sum does not have 
zero mean and the test statistics tends to assume large values. Therefore, the distribution is not standard and 
is tabulated by Hansen (1992). There are six explanatory variables in model (4.7) including both the constant 
and the errors variance. At 5% significance level the critical value is 1.68, while the 10% critical value is 
1.49. The null hypothesis of joint parameter stability is rejected if the test statistics exceeds the critical 
values. The Hansen joint test for parameter stability reminds of the  -test to assess the joint significance of 
parameters in an ordinary least squares regression. Hansen reveals “                                    
                                                                        ”.  Results  are  supportive  of  parameters 
instability. 
 
. 
U.S.  -  (120, 3)  EMU  -  (120, 3)  CAN  -  (120, 3)  U.K.  -  (120, 3) 
coef  Li  coef  Li  coef  Li  coef  Li 
β1  0.3583  0.233  β1  0.4007  0.278  β1  0.6395  1.950  β1  0.4952  0.228 
β2  0.1403  0.178  β2  -0.3239  0.213  β2  0.1152  1.993  β2  -0.6573  0.511 
β3  -0.0394  0.191  β3  4.0527  0.280  β3  -0.2464  1.764  β3  0.1740  0.311 
β4  0.6563  0.178  β4  1.0156  0.480  β4  0.7334  1.589  β4  0.6822  0.790 
var  0.2243  0.762  var  0.0391  0.640  var  0.3853  0.644  var  0.2048  0.182 
Lc     2.739  Lc     2.957  Lc     7.379  Lc     3.389 
                       
U.S.  -  (60, 3)  EMU  -  (60, 3)  CAN  -  (60, 3)  U.K.  -  (60, 3) 
coef  Li  coef  Li  Coef  Li  coef  Li 
β1  0.5394  1.849  β1  0.8860  0.530  β1  0.2835  1.944  β1  0.5987  1.074 
β2  0.3267  1.862  β2  -0.5189  0.335  β2  -0.0559  1.622  β2  -0.4419  2.207 
β3  0.0283  0.731  β3  1.5821  0.469  β3  -0.1290  2.230  β3  0.1975  2.111 
β4  2.3116  1.955  β4  0.9369  0.681  β4  0.3505  0.330  β4  0.5786  0.403 
var  0.6508  1.230  var  0.0971  2.291  var  0.9492  3.117  var  0.7354  1.529 
Lc     10.27  Lc     4.649  Lc     8.603  Lc     11.73 
. 
Table 4.14 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
An Empirical Investigation of the Lucas Hypothesis:  
,on Linearity in the Money-Output Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Existing evidence about the effectiveness of money growth to stimulate economic activity has been 
criticized from different perspectives. In addition, high correlation between money and output is not 
helpful to detect the direction of causality. From a policy perspective, in fact, positive correlation 
may arise from two opposite conducts: either the monetary authority sets the supply of money to 
influence future output fluctuations, or the central bank controls money growth reacting to the past 
evolution of macroeconomic variables. In this chapter the relationship between money and output is 
analysed within a non linear framework that ascribes a primary role to expectations. In particular, 
we find evidence that the Lucas (1973) hypothesis, that there is an inverse correlation between the 
variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, is supported 
by data evidence when the yield curve is either flat or downward sloping. We also provide evidence 
suggesting that the Friedman (1977) hypothesis, that the variability of inflation exerts a negative 
effect on the natural level of output, holds when a positive risk premium is incorporated in an 
upward sloping term structure of interest rates. 
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5.1   Introduction 
 
In  previous  chapters  we  have  always  paid  attention  to  the  link  between  macroeconomics  and 
finance, focusing on the informative content carried by the term structure of interest rates about real 
output. In particular, we have investigated whether the curvature of the yield curve reflects the 
evolution of economic activity; secondly, we have examined to what extent the yield spread can 
anticipate  future  output  growth.  Ultimately,  in  Chapter  4  we  have  also  found  the  conditional 
volatility of term premia helps to anticipate future output fluctuations.  
In this last chapter of the thesis we would like to investigate whether there is a direct relationship 
between money, or a measure of it, and output. We would like to address the issue whether or not 
the stock of money itself, without being filtrated by movements of the term structure of interest 
rates through agents’ expectations regarding the incoming stance of monetary policy, is informative 
about the business cycle. Actually, in chronological terms, we move back in time by focusing on the 
starting point of the research in monetary economics (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  
Investigating  the  relationship  between  money  and  output  has  always  been  a  major  concern  of 
macroeconomists.  The  classical  dichotomy  about  whether  money  influences  the  future  level  of 
output or, viceversa, whether output fluctuations influence money supply, is still an unresolved 
puzzle. Economists affiliated to the monetarist school believe that money growth will be merely 
reflected in the future price level. However, the monetarist view that money does not affect real 
output seems to be a weak argument in the short run. On the other hand, Keynesian economists 
believe that short run policies may well influence the level of economic activity.  
In this chapter we analyse the relationship between money and output within a non linear empirical 
framework that allows for rational expectations. In particular, we investigate whether the Lucas 
(1973) hypothesis, that there is a negative relationship between the variance of nominal shocks and 
the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, is supported by data evidence. The contrarian 
argument, that the conditional variance of money forecast errors negatively affects the natural level 
of output, has been proposed by Friedman (1977). 
We find evidence that conditioning the examination of the money-output relation to the shape of the 
yield curve gives the opportunity of reconciling the aforementioned opposite views
108. Evidence 
suggests that the variability of inflation, captured by the conditional variance of money forecast 
errors, exerts a negative influence on output when the yield curve is upward sloping. There is also 
some evidence that the Friedman hypothesis holds when the linear model is estimated over the 
entire sample (from 1967 to 2007). However, in the regime characterized by a flat or downward 
                                                 
108 Estrella and Mishkin (1997), as well as Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Wright (2006), show, in fact, that a negative spread 
increases the likelihood of a recession in the near future.   163 
sloping yield curve the Lucas hypothesis seems to prevail. We thus provide evidence supporting the 
Lucas hypothesis, which is usually rejected by data analysis (Kim and Nelson, 1989). 
The weaknesses of traditional models (King and Plosser, 1984; Ravn and Sola, 2004) coupled with 
the difficulty of detecting a unique direction for causality call for an approach that emphasizes the 
role of expectations. Hence, the contribution of this chapter is also methodological. We propose to 
examine expectations exploiting a two-level structure. At a       level, the bottom level, agents’ 
expectations focus on the central bank operational procedure regarding the supply of money. The 
      mechanism of processing available information is based on the Kalman filter, which implies 
a  continuous  refinement  of  expectations  on  the  basis  of  past  prediction  errors,  i.e.  deviations 
between         expected and         observed values of the money stock. Hence, agents form 
expectations according to a Bayesian iterative sequence that combines the re-elaboration of past 
prediction errors with the analysis of new flows of information. Moreover, what is peculiar in the 
      analysis of expectations is that Kalman filtering allows separating the expected from the 
unexpected  component  of  money  growth.  The  adoption  of  a  time-varying  approach  for  the 
monetary policy rule is also consistent with recent evidence. Cogley and Sargent (2006) as well as 
Boivin (2006) document important time variation in the response of the monetary authority to the 
state of the economy. Also Sims and Zha (2006) point out that the changing view of the Fed about 
the economy has been gradual; they argue it could be attributed to the changes of shocks’ variance. 
Finally, Primiceri (2008) provides evidence that the reaction of monetary policy to the changes in 
both inflation and unemployment has become more and more aggressive in the last decades. Last, 
but certainly not least, we focus on a policy rule expressed in terms of money supply since our 
sample is characterized by periods of inflation instability; Bernanke and Mishkin (1993) argue, in 
fact, that central banks tend to adopt targets in terms of money growth when the inflation rate 
threatens to be out of control.   
At a       level, the top level, expectations focus on the future economic outlook, as reflected by 
the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates. The       perspective captures the sentiment 
regarding the future evolution of key macroeconomic variables as well as institutional or socio-
political factors, or, finally, technological changes. There is large evidence that the slope of the term 
structure  could  be  used  to  make  inference  about  the  future  state  of  the  economy  (Estrella  and 
Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1997; Ang, Piazzesi and Wei, 2006). 
Our methodology also partially accounts for the criticism moved by Amato and Swanson (2000). 
Despite some evidence suggests that monetary aggregates help to predict future output (Stock and 
Watson, 1989; Becketti and Morris, 1992; Feldstein and Stock, 1994), Amato and Swanson (2000) 
point out that such evidence might be contingent upon the nature of the dataset. Using real time,   164 
rather than revised, data they document a substantial reduction of the marginal predictive power of 
money. The threshold approach adopted in this chapter implies non linearity in the dataset thus 
breaking time continuity; for this reason, it allows reducing the impact of the historical track. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next Section contains a brief survey of the 
literature and discusses motivations. In Section 5.3 we present some evidence about causality. In 
Section  5.4  we  outline  the  structure  of  expectations  at  the         level.  Empirical  evidence  is 
discussed in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes. Data are presented in              . In 
               we report auxiliary estimations.  
 
 
 
5.2   Motivations and Literature Review 
 
Whether and to what extent money growth is capable of contributing to the determination of real 
output is still an unresolved puzzle of macroeconomics. The monetarist view that money growth 
induces a proportional change in the price level leaving real output unaffected is acknowledged to 
work in the medium-long run. However, as Keynesian theory suggests, monetary disturbances are 
believed to have some real effects in the short run. Although the contribution of monetary shocks is 
limited, or absent, on permanent income growth, managing money supply is a useful instrument 
under the control of the monetary authority for stabilizing or stimulating the economy across the 
business cycle.  
In this Section we investigate the relationship between money and output for the U.S. economy. The 
classical dichotomy of money neutrality, i.e. nominal variables are unable to affect real variables, 
has been initially investigated by means of the following equation, which is known as the Saint 
Louis equation since it has been introduced by economists working in that Federal Reserve District:    
 
                                       ε β β β β β α + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − − − − − − 4 12 , 9 3 9 , 6 2 6 , 3 1 3 , 0 3 ,                        (5.1) 
 
The LHS variable is the quarterly change in the industrial production index; while, the quarterly 
changes of the money stock over the last year are explanatory variables. The above regression also 
includes a constant and a time trend (to account for eventual trend in money and output growth). 
Different  monetary  aggregates  have  been  considered:  M1,  M2,  and  the  U.S.  Fed  Board  of 
Governors monetary base (MB). The analysis is performed on U.S. monthly data from 1967 to 2007. 
Empirical results are reported in Table 5.1. The contemporaneous effect on output exerted by M2 
turns out to be negative ( 0 β < 0); however, more generally, results suggest that the rate of growth of 
M2 over the last three quarters have a positive influence on IP growth ( 1 β , 2 β > 0). The rate of 
growth of M1 has a marginal, though significant, effect on the current growth of the IP index.   165 
 
. 
St. Louis Equation -  IP grw (3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   4 β   R
2 
M1  1.2986  -0.1155  0.1551  0.0822  0.0686  0.0013  0.027 
t-stat  (0.1318)  (0.0963)  (0.0312)  (0.2534)  (0.3221)  (0.5490)   
NW   (0.5261)  (0.2251)  (0.1359)  (0.4039)  (0.4407)  (0.7734)   
White  (0.2081)  (0.1465)  (0.0504)  (0.2466)  (0.2651)  (0.5728)   
M2  -0.0020  -0.1238  0.1447  0.1191  0.0593  0.0005  0.094 
t-stat  (0.0710)  (0.0016)  (0.0007)  (0.0051)  (0.1292)  (0.0262)   
NW   (0.4226)  (0.0069)  (0.0027)  (0.0361)  (0.2146)  (0.2781)   
White  (0.1166)  (0.0007)  (0.0001)  (0.0062)  (0.1138)  (0.0364)    
MB  -0.0093  0.4487  0.5870  0.3514  0.3628  0.0001  0.019 
t-stat  (0.4713)  (0.2062)  (0.1004)  (0.3263)  (0.3101)  (0.3757)   
NW   (0.7033)  (0.3348)  (0.1775)  (0.3638)  (0.4721)  (0.6656)   
White  (0.4594)  (0.1458)  (0.0428)  (0.1478)  (0.2115)  (0.3926)   
p-values in parenthesis 
. 
Table 5.1 
 
In order to see whether there is a significant influence of money on output we have looked at the 
jointly significance of estimated coefficients in each equation. In all the equations, coefficients turn 
out to be jointly significant supporting the influence of money on output. In addition, we have also 
run a Wald test to check the following restrictions: ∑ = =
3
0 0
    β , i.e. to check whether money growth 
does  explain  output.  The  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  in  two  cases  since  the  probability  value 
associated to the test is      for both M2 and MB equations, thus suggesting the influence of these 
monetary aggregates on real activity. M1 growth, instead, does not seem informative about output. 
As a forecasting exercise we have estimated the above regression using the future determination of 
output in the LHS: 
 
                                       ε β β β β β α + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − − − − − + 4 12 , 9 3 9 , 6 2 6 , 3 1 3 , 0 , 3                        (5.2) 
 
Results reported in Table 5.2 suggest that M2, rather than M1 and the monetary base, is effective in 
influencing both the current and the future level of industrial production. In the equation for M2 
both coefficients  0 β  and  1 β  are statistically significant indicating that future output is influenced by 
money growth up to six months before. The goodness of fit is definitely poor; however, the M2 
equation returns a much better fit than the other equations. The dynamics of M1 over the most 
recent quarter has a marginal impact on the IP growth. Coefficients are jointly significant ( -test) in 
equations M1 and M2. We repeat the Wald test to check for the following restriction: ∑ = =
3
0 0
    β . 
The null hypothesis is definitely rejected in all the three cases supporting the influence of money 
(M1, M2, and MB) on future economic activity.  
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. 
St. Louis Equation -  IP grw (+3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   4 β   R
2 
M1  0.0228  0.0304  0.0190  0.0215  -0.0181  0.0005  0.025 
t-stat  (0.2877)  (0.0796)  (0.2883)  (0.2321)  (0.2941)  (0.3033)   
NW   (0.6378)  (0.2752)  (0.4457)  (0.2973)  (0.4842)  (0.6076)   
White  (0.3499)  (0.0812)  (0.2828)  (0.1945)  (0.2622)  (0.3162)   
M2  -0.0074  0.2269  0.2916  0.0989  -0.0191  0.0001  0.075 
t-stat  (0.0101)  (0.0223)  (0.0068)  (0.3563)  (0.8461)  (0.0081)   
NW   (0.2359)  (0.1031)  (0.0492)  (0.4050)  (0.8891)  (0.1906)   
White  (0.0197)  (0.0126)  (0.0101)  (0.3488)  (0.8458)  (0.0112)    
MB  -0.0011  0.1584  0.1056  0.1041  0.0086  0.0004  0.017 
t-stat  (0.7192)  (0.0771)  (0.2396)  (0.2474)  (0.9238)  (0.4298)   
NW   (0.8391)  (0.1954)  (0.2347)  (0.3739)  (0.9369)  (0.6890)   
White  (0.6976)  (0.0422)  (0.0674)  (0.1437)  (0.9073)  (0.4349)   
p-values in parenthesis 
. 
Table 5.2 
 
The macroeconomic debate has further focused on the asymmetric effect of monetary policy on 
output. Models with sticky prices or financial constraints suggest that interest rate changes generate 
greater effect on real activity during recessions. Similarly to Romer and Romer (1994), Garcia and 
Schaller (1999) find evidence in line with this conjecture arguing that monetary policy is more 
effective during recessions. Ravn and Sola (2004) find evidence corroborating the hybrid traditional 
Keynesian asymmetry, that is only small negative monetary policy shocks tend to influence real 
output.  In  order  to  account  for  this  effect  we  estimate  the  above  equations  including  dummy 
variables to distinguish the effect of positive rather than negative money growth rates.   
 
                                         ε β β β β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − −
+
− −
+
− −
+
−
+
− 12 , 9
) (
3 9 , 6
) (
2 6 , 3
) (
1 3 ,
) (
0 3 ,             (5.3) 
 
                                         ε β β β β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − −
−
− −
−
− −
−
−
−
− 12 , 9
) (
3 9 , 6
) (
2 6 , 3
) (
1 3 ,
) (
0 3 ,             (5.4) 
 
Where  
    indicates a positive quarterly growth rate of the monetary aggregate, while  
    indicates 
a negative growth rate. Results strongly support the hypothesis advanced by Romer and Romer 
(1994).  Coefficients  are  statistically  significant  only  in  equation  (5.3)  (top  panel  of  Table  5.3) 
suggesting that only stimulus to economic activity seem to be effective. Moreover, the goodness of 
fit (0.033) of equation (5.3) is much larger than that (0.006) of equation (5.4) (bottom panel of 
Table 5.3). The  -test suggests coefficients are jointly significance only in equation (5.3). The Wald 
test confirms that the null hypothesis ∑ = =
3
0 0
    β  cannot be rejected for equation (5.3) solely.   
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. 
Dummies D(+) -  IP grw (3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  1.5221  -0.0924  0.1143  0.1369  0.1591  0.033 
t-stat  (0.0009)  (0.1307)  (0.0538)  (0.0212)  (0.0094)   
p-values in parenthesis 
   
 
         
Dummies D(-) -  IP grw (3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  2.2632  0.1056  0.0615  0.0301  -0.0415  0.006 
t-stat  (0.0000)  (0.1877)  (0.4278)  (0.6977)  (0.6020)   
p-values in parenthesis 
. 
Table 5.3 
 
The  -test reveals that coefficient are jointly not significant in equation (5.4); moreover, the Wald 
test to check for ∑ = =
3
0 0
    β  does not allow to reject the null hypothesis. 
Results are similar when replacing the dependent variable  3 , − ∆         with its future realization         , 3 + ∆ : 
 
. 
Dummies D(+)  -  IP grw (+3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  0.3606  0.0352  0.0335  0.0323  -0.0157  0.032 
t-stat  (0.0019)  (0.0220)  (0.0247)  (0.0301)  (0.3046)   
p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
        Dummies D(-)  -  IP grw (+3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  0.5663  0.0910  0.0747  -0.0459  0.0242  0.005 
t-stat  (0.0000)  (0.6507)  (0.7008)  (0.8131)  (0.2246)   
p-values in parenthesis 
. 
Table 5.4 
 
Although  not  reported,  and  coherently  with  the  estimations  above,  the  joint  estimation  of  an 
equation including all dummy variables, both  
    and  
   , returns significant coefficients only for 
dummies  
    denoting an increase of the monetary aggregate. 
The main drawback of the above equations is that they are not sufficient to establish any causality 
relation running from money to output. King and Plosser (1984) observe that monetary aggregates 
such as M1 and M2 are determined by the interaction between the high-powered money, a liability 
of the central bank, the behaviour of both firms and households, and the efficiency of the financial 
system through the strategies of the banking sector. Therefore it is possible to observe changes in 
the money stock that anticipate output movements without causing them. Endogeneity is the second 
problem associated with both equations (5.1) and (5.2) and equations (5.3) and (5.4). The high   168 
correlation  eventually  captured  by  the  coefficients  of  the  equations  may  well  derive  from  the 
conduct of the monetary authority that sets the future supply of money in response to past output 
fluctuations. The chronological sequence of a tight monetary policy which follows growing GDP, 
like a reduction of the rate of money growth whose final goal is to curb economic activity, and of an 
accommodative policy to tackle falling GDP preserves high correlation between money and output 
but with important implications for reverse causation. In addition, from a policy point of view, it is 
impossible to ascribe to monetary policy the effect of money on output without simultaneously 
considering the effect on GDP exerted by fiscal policies. The poor good of fit obtained for the 
above regressions is, in fact, a sign of misspecification; in particular, some relevant variables may 
be omitted. Finally, the time series analysis performed by estimating the above equations might be 
affected by shifts in money demand since financial innovations contributes to changing agents’ 
preferences.  In  particular,  as  Ravn  and  Sola  (2004)  argue,  the  instability  of  M1  demand  may 
underlie the poor fit of the M1 equation; furthermore, and specifically in this analysis, the monthly 
frequency of data may, in principle, accentuate the effect of M1 volatility. 
The aforementioned intrinsic difficulties of detecting the effect of money on output coupled with 
the  devastating  effect  of  the  Lucas  critique  call  for  an  empirical  method  based  on  dynamic 
expectations as that implied by Kalman filtering. Expectations are subject to continuous refinement 
as long as new information becomes available; in addition, agents revisit their expectations on the 
base of past prediction errors. So far, in fact, we have not discriminated between anticipated and 
unanticipated money growth which is a core distinction in economics. In this vein, prediction errors 
work like a proxy for unanticipated money supply. Our approach will be deeply motivated later.  
Before presenting in details the methodology adopted in this chapter, next Section provides some 
more evidence regarding the money-output relation.  
 
 
5.3   Preliminary Evidence on Causality 
 
In this Section we focus on the causality issue characterizing the empirical relationship between real 
variables and monetary aggregates. Using U.S. monthly data from January 1967 to December 2007, 
we start by looking at dynamic short-run correlations. Each panel of Figure 5.1 shows correlations 
between  a  measure  of  real  activity  and  different  monetary  aggregates  (M1,  M2,  and  MB,  the 
monetary  base).  The  top-left  diagram  indicates  that  all  monetary  aggregates  are  positively 
correlated  with  the  Hodrick-Prescott  detrended  series  of  industrial  production  (IP)  at  lags,  but 
negatively correlated at leads. Hence, booms (high IP relative to trend) tend to be preceded by high 
values of money growth; while positive values of IP relative to its HP trend tend to be followed by 
low  values  of  money  growth.  Positive  values  of  the  HP  filtered  IP  give  signals  of  a  thriving   169 
economy;  a  positive  IP  gap  means  that  resources  are  employed  above  the  natural  long-run 
equilibrium level. Hence, if important rates of money growth tend to anticipate positive HP gap 
there is some evidence that the causality relationship runs from money to output. This evidence is in 
line with the idea that money supply acts as a stimulus to real economic activity; while in response 
to fast-growing economy, and to the associated threat of mounting inflation, the monetary authority 
inverts the sign of the monetary policy conduct. The bottom-left diagram shows the correlations 
between monetary aggregates and the annual change in the unemployment rate. Consistently with 
the  above  story,  all  monetary  aggregates  are  negatively  correlated  at  lags  with  the  growth  in 
unemployment, i.e. a reduction in unemployment tends to be preceded by high values of money 
supply;  on  the  other  hand,  monetary  aggregates  are  positively  correlated  with  the  increase  of 
unemployment at leads.  
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
M1 grw  M2 grw MB grw
IP gap (HP)
-24   -20    -16    -12   -8   -4    0    4   8   12   16   20   24
 
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
M1 grw M2 grw MB grw
real CONS grw
-24   -20    -16    -12   -8   -4    0    4   8   12   16   20   24
 
 
 
IP  gap  (HP):  industrial  production 
gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescot 
filter. real CO,S grw: annual growth 
of  the  seasonally  adjusted  real 
personal  consumption  expenditures. 
M1 grw: annual growth of monetary 
aggregate  M1.  M2  grw:  annual 
growth  of  monetary  aggregate  M2. 
MB  grw:  annual  growth  of  the 
monetary base. 
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
M1 grw M2 grw MB grw
UN grw
-24   -20    -16    -12   -8   -4    0    4   8   12   16   20   24
 
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
M1 grw M2 grw MB grw
TCU (ln)
-24   -20    -16    -12   -8   -4    0    4   8   12   16   20   24
 
 
 
 
 
U,  grw:  annual  growth  of  the 
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annual growth of monetary aggregate 
M1.  M2  grw:  annual  growth  of 
monetary  aggregate  M2.  MB  grw: 
annual growth of the monetary base. 
Figure 5.1 
 
The top-right diagram of Figure 5.1 shows the pattern of short run correlations between the change 
in  real  consumption  expenditures  and  monetary  aggregates.  Private  consumption  seems  to  be 
positively related to money growth in the short run at both leads and lags. The smoother pattern of 
the  monetary  base  correlations  is  consistent  with  the  theory  put  forward  by  King  and  Plosser 
(1984);  they  find  that  inside  money,  i.e.  the  internal  monetary  measures  which  represent  the 
liabilities of the banking sector as a component of monetary aggregates, rather than outside money, 
i.e. the external monetary measures which represent the liabilities of the central bank, are positively 
correlated with real activity.   170 
Finally, although lower with respect to other real indicators, the bottom-right panel shows that the 
correlation between monetary aggregates and the (   ) total capacity utilization is positive at both 
lags and leads; thus both past money supply and expectations of future important money supply 
tend to positively affect the employment of the factors of production.  
Previous evidence is provided by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in a classical contribution about 
the monetary history of the United States; they find that money growth rate changes lead changes in 
real  GDP.  The  left  diagram  of  Figure  5.2  shows  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  M1  systematically 
anticipates business cycle movements between 1967 and the mid 1980s. Falling money growth 
precedes slowdowns in economic activity; while increasing money stocks anticipate both recoveries 
and booms. However, more recent evidence presented in the right diagram is more controversial: 
starting from 1985, in fact, the relationship between money and output is not as close as before, 
both the length and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations do not reproduce the preceding dynamics 
of the monetary aggregate. The different pattern of the relationship between M1 and the IP gap 
might be due to financial innovations which affected the demand for money. The greater variability 
of the rate of growth of M1 might also reflect greater difficulty of the money stock to influence 
output from 1986 and 1997. In addition, Choudhry (2002) finds that the stated monetary act of 1980 
considerably affected the income and interest rate demand elasticities of both M1, M2 and their 
components in U.S. Moreover, he argues that the fall in the M1 interest rate elasticity may well 
indicate M1 as possibly a more effective monetary policy tool after 1980.  
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Figure 5.2 
 
In line with the above evidence, the following scatter diagrams suggest a stronger effect displayed 
on both current and future output (detrended  IP) by M2 rather than by  M1 or MB
109. The top 
diagrams show the scatter between the IP gap and the contemporaneous growth rate of the monetary 
aggregates. In the bottom panels we report the scatter plots between the actual HP-detrended IP and 
the rate of money growth 12 months before.  
                                                 
109 The regressing line associated to M2 is, in fact, always steeper. The only exception occurs in the mid-bottom panel, the regressing 
line associated to MB turns out to be marginally steeper than the one associated to M2. However, in the former case (MB) there is a 
greater vertical dispersion of observations around the regressing line; in the latter case (M2), instead, observations more closely 
concentrated around the regressing line along its entire length.    171 
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Scatter plot diagrams. IP gap (HP): industrial production gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescot filter. M1 grw: annual growth of 
monetary aggregate M1. M2 grw: annual growth of monetary aggregate M2. MB grw: annual growth of the monetary base. (-12) 
means the twelfth lag (monthly frequency of data). 
Figure 5.3 
 
As  Walsh  (2003)  points  out  “                                                                     
                                                                                                       
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                       ”. 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned stronger influence on real variables exerted by M2 than other 
aggregates, the Granger causality tests suggest M1 being the only source capable of affecting the 
future level of both industrial production and total capacity utilization. The null hypothesis that the 
rate of growth of M1 does not cause the IP gap cannot be rejected, as well as the null that M1 does 
not cause (   ) TCU. The real personal consumption expenditure seems to be caused in the Granger 
sense by all monetary aggregates. Results are reported in Table 5.5.  
The Granger tests are also employed to investigate whether lagged levels of the real variables help 
to  predict  the  future  path  of  monetary  aggregates.  Results  are  significantly  supportive  in  this 
respect,  as  shown  in  Table  5.6.  Such  statistical  evidence  about  causality  is  compatible  with  a 
Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function implying the monetary authority to raise the policy 
rate when the pace of economic growth is as fast as to create undesired inflationary pressures. 
 
 
 
   172 
 
. 
Granger Causality Test 
 
lags  IP gap (HP)  TCU (ln)  Unemp  r-cons 
M1  3  (0.0432)  (0.0296)  (0.8090)  (0.3827) 
 
6  (0.0577)  (0.0158)  (0.8598)  (0.0063) 
   12  (0.7340)  (0.6834)  (0.1455)  (0.0066) 
M2  3  (0.1971)  (0.1568)  (0.6825)  (0.0013) 
 
6  (0.2398)  (0.4621)  (0.2978)  (0.0005) 
 
12  (0.4150)  (0.2986)  (0.1740)  (0.0050) 
MB  3  (0.5173)  (0.5698)  (0.7667)  (0.0321) 
 
6  (0.7928)  (0.9175)  (0.7430)  (0.1002) 
   12  (0.2935)  (0.2558)  (0.3408)  (0.0436) 
Null  Hypothesis:  the  monetary  aggregate  does  not  Granger-cause  the  real 
variable. Tests p-values in parenthesis. 
. 
Table 5.5 
  
 
. 
Granger Causality Test 
  Lags  M1  M2  MB 
IP gap (HP)  3  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0765) 
 
6  (0.0231)  (0.0003)  (0.0239) 
   12  (0.0914)  (0.0004)  (0.1145) 
unemp  3  (0.0100)  (0.0002)  (0.1510) 
 
6  (0.0408)  (0.0006)  (0.3795) 
 
12  (0.0606)  (0.0136)  (0.4834) 
TCU  3  (0.0055)  (0.0170)  (0.4816) 
 
6  (0.0321)  (0.0053)  (0.0407) 
 
12  (0.1117)  (0.0136)  (0.1669) 
r-cons  3  (0.0046)  (0.0005)  (0.0778) 
 
6  (0.1192)  (0.0008)  (0.1646) 
   12  (0.3280)  (0.0340)  (0.6395) 
Null  Hypothesis:  the  real  variable  does  not  Granger-cause  the 
monetary aggregate. Tests p-values in parenthesis. 
. 
Table 5.6 
 
We sum up the preliminary evidence discussed in this Section by saying that results regarding the 
effect  of  money  on  output  turn  out  to  be  somehow  ambiguous.  Short  run  correlations  tend  to 
suggest a positive influence of lagged money on actual output; however, the Granger tests partially 
contradict this evidence by suggesting a causality relationship working in the opposite direction. In 
addition, despite the existing evidence suggesting that money helps to predict future output (Stock 
and Watson, 1989; Becketti and Morris, 1992; Feldstein and Stock, 1994), Amato and Swanson 
(2000) argue that results are someway misleading because they crucially depends on  revised, rather 
than real time, monetary aggregates data. 
The aforementioned ambiguity can be dealt with by introducing a new element in the analysis; we 
thus  attribute  a  role  of  primary  importance  to  agents’  expectations  and,  in  particular,  to  the   173 
associated expectations errors. To conclude, we recall that the choice of M1 as the benchmark 
reference aggregate for the monetary policy rule in the following analysis hinges on the results of 
the Granger tests reported in Table 5.5.  
 
 
 
5.4   Empirical Methods for Expectations  
 
In this Section we summarize the approach employed to derive agents’ expectations about the future 
stance of monetary policy as captured by the rate of growth of M1.  
King  and  Plosser  (1984),  in  fact,  suggest  inside  money,  a  component  of  M1  representing  the 
liabilities of the banking sector, being highly correlated with business cycle movements. In addition, 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1993) argue that the monetary authority tends to define targets in terms of 
money growth if there is a concrete likelihood that inflation gets out of control. Our sample is 
characterized by periods of high and volatile inflation. Finally, we justify the time-varying approach 
by observing that there is substantial evidence highlighting that both the monetary policy conduct 
and the variance of nominal shocks have changed over time (Cogley and Sargent, 2006; Boivin, 
2006; Sims and Zha, 2006; Primiceri 2008).  
We thus compute expectations by applying the Kalman filter, since it provides with an effective 
formalisation of the mechanism through which agents form expectations rationally. Moreover, the 
Kalman approach gives the opportunity of deriving a measure of innovations which overcomes the 
criticism traditionally moved to the VAR approach. In what follows we briefly outline the main 
features of Kalman filtering.  
The observation equation, or measurement equation, of the state-space system is: 
 
                + + = ∆ − β 1                                                                                                                      (5.5) 
 
Actual quarterly money growth is a function of the changes of the T-bill rate, of the price level, and 
of the money stock over the previous quarter;       is a stochastic  ( )         σ , 0 . . .  noise. The specification 
of the money equation come from Mishkin (1982) and Weintraub (1980); it has been successively 
considered by Kim and Nelson (1989). The only difference is that we rule out the fiscal variable, 
because of the superior independence achieved by the monetary authority in recent times. The state, 
or transition, equation captures the evolution of coefficients over time: 
 
          + + = −1 β µ β                                                                                                                       (5.6) 
  
Where        is  an  idiosyncratic  disturbance  ( )         σ , 0 . . . .  Following  standard  practice,  we  impose 
matrix   to be the identity matrix since we assume that the regressing coefficients follow random   174 
walk processes (Kim and Nelson, 1998; Kim and Nelson, 2006; Boivin, 2006). The Kalman filter is 
an iterative algorithm based on updating the informative set with most recent available information 
and predicting future movements of the variable under examination. The coefficients covariance 
matrix conditional on information available up to time     is: 
 
( )( ) [ ]
 
                    1 | 1 | 1 | − − − − − = β β β β                                                                                                     (5.7) 
 
Equation (5.8) provides the prediction of money growth based on information available up to time   
given  that  economists  know  the  econometric  relationship  linking  the  core  variable  to  the 
explanatory variables till time    .  
 
1 | 1 | − − = ∆               β                                                                                                                              (5.8) 
 
Once the actual contemporaneous value of the core variable is observed, agents can compute the 
prediction error according to the following  
 
1 ! 1 | 1 | − − − ∆ − ∆ = − ∆ =                           β η                                                                                            (5.9) 
 
Finally, equation (5.10) represents the conditional variance of money growth prediction errors:  
 
[ ]
2
1 |
2
1 | 1 | ε σ η + = = − − −
 
                                                                                                                               (5.10) 
 
According to (5.10) Kalman filtering allows two sources of uncertainty generating the conditional 
variance  of  the  forecast  error  ( 1 | −       ).  One  source  depends  on  the  evolutionary  behaviour  of 
estimated coefficients through the coefficients covariance matrix, thus capturing the gradual change 
of the policy regime over time; the other source is a random noise related to future disturbances, 
like unpredictable institutional or technological shocks. The assumption of a constant variance of 
nominal shocks to money growth seems too severe since aggregate M1 is regarded to respond on a 
great variety of shocks. First, M1 trivially depends upon the monetary policy conduct through the 
money supply (high-powered money). Second, M1 is affected by the interaction between money 
supply and money demand, so that a demand shock, rather than a supply shock, may influence 
aggregate M1. For instance financial innovations as well as deregulation may affect M1 in the 
medium-short run. Finally, M1 depends also on the strategic decisions of the banking system and on 
the credit market conditions. Therefore, a measure of variance which is conditional to the state of 
the economy provides with a more realistic picture of aggregate risk.   175 
An  alternative  method  to  compute  the  time-varying  conditional  variance  is  to  estimate  an 
autoregressive  model  for  money  growth  (either  AR  or  VAR,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
analysis), and then to compute the squared of fitted residuals
110 (Piazzesi, 2003). 
 
 
 
5.5   Empirical Results 
 
In this Section we provide evidence that the Lucas hypothesis, i.e. that exists a negative relationship 
between the variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, 
usually rejected in linear model, holds when the likelihood of a slowdown in economic activity is 
warned by financial indicators. Evidence also suggests that the alternative Friedman hypothesis, that 
the  augmenting  variability  of  inflation  exerts  a  negative  effect  on  output,  tends  to  hold  when 
financial indicators anticipate a thriving pace of economic growth. 
A  crucial  issue  involved  in  testing  the  Lucas  hypothesis  is  the  examination  of  the  conditional 
variance of nominal shocks over time. Hence, the analysis starts with the estimation of time-varying 
monetary policy function expressed in terms of money rather than in terms of the rate of interest. 
The inverse relationship tying money supply and interest rates is trivially respected in any modern 
economy; moreover, the extensive sample period covered in this analysis calls for a generic version 
of the monetary policy rule. 
After estimating a time-varying specification of equations (5.5) and (5.6), we obtain a series of 
prediction errors ( 1 | −     η ) and a measure of forecast errors’ conditional volatility ( 1 | −       ). The basic 
equation to test the Lucas        the Friedman hypothesis is the following: 
 
                          + + + + = − − − 1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 0 α α η α α                                                                                  (5.11) 
 
Where the output gap is the HP de-trended series of     IP. In addition, coefficient  1 α  is set equal to 
1 | 1 0 1 − + =       γ γ α . The functional form of  1 α  is motivated with the aim of reducing the effect of 
multi-collinearity in the OLS regression. Equation (5.11) thus becomes  
 
( )                                     + + + ⋅ + + = − − − − − 1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 1 | 0 0 α α η γ η γ α                                                        (5.11’) 
 
The inclusion of the first lag of the dependent variable, which is highly correlated with its actual 
level, certifies the robustness of other coefficients estimates. In addition, different computational 
methods  for  the  variance-covariance  matrix  have  been  employed  in  order  to  obtain  consistent 
                                                 
110 In                we provide with a comparison between the conditional variances of money growth prediction errors obtained 
both by Kalman filtering and by autoregressive modeling.   176 
estimates  (White,  1980;  Hansen  and  Hodrick,  1980;  Newey  and  West,  1987;  and,  finally,  the 
simplified Hansen and Hodrick).   
The  theory  advanced  by  Lucas  is  satisfied  when  both  0 0 > γ   and  0 1 < γ ;  while,  testing  the 
Friedman hypothesis is equivalent to detecting whether coefficient  2 α  is negative ( 0 2 < α )
111. The 
assumption here is that the conditional variance of money forecast errors acts as a proxy for the 
variability  of  inflation.  The  original  idea  put  forward  by  Friedman  (1977),  in  fact,  is  that  the 
variability of inflation, rather than that of money, reduces the natural level of output since it disturbs 
the allocation efficiency of the price system. 
The  linear  model  (5.11’),  estimated  over  the  entire  sample  1967-2007,  does  not  reveal  any 
particular information about the way nominal shocks affect business cycle fluctuations. Table 5.7 
shows estimation results for different measures of the business conditions. The dependent variable 
in the top panel is the Hodrick-Prescott measure of the IP gap; (from the top to the bottom) in the 
second  panel  the  dependent  variable  is  the      total  capacity  utilization;  in  the  third  panel  the 
dependent variable is the rate of unemployment; finally, in the bottom panel, the dependent variable 
is the rate of change of unemployment
112.  
There is weak evidence supporting the Friedman hypothesis. Although coefficient  2 α  is inversely 
related to the dynamics of real variables, it is either marginally or not significant with the only 
exception holding for unemployment. The Lucas hypothesis is definitely rejected. Coefficient  0 γ  is 
not statistically significant. In two cases coefficient  1 γ  turns out to be significantly positive thus 
contradicting the Lucas hypothesis
113. 
The  linear  estimation  of  equation  (5.11’)  is  not  entirely  reliable  though,  since  the  pattern  of 
residuals series is affected by heteroscedaticity in all cases. In addition, a strong ARCH effect is 
found after performing the Engle (1982) test. The recursive residuals and the CUSUM square of 
residuals reveal the instability of coefficient estimates as reported in Figure 5.4
114. Finally, also the 
Hansen tests (1992, 2000) highlight the presence of non-linearity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 Trivially it holds the opposite sign of coefficients when the dependent variable is either the unemployment or its rate of change.  
112 Coefficient  3 α  in equation (5.11’) multiplies the first lag of the respective dependent variable.  
113 In                we report the estimation of equation (5.11’) using an alternative measure of the conditional variance of  money 
growth forecast errors leading to similar results. In particular, after estimating an unrestricted VAR (9) model of money growth, 
inflation, and the change in the 3-month T-bill rate, we obtain the conditional variance of money forecast errors as the squares of 
residuals from the money growth equation.  
114 Figure 5.4 reports tests when the dependent variable is the HP filtered IP series; tests for other equations with different real 
variable offer very similar results.   177 
. 
joint estimation  -  IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.1198  0.0436  -0.0158  -0.0182  0.9444  0.906 
t-stat  [-1.423]  [1.238]  [-1.143]  [-1.544]  [64.75]   
white  [-1.346]  [1.485]  [-1.325]  [-1.410]  [54.71]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-1.501]  [1.884]  [-1.552]  [-1.702]  [95.31]   
NW (12)  [-1.342]  [1.634]  [-1.449]  [-1.531]  [55.74]   
s-HH  [-0.656]  [1.474]  [-1.181]  [-0.812]  [22.92]    . 
. 
joint estimation  - TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.9839  0.0163  0.0283  -0.0003  0.9780  0.974 
t-stat  [2.893]  [0.958]  [2.181]  [-0.846]  [127]   
white  [-2.816]  [0.971]  [2.107]  [-1.123]  [124]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-1.894]  [0.880]  [2.409]  [-1.835]  [83.27]   
NW (12)  [-1.839]  [0.873]  [2.291]  [-1.360]  [80.98]   
s-HH  [-0.918]  [1.267]  [1.174]  [-0.848]  [40.26]    . 
. 
joint estimation  -  Unemployment 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.2986  -0.1251  0.0012  0.0077  0.9870  0.985 
t-stat  [-0.805]  [-0.301]  [0.522]  [2.458]  [173]   
white  [-0.771]  [-0.298]  [0.786]  [2.895]  [149]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-0.472]  [-0.462]  [0.973]  [2.991]  [83.63]   
NW (12)  [-0.501]  [-0.339]  [0.881]  [3.005]  [88.19]   
s-HH  [-0.257]  [-0.398]  [0.555]  [1.323]  [53.01]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.1502  -0.0852  0.0861  0.0102  0.9634  0.933 
t-stat  [0.027]  [-0.867]  [1.710]  [0.134]  [76.10]   
white  [0.027]  [-0.812]  [2.189]  [0.137]  [59.75]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [0.031]  [-1.700]  [5.122]  [0.208]  [89.14]   
NW (12)  [0.027]  [-0.968]  [2.819]  [0.158]  [49.62]   
s-HH  [0.013]  [-1.139]  [1.719]  [0.075]  [25.62]   
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 5.7 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
recursive resid std err  
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
CUSUM sqr 5% significance  
 
Recursive  resid:  recursive 
residuals. std err.: standard error 
bands. CUSUM sqr: cumulative 
sum  of  squared  residuals.  5% 
significance: bands denoting the 
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to  the  cusum  of  squared 
residuals statistics plot.  
Figure 5.4 
 
Therefore, we consider a non linear version of model (5.11’) allowing for two different regimes 
determined by slope of the term structure, i.e. the difference between the 10-year and the 3-month   178 
yields
115. The slope of the yield curve is believed to reflect agents’ expectations about the future 
stance of monetary policy and, thus, it is thought to anticipate business cycle movements (Estrella 
and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1997). Conditioning the test of the Lucas hypothesis 
to the slope of the term structure means to relating agent’s expectations to a leading economic 
indicator  (Stock  and  Watson,  1989).  In  particular,  the  yield  curve  represents  a  link  between 
monetary policy, the financial sector and the real economy. We recall that the peculiar aspect of this 
methodology  is  to  consider  expectations  on  a  double  level.  At  the  first  level,  the         level, 
expectations are modelled through Kalman filtering the money supply function in order to isolate 
prediction errors (Section 5.4). At the second level, the       level, expectations have a         
        nature in that they are intended to capture the future evolution of the economy as reflected 
by the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates.       expectations interpret a perspective 
sentiment  present  throughout  the  economy,  a  broad  view  regarding  the  economic  conditions, 
including political as well as institutional, or technological, factors.  
A crucial issues to be pointed out is that the       level analysis of expectations is performed on a 
monetary policy function expressed in terms of money supply. While, the       level expectations 
are  inferred  by  the  evolution  of  the  yield  curve,  whose  dynamics  depends  not  only  on  the 
determination of the policy rate, or a measure closely related to it as it may be the effective federal 
funds rate, but also on the abovementioned factors. The choice of the monetary policy function in 
terms of the money stock is thus intended to separate two different levels of expectations’ analysis. 
We aim at distinguishing the  expectations regarding the operational procedure  of the monetary 
authority in setting the money supply from the overall movements displayed by the yield curve.  
Although there exists an unquestionable inverse relationship linking money supply and short rates, 
the evolution of the yield curve, as well as the determination of expectations at a       level, 
depend on a greater variety of factors. So that we believe our approach is immune from the criticism 
that the       and       structures for expectations share a common root
116.  
The threshold methodology implies that the same equation is estimated in two different regimes 
depending on the values assumed by a predetermined variable (τ ), i.e. the yield spread which is a 
measure of the slope of the term structure.  
 
( )
( ) 




> + + + ⋅ + + =
≤ + + + ⋅ + + =
− − − − −
− − − − −
τ τ α α η γ η γ α
τ τ α α η γ η γ α
ˆ
ˆ
1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 1 | 0 0
1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 1 | 0 0
                
                
                     
                     
                                   (5.12) 
 
                                                 
115 Similar results are obtained if the threshold variable is the spread between the 5-year and the 3-month yields. 
116 If we had chosen to apply the Kalman filter to a monetary policy rule (Section 5.4) expressed in terms of the policy rate the 
criticism might have been appropriate.   179 
Regime 1 is determined by values of the yield spread below the estimated threshold (τˆ ); hence, the 
first regime is characterized by a flat or downward sloping yield curve. The conventional view tends 
to associate such a regime to an imminent slowdown in economic activity. On the other hand, 
regime 2 is defined on high values of the spread (positive slope of the yield curve) reflecting an 
accommodative stance of monetary policy. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), as well as Estrella and 
Mishkin (1997), present important evidence that the yield spread is related to the future evolution of 
real  activity.  In  particular,  a  downward  sloping  or  a  flat  yield  curve  augments  the  odds  of  a 
recession in the near future. Along the same line Wright (2006) finds a link between the shape of 
the yield curve and the probability of future economic slowdowns. 
Estimation results for regime 1 (below the estimated threshold) are show in Table 5.8.  
. 
REGIME 1 - IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.4327  0.0291  -0.0118  0.0080  0.9039  0.860 
t-stat  [1.603]  [1.524]  [-1.809]  [2.246]  [19.60]   
white  [2.083]  [2.245]  [-1.893]  [2.358]  [21.60]  obs 74 
HH (12)  [2.857]  [2.644]  [-1.838]  [5.067]  [19.49]   
NW (12)  [2.222]  [2.004]  [-1.693]  [2.533]  [18.95]   
sHH  [0.912]  [1.975]  [-1.557]  [1.630]  [12.74]    . 
. 
REGIME 1 – TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.6857  0.0242  -0.0119  0.0017  0.9844  0.968 
t-stat  [-1.584]  [2.651]  [-2.632]  [0.971]  [100]   
white  [-1.531]  [2.373]  [-2.188]  [1.017]  [97.12]  obs 355 
HH (12)  [-1.474]  [2.134]  [-1.993]  [1.448]  [93.61]   
NW (12)  [-1.463]  [2.256]  [-2.080]  [1.194]  [92.99]   
sHH  [-0.809]  [2.928]  [-2.967]  [0.777]  [51.40]    . 
. 
REGIME 1 – Unemployment 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.2949  -0.0472  0.0232  -0.0063  0.9967  0.985 
t-stat  [0.071]  [-2.188]  [2.177]  [-1.547]  [146]   
white  [0.073]  [-1.914]  [1.790]  [-1.611]  [145]  obs 362 
HH (12)  [0.081]  [-1.761]  [1.708]  [-1.842]  [129]   
NW (12)  [0.084]  [-1.875]  [1.812]  [-1.692]  [143]   
sHH  [0.033]  [-2.399]  [2.409]  [-1.356]  [70.28]    . 
. 
REGIME 1 - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.1966  -0.0126  0.0622  0.0174  1.0198  0.913 
t-stat  [-2.558]  [-2.175]  [2.148]  [1.553]  [47.98]   
white  [-2.615]  [-2.551]  [2.484]  [1.566]  [43.52]  obs 248 
HH (12)  [-6.869]  [-2.325]  [2.147]  [4.158]  [37.65]   
NW (12)  [-3.198]  [-2.257]  [2.189]  [1.843]  [43.36]   
sHH  [-1.532]  [-2.305]  [2.357]  [1.217]  [39.38]   
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 5.8   180 
The Lucas hypothesis seems to be respected regardless the variable used to measure the business 
cycle. The conditional variance of money growth affects real variables through the coefficients of 
the  prediction-error  term  ( 1 γ ).  The  direct  influence  of  the  conditional  variance  implied  by  the 
Friedman  hypothesis  is  not  significant  with  the  only  exception  for  the  IP  gap  equation,  where 
surprisingly  the  effect  of  the  conditional  variance  appears  to  work  in  the  opposite  direction. 
However,  this  is  far  from  being  paradoxical  as  long  as  when  the  economy  is  going  toward  a 
recession,  a peak in the variability of inflation, captured by the conditional variance of money 
growth, might act as a stimulus to economic activity, or might be interpreted as a sign that the 
recession is neither severe nor long-lasting. 
Generated variables in the above regression might invalidate inference procedures. To handle with 
it  not  only  we  propose  alternative  measures  of  the  standard  errors  (White,  1980;  Hansen  and 
Hodrick, 1980; Newey and West, 1987; the simplified Hansen and Hodrick), but also we perform a 
Monte Carlo simulation. Results show a clear convergence of both Lucas parameters towards the 
true values just after few thousands replications ( 0 γ  in the left panel;  1 γ  in the right panel). The top 
diagrams show the simulation with 15000 replications, while in the bottom diagrams we run 50000 
replications. 
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Figure 5.5 
 
The estimation of regime 1 has also been performed after ruling out the conditional variance of 
money prediction errors. Results are reported in Table 5.9. There is a clear confirmation that the 
Lucas hypothesis is not rejected by the data when the yield curve is either flat or downward sloping. 
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. 
REGIME 1 - IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0414  0.0245  -0.0123    0.9554  0.843 
t-stat  [1.152]  [2.963]  [-3.007]    [58.41]   
white  [1.143]  [2.599]  [-2.449]    [49.35]  obs 74 
NW (12)  [1.143]  [2.438]  [-2.279]    [50.81]   
. 
. 
REGIME 1 – TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.5250  0.0254  -0.0125    0.9878  0.968 
t-stat  [-1.261]  [2.852]  [-2.861]    [104]   
white  [-1.183]  [2.529]  [-2.342]    [98.19]  obs 355 
NW (12)  [-1.126]  [2.391]  [-2.207]    [93.54]    . 
. 
REGIME 1 – Unemployment 
0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.1997  -0.0532  0.0265  0.9998  0.985 
t-stat  [-0.513]  [-2.503]  [2.525]  [153] 
white  [-0.535]  [-2.243]  [2.124]  [147]  obs 362 
NW (12)  [-0.557]  [-2.151]  [2.124]  [152] 
. 
. 
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 5.9 (a) 
 
. 
REGIME 1 - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.0843  -0.0179  0.0522    1.0085  0.911 
t-stat  [-3.209]  [-1.891]  [1.841]    [50.35]   
white  [-3.237]  [-1.941]  [1.833]    [45.45]  obs 248 
NW (12)  [-3.298]  [-1.872]  [1.778]    [45.00]   
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 5.9 (b) 
 
Regime 2 is characterized by high, and positive, values of the yield spread. Regime 2 estimates are 
reported in Table 5.10.  
The monetary accommodation reflected in the upward sloping term structure is usually expected to 
stimulate economic activity thus pushing the economy on an expansionary path. On the other hand, 
a positive slope of the yield curve implies a positive risk premium required by investors to move to 
longer horizons. In particular, Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008) find evidence that the slope of the 
nominal term structure is due to a positive inflation risk premium. In case of perfect foresight about 
future spot rates, in fact, the arbitrage mechanism would equalize holding period returns along the 
entire spectrum of maturities implying a flat yield curve. In a context characterized by imperfect 
information, uncertainty causes the term structure to deviate from its risk-neutral implied shape. 
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. 
REGIME 2 - IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.2375  0.0059  0.0009  -0.0371  0.9436  0.904 
t-stat  [-2.683]  [0.170]  [0.064]  [-2.949]  [57.55]   
white  [-2.902]  [0.220]  [0.096]  [-3.213]  [48.44]  obs 394 
HH (12)  [-2.731]  [0.214]  [0.090]  [-3.033]  [62.92]   
NW (12)  [-2.685]  [0.194]  [0.082]  [-3.045]  [52.57]   
sHH  [-1.558]  [0.136]  [0.054]  [-2.332]  [39.26]    . 
. 
REGIME 2 – TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.4740  0.0351  -0.0076  -0.0041  1.012  0.982 
t-stat  [0.787]  [0.815]  [-0.480]  [-2.502]  [73.79]   
white  [0.690]  [1.023]  [-0.694]  [-3.385]  [64.84]  obs 113 
HH (12)  [1.948]  [1.039]  [-0.814]  [-4.501]  [181]   
NW (12)  [0.911]  [1.044]  [-0.711]  [-3.227]  [85.78]   
sHH  [0.930]  [0.603]  [-0.363]  [-2.308]  [86.72]    . 
. 
REGIME 2 – Unemployment 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.3876  -0.0263  0.0131  0.0096  0.9874  0.938 
t-stat  [0.394]  [-0.223]  [0.301]  [2.114]  [77.32]   
white  [0.246]  [-0.249]  [0.412]  [3.314]  [46.66]  obs 106 
HH (12)  [0.476]  [-0.237]  [0.439]  [5.850]  [63.61]   
NW (12)  [0.325]  [-0.214]  [0.381]  [4.067]  [50.27]   
sHH  [0.452]  [-0.157]  [0.217]  [1.904]  [95.88]   
. 
. 
REGIME 2 - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.1910  -0.0211  0.0983  0.0169  0.9416  0.953 
t-stat  [2.664]  [-0.842]  [1.026]  [1.745]  [63.27]   
white  [2.906]  [-0.780]  [1.119]  [2.050]  [51.02]  obs 220 
HH (12)  [6.212]  [-0.752]  [1.164]  [4.223]  [39.94]   
NW (12)  [3.392]  [-0.767]  [1.165]  [2.377]  [45.15]   
sHH  [1.618]  [-0.627]  [0.803]  [1.468]  [58.52]   
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 5.10 
 
The joint effect of uncertainty and economic growth is reflected in a greater variability of expected 
inflation, and, thus, in the dynamics of the conditional variance of money growth (Barro, 1976; 
Friedman,  1977).  Therefore,  the  threshold  estimation  of  regime  2  should  return  a  significant 
coefficient  2 α  stressing out the inverse relationship between the money conditional variance and 
the economic cycle. Coefficient  2 α  is, in fact, negative in the equations expressed in terms of the IP 
gap  and  the  total  capacity  utilization;  while,  coefficient  2 α   turns  out  to  be  positive  when  the 
dependent variable is unemployment or its rate of change. As Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson (2007) 
have found, this result can be interpreted in line with our previous findings (Section 4.4.1, Chapter 
4) that there exists an inverse correlation between term premia and output growth.   183 
5.6   Concluding Remarks 
 
In  this  chapter  we  propose  and  implement  an  innovative  method  for  expectations  in  order  to 
investigate the relationship between money and output. Previous evidence tends to support the view 
that money is effective in stimulating real economic activity; however, some contrarian evidence 
suggests the issue is still controversial. In particular, the high correlation between money and output 
does  not  reveal  an  unambiguous  direction  of  causality.  From  a  policy  perspective,  in  fact,  the 
aforementioned positive correlation can derive from two opposite phenomena. On the one hand, the 
monetary authority can govern the supply of money to influence the future economic conjuncture; 
on the other hand, the central bank can manage the dynamics of monetary aggregates in response of 
past macroeconomic conditions. In addition, the weaknesses associated to traditional approaches 
call for an effective role of expectations. 
After estimating a time-varying monetary policy rule where expectations are analysed at a       
level, we condition the examination of the money-output relationship to the shape of the  yield 
curve. In particular, in this chapter we test the Lucas (1973) hypothesis against Friedman’s (1977). 
Within a non linear approach, we find evidence that the conditional variance of money growth 
affects real output through the  coefficients on the forecast error term in the  Lucas type output 
equation if the shape of the term structure reflects expectations of a slowdown in economic activity. 
The Lucas hypothesis implies a negative relationship between the variance of nominal shocks, quite 
low when a flat, or inverted, yield curve reflects a clear and severe monetary policy tightening, and 
the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, quite large when policy tightens according to 
the traditional keyenesian asymmetry. 
Moreover,  the  conditional  variance  of  money  growth,  which  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  inflation 
variability, appears to affect directly output when the term structure is upward sloping, i.e. investors 
require  a  positive  term  premium.  The  Friedman  hypothesis  implies  that  high  inflation  tends  to 
reduce  the  natural  level  of  output  since  the  re-adjusting  preferences  of  the  policy  makers  will 
distress the real interest rate thus reallocating resources and pushing the economy out of the steady-
state equilibrium level. 
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Appendix A5.I  -  Data 
 
All data have monthly frequency; the sample starts in January 1966. The core econometric analysis, after 
Kalman filtering, is thus performed from January 1967 since we rule out the first 12 observations.  
The U.S. series of seasonally adjusted industrial production is from the FRED database (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data). The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate series (civilian unemployment), as well as the 
total capacity utilization index, are from the FRED database; the source is the U.S. Department of Labour 
(Bureau of Labour Statistics). The series are covariance stationary as suggested by both the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  test  and  the  Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  test.  (as  usual       stands  for  “rate  of 
growth”). Also results from the Phillips and Perron test is reported in the Table.  
 
. 
Stationarity 
adf  (aic) 
[lag] 
adf  (sic) 
[lag] 
adf  (hq) 
[lag]  pp (b)  pp (q)  kpss (b)  kpss (q) 
Ffr  (0.0253)*  
[16] 
(0.0942)* 
[2] 
(0.0883)* 
[13]  (0.1576)*  (0.1397)*  0.2652*  0.2161* 
y3m grw3  (0.0001)* 
[17] 
(0.0000)* 
[7] 
(0.0002)* 
[16]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.0521*  0.0454* 
M1 grw3  (0.0548)* 
[17] 
(0.0452)* 
[12] 
(0.0452)* 
[12]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.5193*  0.4683* 
M1 grw  (0.0043)*      
[12] 
(0.0210)*   
[13] 
(0.0043)*      
[12]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.7103*  0.9431* 
M2 grw  (0.0036)*       
[17] 
(0.1160)*      
[13] 
(0.1160)*     
[13]  (0.0465)*  (0.0440)*       0.9783*  1.3169* 
MB grw  (0.0879)*    
[13] 
(0.0879)*    
[13] 
(0.0879)*    
[13]  (0.0088)*  (0.0163)*  0.4564*  0.5296 
infl(3)             
(cpi grw3) 
(0.0751)* 
[16] 
(0.0729)* 
[13] 
(0.0729)* 
[13]  (0.0000)*  (0.0001)*  0.5873*  0.5244* 
IP gap (HP)  (0.0000)*    
[9] 
(0.0000)*    
[3] 
(0.0000)*    
[3]  (0.0001)*  (0.0000)*  0.3804*  0.4213* 
unemp  (0.0494)* 
[4] 
(0.0494)* 
[4] 
(0.0494)* 
[4]  (0.1347)*  (0.1429)*  0.1849*  0.2589* 
unemp grw  (0.0001)* 
[16] 
(0.0058)* 
[12] 
(0.0001)* 
[16]  (0.0011)*  (0.0007)*  0.2707*  0.3901* 
log(tcu)  (0.0006)* 
[9] 
(0.0066)* 
[3] 
(0.0066)* 
[3]  (0.0176)*  (0.0189)*  0.4238*  0.5549* 
Sample: jan 1967 - dec 2007; adf: augmented Dickey Fuller test. pp: Phillips-Perron test. kpss:Kwiatkoswki, 
Phillips, Schmidt Shin test. * exogenous: intercept. aic: Akaike. sic: Schwarz. hq: Hannan Quinn. b: Barlett. 
q: quadratic special kernel. lag:number of lags in the auxiliary adf regression. y3m grw3:quarterly growth of 
the 3-month yield. M1 grw3: quarterly growth of monetary aggregate M1. M1 grw: annual growth of monetary 
aggregate M1. M2 grw: annual growth of monetary aggregate M2. MB grw: annual growth of the monetary 
base. infl(3):quarterly growth of the seasonally adjusted consumption price index(cpi), urban consumers, all 
items.  IP  gap  (HP):  industrial  production  gap  obtained  by  applying  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter. 
unemp:unemployment  rate.  unemp  grw:  annual  change  in  the  unemployment  rate.  log(tcu):  log  total 
capacity utilization.  
. 
 
Table 5.11 
 
The ADF test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root; while the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be 
rejected by the KPSS test. To match the monthly frequency of data, the rule of thumb selected number of 
lags in the auxiliary regression is either 11 or 12. The automatic lag selection based on different criteria 
(Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn) is consistent with our choice. Unit root test results obtained with the 
automatic lag selections are similar. The critical values of the KPSS test are 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%), and   185 
0.347 (10%) when the intercept is included in the auxiliary model. The compute KPSS statistics never falls 
in the critical region. The KPSS test tends to reject the null of stationarity for the unemployment series.  
In Table 5.12 the stationarity tests are carried out on both the forecast error and the conditional variance 
series obtained from the monetary policy function expressed in terms of money growth. As mentioned above 
in  the  text  both  the  time-varying  parameter  model  estimated  by  Kalman  filtering  and  the  vector 
autoregressive model of order 9 have been employed in this chapter. 
 
. 
Stationarity 
adf  (aic) 
[lag] 
adf  (sic) 
[lag] 
adf  (hq) 
[lag]  pp (b)  pp (q)  kpss (b)  kpss (q) 
forecast  error 
VAR (9) 
(0.0000)* 
[11] 
(0.0000)* 
m 
[3] 
(0.0000)* 
[11]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.2636*  0.2681* 
conditional 
variance VAR(9) 
(0.0000)* 
[4] 
(0.0000)* 
[1] 
(0.0000)* 
[4]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.3061*  0.3221* 
forecast      
error (kf) 
(0.0000)* 
[6] 
(0.0000)* 
[4] 
(0.0000)* 
[4]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.0733*  0.1093* 
conditional 
variance (kf) 
(0.0000)* 
[3] 
(0.0000)* 
[3] 
(0.0000)* 
[3]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.1686*  0.1728* 
Sample:  jan  1967  -  dec  2007.  adf:  augmented  Dickey  Fuller  test.  lag:  number  of  lags  in the  auxiliary  adf 
regression. pp: Phillips Perron test. kpss:Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin test. *exogenous: intercept. aic: 
Akaike; sic: Schwarz. hq: Hannan Quinn. b: Barlett. q: quadratic special kernel. VAR(n): from the n-th order 
vector autoregressive model. kf:from Kalman filter approach. 
. 
Table 5.12 
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Appendix A5.II    
 
In  Table  5.13  we  report  the  estimations  of  equation  (5.11’)  after  deriving  the  prediction  error  and  the 
respective  conditional  variance  series  from  a  vector  autoregressive  model  of  order  9.  The  conditional 
variance series is obtained computing the square of the residuals in the money equation of the VAR(9) 
system (Piazzesi, 2003). Money growth, the inflation rate, and the quarterly change of the T-Bill rate are the 
endogenous variables; the constant is the only exogenous variable. The number of lags has been selected on 
the basis of the Akaike and Schwarz criteria. Results tend to support the Friedman hypothesis rather than the 
Lucas’ one. The dynamics of the real variables seems to be lowered by the conditional variance of money 
growth, which is regarded to be a proxy for price volatility. 
 
. 
joint estimation  -  IP gap (HP) - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0473  -0.0491  0.0190  -0.0194  0.9497  0.905 
t-stat  [0.150]  [-0.283]  [0.139]  [-1.074]  [66.56]   
white  [0.153]  [-0.264]  [0.259]  [-2.332]  [55.23]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [0.110]  [-0.234]  [0.211]  [-1.791]  [188.0]   
NW (12)  [0.109]  [-0.232]  [0.224]  [-2.239]  [62.41]   
sHH  [0.045]  [-0.271]  [0.229]  [-0.722]  [23.57]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - TCU - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0819  0.0190  -0.0002  -0.0346  0.9813  0.974 
t-stat  [2.472]  [0.101]  [-0.106]  [-1.748]  [130]   
white  [2.329]  [0.096]  [-0.202]  [-3.611]  [122]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [1.600]  [0.096]  [-0.178]  [-2.412]  [84.32]   
NW (12)  [1.549]  [0.089]  [-0.184]  [-2.935]  [81.73]   
sHH  [0.778]  [0.096]  [-0.174]  [-1.225]  [40.95]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - Unemployment - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0580  -0.0344  -0.0008  0.0776  0.9903  0.985 
t-stat  [1.656]  [-0.747]  [-0.236]  [1.625]  [176]   
white  [1.499]  [-0.669]  [-0.403]  [3.233]  [147]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [0.854]  [-0.784]  [-0.520]  [4.039]  [81.21]   
NW (12)  [0.909]  [-0.681]  [-0.433]  [3.691]  [86.19]   
sHH  [0.504]  [-0.733]  [-0.398]  [1.088]  [53.49]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - Unemployment grw - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.0397  -0.0411  0.0038  0.0253  0.9626  0.934 
t-stat  [-0.202]  [-0.381]  [0.458]  [2.245]  [79.95]   
white  [-0.207]  [-0.377]  [0.808]  [4.536]  [64.59]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-0.150]  [-0.571]  [1.449]  [4.195]  [102]   
NW (12)  [-0.146]  [-0.513]  [1.086]  [3.948]  [54.29]   
sHH  [-0.061]  [-0.365]  [0.755]  [1.538]  [26.23]   
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 5.13   187 
Conclusion 
 
 
Economic  theory  has  been  remarkably  innovative  during  the  second  half  of  the  last  century. 
Similarly,  there  has  also  been  an  outstanding  development  of  technical  methods  to  measure 
scientifically  social  phenomena.  For  instance,  advancements  in  biometrics  as  well  as  in 
econometrics have contributed to the improvement of medical and economic analysis respectively. 
Furthermore,  the  classical  interest  of  exploiting  interrelations  among  sciences  has  renewed  and 
developed further, emphasizing the multi-disciplinary nature of each field of research particularly in 
social sciences. The multi-disciplinary approach was already familiar to Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) 
who was a moral philosopher before being a social scientist and dedicating his efforts to the science 
of economics. As a matter of fact, the merger between microeconomics and macroeconomics has 
given  life  to  micro-founded  macro  models;  cognitive  sciences  have  been  coupled  with  both 
microeconomics and finance generating experimental economics and behavioral finance. Economic 
theory has progressively increased the interaction with statistics and mathematics; in that respect an 
independent discipline has emerged: econometrics. Econometrics has further specialized in macro- 
and  micro-econometrics;  more  recently  spatial  econometrics,  a  new  branch,  has  appeared.  The 
advancements  in  computer  technology  have  allowed  economists  to  count  on  sophisticated,  and 
computationally feasible, techniques shortening the step from theoretical to applied econometrics.  
In this thesis I extensively use econometric methods for the empirical analysis of macroeconomics 
and finance; in particular, I deal with several issues recently arisen in applied economic research. 
The term structure of interest rates, which is a core issue throughout the thesis, represents the bridge 
between macroeconomics and finance. The short end of the term structure is directly influenced by 
announcements of the monetary authority regarding the level of the policy rate; empirical evidence 
suggests, in fact, that the short end is mostly affected by the evolution of macro factors (Ang and 
Piazzesi, 2003) which are observed by the monetary authority before policy decisions. Movements 
of the long end of the term structure are more closely related to the effect of expectations and 
financial factors. The long end of the term structure also captures the dynamics of term premia 
anchored  to  expected  inflation.  For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  shape  of  the  term  structure  is 
considered  a  leading  economic  indicator  which  contains  valuable  information  about  the  future 
evolution of both inflation and output. 
In Chapter 2 we provide evidence that exists a close association between macroeconomic variables 
and the financial factors underlying the term structure of interest rates. In particular, consistently 
with what stressed above, we find that the slope of the term structure reflects the changes in the 
policy rate as implied by a Taylor-type central bank reaction function. This interpretation is also   188 
theory-consistent since the slope is computed as the difference between smooth and persistent long 
yields and extremely dynamic short yields. The level of the term structure is associated to the rate of 
inflation targeted by the monetary authority. In this respect, since it is measured along the entire 
spectrum of term structure maturities, the level may well be informative about eventual inflation 
risk  premia.  Finally,  we  provide  substantial  evidence  that  curvature,  which  describes  the  term 
structure at medium maturities, is related to the cyclical conditions of the economy. Although few 
attempts have been proposed, the interpretation of curvature is still controversial in the economic 
literature.  Dewachter  and  Lyrio  (2002)  put  forward  the  idea  that  curvature  represents  an 
independent monetary policy factor. Similarly, Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) relate curvature to 
monetary  policy  shocks.  Dewachter,  Lyrio  and  Maes  (2006)  believe  curvature  is  more  closely 
related to the real stance of monetary policy. Giese (2008) argue that curvature is informative about 
the future path of interest rates; while, Hordhal, Tristani and Vestin (2006) find that both inflation 
and  output  display  important  effect  on  medium  term  maturities.  Future  research  needs  to 
concentrate  on  the  interpretation  of  curvature  corroborating  the  interpretation  with  more  robust 
evidence. Nevertheless, we believe that our interpretation of curvature as a cyclical indicator might 
be consistent with all above suggestions. We think, in fact, that yields’ dynamics at medium term 
maturities represents an intermediate step of the transmission of monetary policy actions along the 
entire length of the yield curve thus synthesizing the evolutionary shape of the yield curve over the 
business cycle. We feel our analysis is robust since we also document that curvature from the real 
term structure reflects business cycle fluctuations. 
Examining the term structure of interest rates primarily means to figure out how long term yields 
evolve after observing short yield movements. The expectations hypothesis might be helpful in this 
respect since it implies that long yields are weighted averages of risk-adjusted short term yields. 
Unfortunately, from times to times, the expectations theory has found little empirical support. In 
Chapter 3 we propose a non linear approach to assess the informative content of the yield spread. 
We  find  that  the  predictive  ability  of  the  yield  spread  increases  substantially  if  both  agents’ 
expectations about the incoming stance of monetary policy and individuals’ perception of risk are 
explicitly considered.  Future research may  focus on whether there is a correlation between the 
corroboration of the expectations hypothesis and some phases of the business cycle. Moreover, 
along  the  path  traced  Mankiw  and  Miron  (1986)  there  is  further  space  to  investigate  the 
expectations  hypothesis  in  relation  to  different  monetary  regimes.  In  particular,  it  would  be 
interesting  to  gauge  whether  testing  the  expectations  hypothesis  before  and  after  the  European 
monetary union leads to different results. Finally, it would be appealing to figure out whether either   189 
financial integration or financial innovation have affected the relationship between long and short 
yields in transition economies, for instance in east European countries.  
Actually,  a  refinement  in  the  analysis  of  the  predictive  power  of  the  spread  has  been  already 
proposed. The yield spread, in fact, has been decomposed into a term premium and an expectations 
based component; such a decomposition allows examining separately the effect of risk and that of 
expectations  regarding  the  future  stance  of  monetary  policy.  Predicting  future  output  using  the 
aforementioned decomposition has been useful; however, whether term premia play an active role 
in the predictive model is still controversial (Ang, Piazzesi and Wei, 2006). Hamilton and Kim 
(2002) find weak evidence that interest rates volatility can be regarded as a potential determinant of 
future output growth. In Chapter 4 we focus on the predictive content carried by the conditional 
volatility of term premia, which we consider a measure of financial distress. Data evidence tends to 
suggest that term premia variability is inversely correlated with future economic activity. Future 
empirical research based on survey data could provide with a deeper analysis of the predictive 
power of term premia; basically different sides of risk could be worked out from a single measure 
of term premia. From a theoretical perspective, instead, along the line highlighted by Estrella (2004) 
structural DSGE models, as the one by Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2008) could be augmented 
in order to work out a link between term premia and economic activity.   
Finally, we challenge to read the neoclassical synthesis under a new perspective. In Chapter 5, in 
fact, we examine whether money, or some measures of money, helps to anticipate the business 
cycle. Specifically, we condition the test of the Lucas (1973) hypothesis to the informative content 
carried by the slope of the term structure. The Lucas hypothesis, that there is an inverse correlation 
between the variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, 
tends to prevail when the yield curve is either flat or negatively sloped. While, the alternative 
hypothesis that inflation variability reduces the natural level of output (Friedman, 1977) dominates 
when the yield curve is upward sloping.  
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